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Multi-party computation (MPC) is a way of computing on private
data without revealing the data itself. To do this, data is “secret-
shared” amongst a set of mutually-distrusting parties, which per-
form local computations and interactive processes to evaluate a
function. MPC protocols are diverse and offer a variety of differ-
ent security guarantees, and employ different methodologies to
optimize for different aspects of the evaluation. The goal of this
work is to show how to reduce communication costs involved in
different areas of MPC.
An access structure defines which sets of parties a so-called
adversary can corrupt such that the inputs remain private and
the outputs are revealed to the right parties; one type of access
structure is called Q2, under which assumption there are many
classical results on what sorts of functions can be evaluated. One
of the contributions of this work is to show how special “error-
detection” properties that apply in the context of Q2 access struc-
tures can be used to define MPC protocols that improve on the
efficiency of classical results.
In the so-called preprocessing model, parties evaluate a func-
tion on random inputs, and later “derandomize” using the real
(private) inputs. This model is popular in MPC as function eval-
uation is expensive, whereas derandomization is cheap. In this
thesis, a generic method is given for outsourcing preprocessing to
a set of servers, which means that low-powered clients who wish
to evaluate functions on their data can do so.
The final contribution is a protocol that allows parties to mix
two different MPC techniques called garbled circuits and secret-
sharing in a secure way, even when the adversary deviates ar-
bitrarily from the protocol description. Mixing these methods is
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Cryptography is becoming more and more important in our everyday lives, as the amount
of data we produce by living in a digital world perpetually increases. Indeed, many com-
panies go to great lengths to seek out and exploit personal data to gain an advantage
in an increasingly competitive global market. Moreover, breaches of personal data are
becoming ever more frequent.
In the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) mandates
that companies should disclose data breaches, and provides a legal framework for the
secure storage and use of personal data. This means that fortunately companies are
now obliged to provide a significant measure of control of personal data to the users of
their services.
Even if users are given access to privacy controls, it does not mean they will make
good use of them: with smart home devices (the Internet of Things (IOT)) it has got to
the point where the general population is not only happy to have companies listen to
their every conversation, but are willing to pay them for the privilege.
Cryptography is one tool, and is indeed the main tool used today, that can be used to
redress the balance back towards end users: while it seems the wont of the commercial
world to strip consumers of as much privacy as possible to gain competitive market
advantage, the job of cryptographers, one might say, is to put it back again.
Historically, the study of cryptography has chiefly involved showing how to keep
data safe while in transit or at rest. By contrast, this thesis concerns methods of keep-
ing data secure during computation, and finding efficient ways of doing so. This, per-
haps counterintuitive, idea has its roots in the late 1980s when the first results were




The specific tool under consideration in this work is known as multi-party computa-
tion (MPC), which is a method of computing on private data held by different entities
so that the only information learnt by each party at the end is the result of the com-
putation and whatever can be inferred from the output and each party’s own private
input. By construction, the protocol always computes the correct function when all par-
ties are honest. Additionally, the protocol must provide security guarantees that refer
to the level of tolerance of misbehaviour by corrupt parties the protocol can withstand
while ensuring correctness of the computation and the secrecy of inputs. Certain theo-
retical impossibility results preclude the existence of protocols for guarantees that are
“too strong”, i.e. when the corrupt parties are assumed to have too much power.
MPC has many applications and is particularly useful in situations in which pri-
vacy is paramount. A popular example is that of computing on private medical data,
in which multiple hospitals or data centres hold sensitive data on patients, and us-
ing MPC, researchers can analyse the data and perform aggregate statistical analysis
without directly learning the private information of individual data subjects. On the
commercial side, it has been shown how to use MPC: for private contact discovery, al-
lowing two users of a messaging service to discover they are both users of the service
without revealing this metadata to the service provider [DMP11]; in machine learn-
ing, to allow a model trained on a private dataset to be queried on a client’s private
input [MRSV19]; in online advertising, to correlate purchases with whether or not an
advert has been shown, to determine its success rate [PSSZ15]; and in private auctions,
of which the quintessential example is the Danish Sugar Beet auction [BCD+09], and
without mention of which no thesis on MPC would be complete.
1.1 This work
In this thesis, various aspects of secret-sharing-based MPC are explored and improved
on. The focus is on evaluating arithmetic circuits on secret inputs in a finite field, i.e.
addition and multiplication, but many of the protocols can be executed over F2, the
Galois field of two elements. Computation over a large prime field is often used to em-
ulate arithmetic over Z; one of the major downsides of protocols designed to allow for
computation of such circuits is that non-linear operations – such as comparisons of
secret-shared data – can be expensive in terms of communication; one of the goals of
this thesis to to reduce this cost. The other main goal is to provide efficient protocols
for so-called Q2 access structures by taking information-theoretic protocols and using
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computational assumptions to improve on them.
In Chapter 3, proofs of folklore results that apply to linear secret-sharing schemes
realizing Q2 access structures are given. These theoretical results are used to define a
practically-efficient actively-secure opening procedure, which is put to good use in later
chapters.
The preprocessing model involves splitting computation into an expensive prepro-
cessing phase and a cheap online phase. Before discussing specific MPC protocols, Chap-
ter 4 provides an overview of how preprocessing is used in MPC in different ways, and
gives general constructions that are used throughout the remainder of the thesis.
Chapter 5 gives a protocol to “transfer” secret-shared preprocessed data from a set
of servers to a set of clients very cheaply, with the idea that low-powered clients can
use the preprocessed data to evaluate a circuit by executing the online phase, without
having to execute the preprocessing phase themselves.
Using the results from Chapter 3, in Chapter 6 a computationally-secure protocol
that uses replicated secret-sharing to evaluate a circuit is given. Noting the inefficiency
of replicated secret-sharing for a large number of parties, in Chapter 7 the results are
generalized to an arbitrary secret-sharing scheme, which scales much better with the
number of parties.
Finally, in Chapter 8, a “mixed” protocol is given, that allows switching between gar-
bled circuits and secret-sharing, with active security, in the general multi-party setting.
Other works focus on small numbers of parties and involve asymmetric procedures that
do not appear to be amenable to generalization to large numbers of parties in the active
security setting. The experimental results show there is a tradeoff between preprocess-
ing computation and online computation.
1.2 Changes to Submissions and New Contributions
The work of this thesis is taken mostly from the following publications:
• [SSW17] When It’s All Just Too Much: Outsourcing MPC-Preprocessing, published
at IMACC 2019, joint work with Peter Scholl and Nigel Smart.
• [KRSW18] Reducing Communication Channels in MPC, published at SCN 2018,
joint work with Marcel Keller, Dragos Rotaru, and Nigel Smart.
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• [SW19] Error Detection in Monotone Span Programs with Application to Commun-
ication-Efficient Multi-party Computation, published at CT-RSA 2019, joint work
with Nigel Smart.
• [RW19] MArBled Circuits: Mixing Arithmetic and Boolean Circuits with Active Se-
curity, in submission, joint work with Dragos, Rotaru.
Descriptions in the preliminaries borrow from these works. Many of the definitions of
functionalities and protocols (and consequently proofs) are standard and immutable. All
of the proofs have been reformulated and tidied.
Chapter 3 All of the results of this chapter are taken from [KRSW18,SW19], and have
been revised into a general form to unify the works. The proofs in these papers
were completed by me, as were the main results on error-detection for Q2 access
structures.
Chapter 4 Section 4.3 is the protocol from [SW19]; however, Section 4.2 that models
this protocol independently as a functionality, and the proof, are new. Section 4.5,
including FABB and ΠOnline, are standard definitions from the literature, and the
proof is new but is a standard argument. Section 4.6 that defined FPrep is based on a
standard definition of an MPC functionality, for example as described in [LPSY15].
Section 4.7 is new as it explains how to model SPDZ using the newly-defined func-
tionality FOpen.
Chapter 5 Section 5.3 is new. Section 5.4 is unchanged from the publication, although
the proofs (which were completed by me for the publication) have been revised and
unified with the exposition for the Q2 case.
Chapter 6 Most of the results of this chapter are taken from [KRSW18], for which the
main MPC protocol formulation was a joint effort but the proofs were completed by
me. The main difference in this thesis is that a different formulation of functionali-
ties for generating random secrets in Section 6.3 is presented, in order to make the
constructions throughout the thesis more modular. These new formulations, how-
ever, are very well-known and standard results.
Chapter 7 This chapter uses the fact that ΠOnline can be executed for any access struc-
ture, which was the idea in [SW19]. Section 7.3 is new. Section 7.5 is a revision of
the costs given in [SW19] according to the new results from Section 7.3.
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Chapter 8 All of the results of this chapter are taken from [RW19], revised to use the
functionality FPrep, which replaces a functionality FMPC from the original work. The
idea of using cut-and-choose type protocols was a joint effort with my coauthor; the
formulation of the protocols and proofs were my contribution. The implementation,





This chapter gives the standard definitions, notation, and cryptographic primitives that
are used repeatedly throughout this thesis. A large section is devoted to describing the
universal composability (UC) model of Canetti [Can00], since all of the protocols in this
thesis are proved secure in this model.
2.1 General
2.1.1 Notation
The set of integers is denoted by Z, the set of natural numbers (excluding 0) by N, and
the set of real numbers by R. A set is called countable if it is in bijection with a subset of
N. The symbol := is used to denote assignment, so that x := a means that the variable x
is assigned the value a. Intervals are defined in the following ways: [a,b] := {x ∈R : a ≤
x ≤ b}; (a,b] := {x ∈R : a < x ≤ b}; [a,b) := {x ∈R : a ≤ x < b}; and (a,b) := {x ∈R : a < x < b}.
The set [1,n]∩Z= {i ∈Z : 1≤ i ≤ n} is written as [n]. For a real number a ∈R, the value
dae is defined as min{b ∈Z : b ≥ a}, and bac is the value max{b ∈Z : b ≤ a}. The function
log will always be used to refer to the base-2 logarithm. For a set S its cardinality will
be denoted by |S|, and its powerset by 2S. The notation S∗ is used to describe the set of
all words of finite length comprised of symbols in S. An element str of {0,1}∗ is called a
binary string, or simply string, and its length is denoted by |str|. The notation a ∈ A is
used to denote set membership, and the notation A 3 a is used to indicate that A is the
variable under consideration and that only those sets A containing the element a are to
be taken: thus {A ∈ {Ak}k∈[t] : A 3 a} is the set of all sets in {Ak}k∈[t] that contain a.
For any ring R, the value char(R), called the ring’s characteristic, is defined as the
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smallest positive integer c ∈Z such that c·x = 0 for all x ∈ R. The finite field of q elements
will be denoted by Fq; it is well known that q must be a prime power. A field is called
Boolean or binary if it is a (possibly trivial) finite field extension of F2. When the specific
field is unimportant it will be written as F.
Matrices will be written as uppercase letters and vectors in bold1. The space of all
matrices of dimension m×d with entries in the field F is denoted by Fm×d. Vectors are
assumed column vectors (i.e. elements of Fm×1q ) unless otherwise stated. The notation
0 and 1 is used to describe the “all zeroes” and “all ones” vector, respectively; the di-
mensions are omitted where it is clear from context. Vectors in Fmq are identified with
elements of Fm×1q – that is, column vectors are considered to be matrices with a single
column. If M ∈Fm×dq then the element in the jth column of the ith row is written as Mi, j.
If x ∈Fmq then its ith component is written as xi.
The function supp :Fm → [m] is defined to be s 7→ {i ∈ [m] : si 6= 0}, called the support
of s. The Hamming weight of a vector is defined as HW(s) := |supp(s)|. For a matrix
M ∈ Fm×d, its transpose will be denoted by M>. Given a set S ⊆ [m], the submatrix
denoted by MS is the matrix formed by concatenating all rows of M indexed by S. If S
is a singleton set {i} then Mi is used in place of M{i}.




w ∈Fd : 〈v,w〉 = 0
}
where 〈v,w〉 = v> ·w is the standard inner product. A linear map L : V → W between
vector spaces V ⊆Fd and W ⊆Fm can be represented by a matrix M ∈Fm×d, with respect
to some choice of bases for V and W . By the Fundamental Theorem of Linear Algebra,
im(M>)= ker(M)⊥ . The space im(M>) is normally described as the coimage of M and is
denoted by coim(M), which is the space spanned by the rows of M. Similarly, the space
ker(M>) is called the cokernel of M and is denoted by coker(M).
The level of security a protocol offers is parameterized by the computational security
parameter, κ, and the statistical security parameter, σ, which are used to quantify the
ability of an adversary to break the scheme. Roughly speaking, the former is used to
quantify the computational power required to break the scheme and the latter to bound
the ability of the adversary to learn secret information or the chance of cheating without
detection. Later, there will be detailed discussion of how these parameters are used to
define the security of a scheme.
1A special notation will be used for the share vector of a secret in a linear secret-sharing scheme but




The notation ascribed to Bachmann and Landau for describing the asymptotic behaviour
of functions will be used throughout. A function f :Z→R is said to be O(g) if |g| even-
tually bounds | f | from above; that is, if ∃ K ∈R and ∃ N ∈N such that | f (n)| ≤ K · |g(n)|
for all n > N. The function is said to beΩ(h) if |h| eventually bounds | f | from below; that
is, ∃ K ∈R and ∃ N ∈N such that | f (n)| ≥ K · |g(n)| for all n > N. The function f is said
to be Θ( f ′) if it is both O( f ′) and Ω( f ′).
The two primary models of computation considered in this thesis are circuits and
Turing machines. The precise formulations will not be given as they can be found in any
undergraduate textbook on complexity theory, and instead the focus here is on agreeing
the naming conventions used in later chapters.
A circuit is a representation of a function f : Rk1 → Rk2 , where R is a ring and k1 and
k2 are the numbers of inputs and outputs, respectively, as a directed acyclic graph for
which each vertex has indegree 2 and outdegree 1. Vertices are called gates and edges
are called wires, and a certain set of wires are designated as input wires and another set
as output wires. Arithmetic circuits evaluate functions for any ring R, where all gates
represent either addition, +, or multiplication, ×, in R. Boolean circuits are a special
case in which the ring is F2, where addition and multiplication correspond to the logical
operations XOR and AND, respectively. The circuit is evaluated on an input by setting
the appropriate input wires and proceeding gate-by-gate through the graph, executing
the operation defined by the vertex at each step. Circuits are called a uniform model
of computation since all inputs have a fixed length – specifically, the number of input
wires specified in the circuit description.
A Turing machine is an abstract machine that processes inputs on a read-only input
tape according to some program description called a protocol, possibly making use of a
random tape which is another read-only tape that contains an infinitely long string of
uniformly random inputs, and that writes to an output tape. Processing involves reading
from and writing to different tapes, and changing between finitely-many states. Turing
machines are non-uniform, meaning they can take arbitrary length (but polynomially-
bounded) inputs. An interactive Turing machine (ITM) is a Turing machine that has an
input tape that can be written to by other ITMs. Because it depends on inputs provided
by other ITMs, it is said to be reactive.
A Turing machine A is said to have oracle or black-box access to an oracle O if it can
make queries and receive responses but does not observe the internal behaviour – the
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oracle is therefore a “black box” to the querying entity. This access will be denoted by
AO .
A function will be called efficiently computable (or just efficient) if it can be computed
by a Turing machine in polynomial time, which means that the number of reads from
tapes, writes to tapes, and state transitions can be expressed as a polynomial function
of the input length. An algorithm is called probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if it is
probabilistic – i.e. part of the input is a polynomially-bounded random tape – and runs
in polynomial-time. Throughout this thesis, a computation is said to run in polynomial
time, or a probability is said to be negligible, if it is polynomial or negligible, respectively,
as a function of the relevant security parameter.
More generally, an event will be said to occur polynomially-many times if it occurs
a number of times that grows as a polynomial function in the input length. If an event
occurs polynomially-many times but the precise polynomial is unimportant, the function
is denoted by poly :R→R. A function is called negligible, and where the specific function
is unimportant is denoted by negl :N→R, if for every polynomial p ∈Z[X ], there exists
an N ∈N such that negl(n)≤ 1/p(n) for all n > N.
Cryptographic assumptions are based on the idea that superpolynomial-time algo-
rithms become intractible for a large enough input length (i.e. computational security
parameter). The choice to parameterize security in terms of exponential (and negligible)
functions is essentially arbitrary, although a useful feature of such functions is that a
negligible function multiplied by a polynomial function is still negligible. The upshot of
this is that a polynomially-bounded adversary still has negligible advantage in winning
a security game even if it is permitted to observe an event that occurs with negligible
probability a polynomial number of times. Consequently, one can choose the security
parameters in such a way that a computationally-bounded adversary cannot win a se-
curity game except with negligible probability.
The class of non-deterministic polynomial-time algorithms NP can be defined as the
set of problems solvable in polynomial time by a non-deterministic Turing machine (i.e.
those that allow branching in the protocol description), or as the set of problems whose
solutions are verifiable in polynomial time.
2.1.3 Statistics and Probability
An event will be said to occur with overwhelming probability in the security param-
eter λ if it occurs with probability at least 1−negl(λ), and with high probability if it
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occurs with probability at least 1−1/poly(λ).
An ensemble or family of distributions is a sequence of distributions over the same
sample space Ω, parameterized by a subset of N. For a set S, the notation x ← U (S)
is used to say that x is sampled uniformly at random from S. For a distribution D
over a sample space Ω, the notation x ← D (Ω) is used to say that x is sampled from
Ω according to distribution D. More generally, one defines a σ-algebra over Ω and a
distribution D over this algebra which enables sampling a set S ← D (Ω); in this thesis,
this is taken to mean that |S| elements are successively, independently sampled from Ω
according to distribution D. A set S is said to be sampled subject to some constraint if it
is sampled from the space of all possible sets where the constraint holds; for example,
another way of writing that a set {xi}ni=1 ← U (F) is sampled subject to
∑n
i=1 xi = 0 is




i∈[n] xi = 0
})
. In this particular case (that appears
frequently in this thesis), it is equivalent to sampling i∗ ← U ([n]) arbitrarily, sampling
{xi}i∈[n]\{i∗} ← U (F), and setting xi∗ :=−∑i∈[n]\{i∗} xi.
Computational Indistinguishability
Definition 2.1 (Computational indistinguishability). Two ensembles of distributions
D = {Dk}k∈N and E = {Ek}k∈N, where each distribution is over the same sample space Ω,
are said to be computationally indistinguishable or computationally close if for every
PPT Turing machine A, there exists a negligible function negl :N→R and some K ∈N
such that ∣∣∣∣ Prx ← Dk(Ω)[A(x)= 1]− Prx ← Ek(Ω)[A(x)= 1]
∣∣∣∣< negl(k)
for all k > K . This indistinguishability is denoted by D ∼c E .
Statistical Indistinguishability
Definition 2.2 (Statistical distance/Total variation distance). Let D and E be two dis-
tributions over the same sample space Ω. Then the statistical distance is defined as
∆(D,E)= sup
S⊆Ω
∥∥∥∥ PrX ← D(Ω)[X = S]− PrX ← E(Ω)[X = S]
∥∥∥∥∞ .
In the case where Ω is countable, the definition
∆(D,E) := 12 ·
∑
ω∈Ω
∣∣∣∣ Prx ← D(Ω)[x =ω]− Prx ← E(Ω)[x =ω]
∣∣∣∣
can be used, which may be easier to compute.
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Definition 2.3 (Statistical indistinguishability (version 1)). Two families of distribu-
tions D = {Dk}k∈N and E = {Ek}k∈N, where each distribution is over the same sample
space Ω, are said to be statistically indistinguishable or statistically close if there exists
a negligible function negl : N→R for which there exists a K ∈N such that ∆(Dk,Ek) <
negl(k) for all k > K . This indistinguishability is denoted by D ∼s E .
Statistical indistinguishability may be defined in the following way for comparison
with the computational case. Roughly speaking, Definitions 2.3 and 2.4 are equivalent
because the distance between the families of distributions is independent of any distin-
guisher attempting to determine where the distributions differ.
Definition 2.4 (Statistical indistinguishability (version 2)). Two ensembles of distri-
butions D = {Dk}k∈N and E = {Ek}k∈N, where each distribution is over the same sample
space Ω, are said to be statistically indistinguishable or statistically close if for every
(not necessarily polynomial-time) Turing machine A, there exists a negligible function
negl :N→R and some K ∈N such that∣∣∣∣ Prx ← Dk(Ω)[A(x)= 1]− Prx ← Ek(Ω)[A(x)= 1]
∣∣∣∣< negl(k)
for all k > K . This indistinguishability is denoted by D ∼s E .
2.1.4 Combinatorics
Knuth Shuffle
The version by Durstenfield [Dur64] of the algorithm due independently to Knuth [Knu97,





Input Positive integer n ∈N and a seed seed. (The seed is implicitly used to perform all sampling
deterministically.)
Output Random permutation, π ∈ Sn.
Method
1. Set v= (1, . . . ,n).
2. For i := 1 to n−1,
a) Sample j ← U ({i, . . . ,n}).
b) Switch vi and v j.
3. Set π to be the bijection π : [n]→ [n] defined by i 7→ vi.
Figure 2.1: Knuth Shuffle.
2.2 Universal Composability
To prove a protocol is secure, one sets up a “security game” that models possible be-
haviour of an adversary and shows that if there exists an adversary that beats the game
then some well-established computational hardness assumption is false. In the security
game, a challenger poses an arbitrary instance of the computationally-hard problem to
the adversary, which must attempt to solve the problem efficiently with non-negligible
advantage over guessing the answer to the problem, given oracle access to an adversary
against the protocol. If such an adversary can be constructed, then there can be no ad-
versary against the protocol since its existence implies an efficient solution to the hard
problem, which does not exist by assumption. This is known as a reduction, since the
security of the protocol is reduced to the security of the computational assumption. The
protocol is said to be secure under the given assumption.
Security games typically consist of asking the adversary to distinguish between dis-
tributions, in which case the advantage of the adversary in winning the security game
is defined in the following way.
Definition 2.5 (Distinguishing advantage). Let D and E be two distributions. The dis-
tinguishing advantage of a distinguisher A between these distributions is the value
Adv(A) :=
∣∣Pr[A(D)= 1]−Pr[A(E)= 1]∣∣.
Finding the “right” assumption is important from both feasibility and security per-
spectives: if it is not clear how to prove the protocol is secure based on a given hard
13
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problem, then it may be necessary to prove it secure under a stronger assumption. As
an example, consider the hardness assumption called the computational Diffie-Hellman
problem (CDH):
Computational Diffie-Hellman Fix a group G generated by some element g ∈ G, so
G = {gk : k ∈Z}. Given ga and gb, compute ga·b.
One example of a stronger hardness assumption is the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
problem:
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Fix a group G generated by some element g ∈ G, so G =
{gk : k ∈Z}. Given (ga, gb, gc), determine if c = a ·b.
This is a stronger hardness assumption since any adversary with access to a CDH ad-
versary solving the computational problem can be used to determine ga·b, and compared
with the value gc to give a solution to the DDH problem.
Towards a discussion of the language of “oracle access”, consider the gap Diffie-
Hellman problem:
Gap Diffie-Hellman Fix a group G generated by some element g ∈ G, so G = {gk :
k ∈Z}. Given ga and gb, find ga·b given oracle access to a decisional Diffie-Hellman
oracle.
In this case, the protocol would be considered secure under the so-called “gap Diffie-
Hellman” assumption. Another way to say the same thing is to say that the protocol is
secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption given access to a decisional
Diffie-Hellman oracle. This is a more generic way to describe the security of protocols
under standard security assumptions without the need to invent names for interme-
diate assumptions. Indeed, this language is by far the most common in the security
framework that will be considered in this thesis.
Motivating Composable Security
Historically, most cryptographic protocols have been proved secure in the standalone
model, in which one is only concerned about the security of a single execution of the
protocol, isolated from any other information potentially in the system in which the
protocol is run. In particular, this means the adversary may only query oracles whose
scope is limited to the security game. Consequently, proofs in this model offer no claims
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of security when executing multiple protocols (or the same protocol multiple times si-
multaneously) using the same oracles (understood as PPT ITMs) for every game. For
example, if a game forbids the adversary from making specific oracle queries based on
the messages sent to and from the challenger of one game, this does not prevent the
adversary from making the forbidden oracle queries in a second game. This is not al-
ways directly problematic, but it highlights that designing cryptographic protocols that
are secure even when executed as part of a larger system while maintaining security is
non-trivial.
This problem motivated the development of a composable security framework in
which protocols could build on the security of others without the need to prove the se-
curity from the ground up each time, mirroring the standard mathematical approach of
building theorems by first proving lemmata and propositions. The UC framework intro-
duced by Canetti [Can00] is a security definition with a strong composability guarantee:
any protocol proved secure retains its security even when executed alongside, sequen-
tially or simultaneously, arbitrarily many other protocols, or even the same protocol. At
its core is the composition theorem:
Theorem 2.1 (Informal, [Can00]). Suppose the protocol Π UC-securely realizes F, and
that Π′ UC-securely realizes F ′ and uses F as a subroutine. Then Π′ UC-securely real-
izes F ′ when replacing F with Π.
The upshot of this theorem is that if a protocol makes use of a functionality as an
oracle, then this functionality may be replaced by any subprotocol that securely real-
izes it and the main protocol retains the same security. Multi-party computation (MPC)
is a perfect use case for composable protocols since the goal of computation on private
data is a complex task requiring multiple cryptographic primitives to achieve full secu-
rity against an active adversary. In this thesis the variant of UC taken from [Can00,
v.2018/12/31, §4.4.2] is used, in which the simulator interacts with the adversary in a
black-box way; Canetti showed that this is equivalent to the general definition of UC
security that he gives.
Defining Composable Security
To understand composable security, it is helpful to recall the more general notion of
security for cryptographic protocols. To prove the security of a protocolΠ in practice, one
constructs a trusted third party called a functionality F that performs an “ideal” version
of Π, that leaks only an “ideal” amount of information to the adversary – that is, it leaks
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exactly as much as the protocol architect decides is acceptable, and no more. One then
argues that Π leaks at most as much as F by showing that the leakage revealed in the
execution of Π can be simulated using only the ideal leakage from F. Since F is secure
by construction and nothing more can be learnt from Π than can be learnt from F, the
protocol is secure. More concretely, one shows that for any “real-world” adversary A
against Π, there exists an “ideal-world” adversary S, called the simulator, against F
with black-box access to A, that simulates the protocol towards A, such that A cannot
tell whether it interacted with S or with real honest parties.
Towards the goal of protocol composition, a stronger guarantee is required: the exe-
cutions should appear the same not only to the adversary, but to any so-called environ-
ment in which the protocol is executed. The execution environment, more formally, is
a non-uniform PPT ITM distinguisher Z that must determine which world of the two
worlds – ideal or real – is being executed, with non-negligible advantage over guess-
ing. The environment is more than a mere observer of the execution: Z is allowed to
choose honest parties’ inputs and observe their final outputs, and may interact arbi-
trarily with A (which controls the corrupt parties) throughout the protocol, including
specifying the code A runs. The only information hidden from Z is the intermediate
communication and computation between the first inputs and final outputs of any hon-
est party (either executing as in the description of the protocol or with the ideal func-
tionality), and their random tapes. The idea behind this definition of Z, which has a
considerable amount of information to help it distinguish, is that the protocol may be
run in some setting in which inputs are received by or sent to some other – potentially
corrupted – process in a larger system, and that the corrupt parties in the current proto-
col execution may be under control of the environment. In other words, the environment
captures exactly everything that is external to the protocol execution.
With these “composable” modifications to the security modelling, a protocol is said
to realize a functionality UC-securely if for every real-world adversary interacting with
real honest parties in the protocol there exists an ideal world simulator interacting with
the functionality such that the executions of the two worlds are indistinguishable from
one another to the environment.
The notation F will be used to denote the ITM for the ideal functionality itself,
as well as the algorithm it runs. Similarly, Pi denotes the ith party out of a set P of
n parties, indexed by [n] and executes the corresponding instructions of the protocol
written as Π. The environment is a PPT distinguisher Z that, given any adversary A,
a random tape, a security parameter, and an execution of Π or F, outputs a guess as
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to which world was executed. The two different possible worlds in which the execution
occurs are shown in Figure 2.2. Notice that in both the real and ideal executions, the






















Figure 2.2: Real World Versus Ideal World.
To formalize the definition, for a fixed PPT A acting on behalf of corrupt parties, and















over the set {0,1}, where z is an input the environment handed to it at the beginning
(roughly speaking the input from another part of the system, and can be thought of as
an “auxiliary information” tape) and λ is the security parameter, and the distribution
is taken over the random tapes of all ITMs. The variable EXEC() outputs 0 if Z guesses
the execution is ideal and 1 if Z guesses the execution is real. The security guarantee is
that for every A there exists an S =SA such that for every Z it holds that
EXEC(Z,A,Π)∼s EXEC(Z,SA ,F).
In more detail, if the indexing set of corrupt parties is denoted by A and the number



















where the distributions are taken over the random tapes of honest parties, and the ran-
dom tape of A which is determined by the environment’s auxiliary information tape z,
and SPi denotes the part of the simulator S that is responsible for emulating Pi. Note
that only the honest parties are assumed to have inputs, reflecting the fact that A
merely sends messages and S deduces the implicit inputs to pass on to F. The “inputs”
of corrupt parties are therefore included in the distribution of the execution implicitly as
part of the variable MESSAGESA↔S , not in the INPUTS variable. Similarly, corrupt par-
ties need not produce “final outputs” since Z can compute anything the corrupt parties
can after the final messages in the protocol have been sent.
Notice that the messages amongst all parties, except corrupt to corrupt, should ap-
pear in the distribution. Technically speaking, the messages amongst honest parties
should be included in the distributions, but usually secure channels are assumed, or
broadcasts over authenticated channels, so this communication does not reveal any in-
formation to the environment.
Constructing a Simulator
Throughout the simulation, S runs A as a black box, and any messages output by A in-
tended for Z are handed to Z, and the response is handed back to A. The full transcript
as viewed by A is passed on from S to Z. As for real honest parties, Z provides initial
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inputs and receives final outputs in exactly the same way in both worlds. Thus the only
potential differences between executions are the values of the inputs and outputs, and
the transcript produced.
Throughout the execution of the protocol between A and S, the simulator must act
on behalf of “emulated” honest parties. The requirements on the distributions derived
from the full execution transcript, i.e. all inputs and outputs, and the messages the sim-
ulator generates on behalf of emulated honest parties, can be expressed as the following
three (informal) criteria:
Correctness Final outputs of all parties in a simulation of the protocol where the sim-
ulator is handed the real inputs of honest parties should result in the same output
as a real execution of the protocol.
Extractability The simulator must be able to deduce the set of inputs of corrupt par-
ties from the transcript.
Equivocation The simulator must be able to generate a transcript that convinces the
environment that the set of all messages sent and received in the execution is self-
consistent.
These properties are not entirely independent, but they summarize the key points
necessary for simulation. (For example, if Correctness and Equivocation hold, then the
simulator must have been able to extract inputs of corrupt parties, or guess them with
overwhelming probability.) A couple of important observations are highlighted here.
Extractability of the inputs of A is necessary in order for F to compute and return
the same output as would have been computed in the real world – i.e. for Correctness to
hold. Without this, even if the corrupt parties executed the protocol honestly, no party
would output the correct result (with high probability). Note that the ability of the
simulator to extract the inputs implies the set of honest parties can also do the same,
which is potentially problematic; in practice, however, the simulator is assumed to have
access to some trapdoor information in the form of a setup assumption to allow it to
extract, as discussed in detail in Section 2.2. It is important to keep in mind that corrupt
parties are not assumed to have explicit inputs, but implicit inputs are deduced from
the communication between A and S.
For Equivocation to hold, self-consistency of messages is required, which is (infor-
mally) defined as follows: the messages for final outputs must be simultaneously con-
sistent with all previous messages and must result in the adversary computing the
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same output that it would have computed in a real execution, despite the fact that emu-
lated communication throughout the protocol generated by S does not – indeed, cannot
– depend on honest parties’ inputs since they are unknown to the simulator in the real-
world experiment. Thus Correctness and Extractability on their own are not enough to
ensure indistinguishability of transcripts.
Proof of indistinguishability
Once a simulator has been constructed, it is necessary to prove that it indeed pro-
vides a view indistinguishable from a view in the real world. To do this, a sequence
of (polynomially-many) “hybrid” worlds is defined in which S is initially given the in-
puts of all honest parties, and then in each subsequent world S has one input fewer;
in the last hybrid world S knows the inputs of no honest parties. Thus the first and
last worlds are perfectly indistinguishable from the real and ideal worlds respectively,
by definition. Then it only remains to prove that consecutive hybrid worlds in the se-
quence are indistinguishable.
In the most formal treatments, a proof should specify a simulator for each hybrid
world and show that there is no distinguisher between any consecutive pair. However,
sometimes the ability of the simulator to extract inputs and equivocate outputs is inde-
pendent of the simulator’s knowledge of the honest parties’ inputs, and in this case the
argument for security can be summarized by showing that the protocol transcript re-
veals no information to the environment, which trivially means the environment cannot
distinguish.
Proving the indistinguishability of worlds will often involve giving a reduction to a
primitive being used in the protocol. For example, recall that the simulator must “fake”
the inputs of honest parties for which it does not know the input, and suppose that
the protocol involves each party broadcasting an encryption of their input. Instead of
broadcasting an encryption of an honest party’s input (which it does not know), the
simulator will send an encryption of 0. Then any environment that can distinguish
between worlds can distinguish between an encryption of 0 and an encryption of this
input. Thus the security reduces to the security of the encryption scheme.
The ability of the environment to distinguish is parameterized by the security pa-
rameters, κ and σ. The following definitions are used throughout this thesis, primarily




Definition 2.6. A protocol is said to realize a functionality UC-securely with statisti-
cal security parameter σ if any environment can distinguish with probability at most
O(2−σ).
Definition 2.7. A protocol is said to realize a functionality UC-securely with com-
putational security parameter κ if there exists an environment for which there is a
polynomial-time reduction to a computationally hard problem which has computational
security κ.
Setup Assumption
It is reasonable to wonder why the simulator should have the ability to extract (im-
plicit) inputs of the adversary based on the messages it sent: indeed, this is undesirable
as it implies the adversary should be able to do similarly from honest parties’ messages.
The classic example of this problem was given by Fischlin and Canetti [CF01]: the exis-
tence of a simulator for a commitment scheme in the UC model implies the commitment
cannot be hiding, since the simulator must be able to extract the message from the com-
mitment, and hence any “real” honest party would also be able to extract the message.
(See Section 2.3.5 for the properties of commitment schemes.)
This demonstrates that there are some functionalities that can never be realized in
the UC framework as described so far. However, giving the simulator some trapdoor
information via a trusted setup (i.e. a setup assumption) can give secure protocols. In
such a situation, instead of giving a protocol in the plain (or standard) model, a protocol
is said to be realized in a hybrid model, in which the existence of one or more ideal
functionalities (oracles) is assumed.
The key difference to a proof in a hybrid model and a proof in the plain model is that
the simulator is required to emulate the functionality to A. This gives the simulator a
limited ability to program the oracle with information of its choosing, although the sim-
ulated oracle should be indistinguishable from an oracle executed honestly, otherwise
the environment can use it to distinguish between worlds.
Random Oracle Model In the random oracle model (ROM), all parties in a proto-
col execution have access to an oracle that, on input some query, returns a uniformly-
sampled output, but always the same output for the same query. In the proof of security
for a protocol in the ROM, the simulator is allowed to program the random oracle – that
is, it emulates the oracle towards the adversary, but it need not execute the exact ideal
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behaviour given in the oracle description. As stated above more generally, the simula-
tor is not allowed to deviate “too much” from the oracle’s description, for example by
sampling according to a different distribution, since this may allow the environment to
determine that a simulation is taking place. By considering the functionality FRO in
Figure 2.3, the notion of the FRO-hybrid model coincides with the classical notion of the
ROM.
Random Oracle FRO
Initialize On input (Initialize, X , sid) where sid is a new session identifier and X is a set,
create a new dictionary DB with identifiers DB.Ids.
Random Element On input (id , sid), if id ∈ DB.Ids then return DB[id], and otherwise sample
DB[id] ← U (X ) and return DB[id].
Figure 2.3: Random Oracle Functionality, FRO.
In the real world, random oracles taking polynomial-length inputs cannot exist since
then a truly random oracle must store exponentially-much data while being efficiently
queryable. This necessitates the use of hash functions. Typically, protocols require the
ROM if stronger properties of a cryptographic hash function are needed than those
usually given (i.e. than those given in Section 2.3.1), but will always be instantiated in
a real-world protocol using a hash function.
The ROM has received criticism as there are some artificial protocols proved secure
in the random oracle model which cannot be instantiated securely by any hash function
[CGH98]. Nevertheless, it is generally believed that protocols secure in the random
oracle model are secure against practical attacks [BR93].
Common Reference String Model In the common reference string (CRS) model, all
parties are handed a string sampled uniformly from an agreed distribution. The benefit
of the CRS model over the ROM is that one need not make the heuristic assumption that
a hash function behaves like a random oracle. However, it is often more challenging to
prove in this model as the simulator has much more limited power to equivocate the
transcript.
This model will not be discussed further except to say that it is, in some sense, one
of the alternative “base cases” for UC protocols for those who wish to avoid the ROM;




Global Setup Suppose a protocol Π securely realizes F in the FRO-hybrid model, and
suppose Π̃ securely realizes F̃ in the FRO,F-hybrid model. The composition theorem
only guarantees security when each subprotocol has a session-specific instantiation of
the random oracle, which in particular means that the same query made to the two
different oracles will (with high probability) lead to different outputs. However, in the
real world a random oracle is usually replaced with a single hash function everywhere
it appears in the protocol description. A model known as the global ROM [CDPW07]
allows exactly this global replacement of the oracle with a hash function.
Canetti et al. [CDPW07] showed that there is a separation between the attacks
mountable against protocols in the non-global random oracle model and those in the
global random oracle model. The salient point for this thesis is that all functionalities
presented will keep track of the current session using a session identifier sid. If a party
calls the functionality with sid different from what was sent in its initialization pro-
cedure, the functionality outputs the message Reject to all parties and awaits another
message. For the sake of brevity this is taken to be implicit and will not be stated each
time a functionality is defined. The first step of almost all protocols in a given hybrid
model is for the parties to agree on a session identifier and initialize the oracle, the ex-
act method of which will not be discussed as its choice does not affect the security of the
protocols and so may be derived from any public information.
To save on denoting one session identifier for every distinct type of oracle (for exam-
ple, one for a commitment functionality and one for a random oracle), it will be assumed
that these functionalities use the same session identifier; the conflict only occurs if two
of the same type of oracle (for example, two commitment schemes) are initialized with
the same sid. This reflects the idea that the whole protocol is “one session”, but note
that this is merely a choice of notation for this thesis and is not standard.
Theorem Statements
To enable theorem statements with a concrete “number of bits” of security, the following
definition is given.
Definition 2.8 (Security with parameter λ). Let Dk be a sequence of distributions pro-
duced by S and let Ek be a sequence of distributions produced by A. A scheme is said to
be secure with security λ (bits) if the parameter k is chosen so that negl(k)≤ 2−λ, where
negl is taken from Definition 2.3 in the statistical case λ = σ, or from Definition 2.1 in
the computational case λ= κ.
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Theorem statements in this thesis will use the terminology of the following defini-
tion.
Definition 2.9. The protocol Π is said to realize F UC-securely with statistical secu-
rity σ if for every A there exists an S such that the distinguishing advantage of any
environment Z is a negligible function in σ.
Observations And Usage of UC in This Thesis
Functionality Interactions Throughout this thesis the functionalities will be de-
scribed as interacting with the ideal-world adversary, that is, the simulator S. In the
literature, functionalities are variously described as interacting nondescriptly with “the
adversary” or directly with the environment. The choice to talk about interaction with S
is, compared with the former, to emphasize that the adversary is “ideal”, and compared
with the latter to highlight that the environment should not “know” whether or not the
functionality is being executed.
Agreement Outside the Protocol To avoid cluttering the functionalities with ex-
traneous information, in most of the algorithms presented there is no discussion of how
to agree on public information such as which parties are to execute a given protocol,
the access structure they assume or the linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) that will
be used. The reason for this is that such information is beyond the scope of the proto-
col: for example, provided the functionality accepts a single set of parties to execute the
protocol, its security holds.
Furthermore, all of the protocols in this thesis are secure against static adversaries
only, which means that the adversary can corrupt parties once at the start of the exe-
cution but not dynamically throughout. For this reason, there will not be discussion of
special messages sent from the adversary to the functionality to allow the corruption of
parties, as is common in the literature, and instead the functionality will be assumed
already to know which parties are corrupt, and therefore how to interact with different
parties.
The Rushing Adversary In a synchronous network setting, the adversary is allowed
to be “rushing” in the sense that it can receive all messages from all honest parties be-
fore deciding what message it will send. This is a weak assumption – i.e. the protocols
have a stronger security guarantee under this assumption – but it often makes the
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simulation a little more involved. As this thesis deals with rushing adversaries, in sim-
ulation proofs the simulator will always send input to the adversary before it receives
the messages in the same round of communication.
Rewinding One key way in which the UC framework differs from that of the stan-
dalone model in terms of the proof technique is that the adversary cannot be rewound
by the simulator, since this would be observed by the environment and provide a way for
it to distinguish between worlds. The ability to rewind the adversary is a crucial ability
in some proofs, such as in proving soundness of zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) protocols.
To prove the indistinguishability of the transcripts, it is of course possible to rewind the
environment; however, this will never enable extraction of the inputs required for the
simulation since the reduction sits outside of the environment.
Such strong security comes at a cost: for even some “natural” cryptographic prim-
itives it has been shown there cannot exist a protocol that UC-securely realizes them
without a setup assumption. For example, to motivate their UC-secure commitment
protocol secure in the CRS model, Canetti and Fischlin [CF01] explained that any UC-
secure commitment protocol in the plain model cannot hide the committing party’s in-
puts (which is a required property of such schemes), since the UC-security implies there
is a simulator that can extract the message from the commitment without any trapdoor
information, which means that any corrupt party can do this in the real world with any
honest party’s commitment.
Convention for Description of Messages Sent In the proofs in this thesis, it will
be stated that messages are sent between the adversary and simulator to mean that, on
behalf of each honest party, the simulator communicates one or more messages to each
corrupt party (controlled by A) or vice versa, over the relevant point-to-point channel.
The reason for this abstraction is that such explanation is cumbersome and distracting
from the important points of the simulation. It is important, however, to note that mes-
sages sent from the adversary to the simulator need to be parameterized by an index for
honest parties, or otherwise express that this happens, because corrupt parties might
send different data to different honest parties.
Combined Security In the theorem statements, for protocols realized in hybrid mod-
els the level of computational or statistical security is described assuming a perfect re-
alization of the hybrid functionalities. This is to avoid making any assumptions on the
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realization of these sub-functionalities. In order to determine the overall security of a
given protocol, one must look at the security of the realization of every functionality. The
computational or statistical security of a protocol is the “worst” computational or statis-
tical security out of the protocols chosen to realize the hybrid-world functionalities.
Relaying Messages To the fullest possible extent, the job of the simulator is to act as
a relay between A and F, “translating” messages into the appropriate format back and
forth. Thus the simulator is sometimes said to “relay” messages between the two. This
is particularly useful language in the following note on extending functionalities since
messages need no translation there.
Extending a Functionality One common way to create a functionality is to con-
struct a functionality that performs a subset of the desired commands and then to “ex-
tend” it with new commands; in this case, the latter functionality is said to extend the
former. This approach can be seen, for instance, in [KOS16]. This language will be used
in functionalities in this thesis.
Subprotocols Sometimes protocols are said to “make use of a subprotocol”. The idea
behind this is simply to make the design more modular and the presentation cleaner.
Subprotocols are not intended to realize any ideal functionality, since usually this is
not possible on their own: it is a presentational choice. Given a protocol ΠA that uses a
subprotocol ΠB, the unified protocol is written as ΠA‖ΠB (or ΠB‖ΠA).
2.3 Cryptographic Primitives and Basic Tools
This section contains definitions of fundamental tools used in cryptography. The proofs
are standard.
2.3.1 Hash functions
Hash functions are used to map arbitrary-length inputs to bit-strings of a fixed length.
Cryptographic hash functions are required to satisfy one or more guarantees on the
level of “unpredictability” of outputs, and consequently are often used to instantiate
random oracles efficiently. More formally, a cryptographic hash function H satisfies one
or more of the following properties:
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First preimage resistance Given a value h in the image, it should be hard to find m
such that h = H(m).
Second preimage resistance Given m, it should be hard to find m′ such that H(m′)=
H(m).
Collision resistance It should be hard to find two messages m and m′ for which
H(m)= H(m′).
Some protocols require the use of a random function, which is instantiated using a
hash function, and the security reduces to the heuristic assumption that a hash function
is “random enough”. However, some protocols do not need the full force of a random
oracle, in which case the security may depend on, for instance, the assumption that the
hash function is collision-resistant.
2.3.2 Pseudorandom Functions
A pseudorandom function (PRF) is a family of efficiently samplable functions whose
members are efficiently computable functions that are computationally-indistinguishable
from random functions (i.e. an instance of a random oracle). More formally, a PRF
{Fk(·) : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}κ}k∈{0,1}κ
satisfies the following properties:





Computability For any k ∈ {0,1}κ, for any x ∈ {0,1}∗, Fk(x) can be computed in time
poly(|x|).
Pseudorandomness For any k ∈ {0,1}κ, it holds that {Fk(x)}x∈{0,1}∗ ∼c U ({0,1}κ).
2.3.3 MACs
A message authentication code (MAC) is a method of ensuring the validity of a message:
specifically, that the message was not altered in transit, and that the message indeed




In almost all MPC protocols for circuits, linear operations come “for free” in the sense
that they require little computation and no – or little – communication, whereas multi-
plications, and non-linear operations in general, require interaction.
A round of communication can be defined as a period of time in which parties send all
possible necessary information from the protocol that is not dependent on other parties’
messages sent in the same round. The key metrics for communication complexity are
the number of rounds and the amount of data sent in a given round. These metrics
are used because they are independent of the network hardware, which determines the
network latency and bandwidth.
Throughout this thesis, synchronous communication will be assumed. In this com-
munication model, all messages for a given round are assumed to be delivered success-
fully before any parties send any messages for the following round. Protocols allowing
for asynchrony in the network more accurately model communication over wide-area
networks (WANs) such as the Internet but are generally more complex.
Authenticated Channels
The recipient of a message sent over an authenticated channel is sure that the pur-
ported sender is indeed the sender, and that the message has not been tampered with
in transit. Such channels do not guarantee privacy of communication. Given a graph
where the vertex set is the indexing set of parties [n] and edges E are connections be-
tween parties, the set of authenticated channels is denoted by AC(E).
Secure Channels
A secure channel is an authenticated channel which additionally guarantees privacy of
communication2. To realize a secure channel, parties use an authenticated channel to
agree on public-key/secret-key pairs, use these to establish a shared symmetric key, and
then use the symmetric key to encrypt all communication, which can then be sent over
the authenticated channel. Given a graph where the vertex set is the indexing set of
parties [n] and edges E are connections between parties, the set of secure channels is
denoted by SC(E).
2One can alternatively define secure channels with privacy but without authentication.
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Broadcast Channels
A message sent via a broadcast channel is one in which every honest party (eventually)
agrees it received the same message. The concern in this thesis is only on protocols se-
cure with abort (explained in Section 2.5), which simplifies the broadcasting procedure.
The functionality FBroadcast is given in Figure 2.4 and the protocol ΠBroadcast in Fig-
ure 2.5. Notice that the protocol need not make use of the random oracle since in the
simulation the simulator just relays the messages directly to the functionality.
Functionality FBroadcast
Initialize On input (Initialize, sid) from all parties, where sid is a new session identifier, set
Abort to false.
Broadcast On input (Broadcast, x, sid) from Pi, or from S if i ∈ A,
If i ∈ [n]\ A, for all j ∈ [n]\{i} send x to P j or to S if j ∈ A.
If i ∈ A, await a set of values {x j} j∈[n]\A and for each j ∈ [n]\ A, send x j to P j. If xi 6= x j for any
i, j ∈ [n]\ A, then set Abort to true.
Verify On input (Verify, sid) from all parties and S, await a message Abort or OK from S. If
the message is OK and Abort is false, send the message OK to all honest parties and continue;
otherwise, send the message Abort to all honest parties, (locally) output ⊥, and then halt.
Figure 2.4: Broadcasting Functionality, FBroadcast.
Protocol ΠBroadcast
Initialize Each party initializes an empty string str and they agree on a collision-resistant hash
function, H.
Broadcast For party Pi to broadcast a value x to all parties:
1. Party Pi sends x to all P j ∈P \{Pi} over an authenticated channel.
2. Each party P j updates str j := str j‖x where ‖ denotes string concatenation.
Verify To verify all broadcasts so far, each party Pi does the following:
1. Compute hi := H(stri).
2. For all j ∈ [n]\{i}, send hi to P j over an authenticated channel.
3. Await h j from P j for all j ∈ [n]\{i}.
4. If h j 6= hi for any j, send the message Abort to all other parties, (locally) output ⊥, and halt.
Figure 2.5: Broadcasting Protocol, ΠBroadcast.
Note that when an honest party aborts, another round of communication is needed to
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ensure all other honest parties abort, but this is not the same as the classical Byzantine
agreement [LSP82] problem since honest parties always abort if any other party tells
them to abort – they do not have to decide whether or not to abort. Note that secure
channels are also authenticated so it is assumed each party knows the identity of the
sender of each message.
Theorem 2.2. The protocol ΠBroadcast UC-securely realizes the functionality FBroadcast
against a static, active, computationally-bounded adversary in the plain model, assum-
ing the parties are connected by a complete network of authenticated channels.
Proof. Simulation is straightforward: the simulator emulates the honest parties hon-
estly, and simply acts as a relay between A and FBroadcast; then S sends the message
Abort to FBroadcast if the hash comparison fails, and otherwise sends OK.
A distinguisher Z between the worlds can be used to break the collision-resistance
of the hash function in the following way. Because S simply relays messages, the only
difference between the simulation and the real-world execution is that in the real world
the parties only abort if the hashes agree, not the messages themselves. Thus Z can
distinguish only if in the real world the adversary sends different messages to different
honest parties so that they do not abort in the protocol execution (whereas in the ideal
execution they would always abort in this case). The only way of doing this is by find-
ing two sequences of messages, i.e. two strings stri and str j, such that stri 6= str j but
H(stri) = H(str j), violating the assumption of collision-resistance of the hash function.
Note that the environment can choose all messages in both worlds, since these are the
parties’ inputs, so second-preimage resistance is not sufficient.
2.3.5 Commitments
A commitment scheme is a way of ensuring a party is not able to change its inputs after
observing the inputs of other parties. It has two intuitive properties:
Hiding The commitment should not reveal anything about the corresponding message.
Binding The party that generated the commitment should not be able to claim con-
vincingly that the message is anything but what was originally used to generate the
commitment.
The ideal commitment functionality FCommit is given in Figure 2.6 and a standard pro-
tocol securely realizing it is given in Figure 2.7.
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Functionality FCommit
Initialize On input (Initialize, X , sid) from all honest parties and S, where X is a set, initial-
ize a new dictionary DB with indexing set DB.Ids.
Commit On input (Commit, i, x, sid) from honest party Pi, or from S if Pi ∈ A, and
(Commit, i,⊥, sid) from all other parties, if x ∈ X , compute a new identifier idx, store DB[idx] :=
(x, i), send idx to all parties and S and continue.
Open On input (Open, i, idx, sid) from all honest parties and S, if (idx, i) ∈ DB.Ids, then send x to
all honest parties and S and continue. Otherwise, await a message Abort or OK from S. If the
message is OK, then send x to all honest parties and continue; otherwise, send the message
Abort to all honest parties, and then halt.
Figure 2.6: Commitment Functionality, FCommit.
Protocol ΠCommit
This protocol is realized in the FBroadcast, FRO-hybrid model.
Initialize The parties do the following:
1. Agree on a set X (elements of which are to be committed), computational security parameter
κ ∈N, and a session identifier sid .
2. Call an instance of FRO with input (Initialize, {0,1}2·κ , sid).
3. Call an instance of FBroadcast with input (Initialize, sid).
Commit For Pi to commit to an input x, parties do the following:
1. Party Pi samples r ← U ({0,1}κ).
2. Party Pi calls FRO with input (x‖r‖i, sid), where ‖ denotes concatenation of strings, and
receives an output τx ∈ {0,1}2·κ.
3. Party Pi calls FBroadcast with input (Broadcast,τx, sid).
Open To open the value with identifier idx, parties do the following:
1. Party Pi calls FBroadcast with input (Broadcast, x‖r‖i, sid). Let m j be the message received
by P j.
2. Each party P j calls FRO with input (m j, sid) and receives τ
j
x in response.
3. The parties call FBroadcast with input (Verify, sid); if FBroadcast returns the message OK
then they continue; otherwise they (locally) output ⊥, and then halt.
4. Each party checks that τ jx = τx and if so then it extracts x from m j = x‖r, outputs x, and
continues; otherwise, it calls FBroadcast with input (Broadcast,Abort, sid), (locally) outputs
⊥, and then halts.
Figure 2.7: Commitment Protocol, ΠCommit.
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Theorem 2.3. The protocolΠCommit UC-securely realizes the functionality FCommit against
a static, active, computationally-bounded adversary in the FBroadcast, FRO-hybrid model.
Proof. If the adversary behaves honestly, then since the protocol is realized in the FRO-
hybrid model, the simulator can extract any secrets to which corrupt parties commit
and forward these to FCommit.
When an honest party commits to a secret x in the ideal world, the simulator receives




instead of calling the local
instance of the random oracle and sends this to A emulating the call to FBroadcast. Now
when this commitment is opened, first S awaits the revealed secret x from FCommit,
and then programs the random oracle by sampling some r ← U ({0,1}κ) and fixing
DB[x‖r‖i] := τx.3 Then to open this secret to A, the simulator sends x‖r‖i to A, emulat-
ing the call to FBroadcast. Thus when the adversary queries the random oracle on x‖r‖i,
it will receive τx.
Now the only problem occurs if any r that was sampled by the simulator when emu-
lating honest parties’ commitments was part of a message already queried by A. How-
ever, the adversary is computationally-bounded so the number of queries is bounded by
some polynomial function in κ, and additionally the number of commitments emulated
on behalf of honest parties is bounded by a polynomial function in κ. Let poly(κ) be the
total number of queries to the random oracle in the execution. Then the probability that
this set contains collisions can be approximated as poly(κ)2 · (2 ·22·κ)−1 by the Birthday
Bound. (The Birthday Bound [Sch96] says that if q is the total number of queries and S
is the codomain of FRO, then the probability of a collision is approximately q2 ·(2·|S|)−1.)
By definition, a protocol secure against a computationally-bounded adversary with pa-
rameter κ means that A cannot perform 2κ operations. Thus 12 ·poly(κ)2 < 2κ and hence
poly(κ)2 · (2 ·22·κ)−1 < 2−κ.
Note that if the adversary does not call FRO before calling FBroadcast on some input
x‖r‖i, then the message it chooses to broadcast, τx, is rejected by honest parties (and
they abort) unless the value that FRO samples when handed the input x‖r‖i later (when
the adversary reveals the secret) happens to be τx. Since τx is sampled from a set of
size 22·κ, the chance that this happens is 2−2·κ.
Thus there is no environment that can distinguish between the real and ideal exe-
cutions except with negligible advantage over guessing.
3The simulator could sample until some r that has not been used before is obtained; however, the
analysis of the chance that collisions occur is easier if the sampling is always uniform here and makes no
difference to the final result.
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2.3.6 Coin-Flipping
The functionality FCoinFlip is given in Figure 8.5. The notion of a “secure coin-flipping”
functionality is an idea that originates from the ’80s at the latest, e.g. [Blu81]. The
idea is for a set of parties to obtain random strings of length at least one such that the
sampled strings follow a uniform distribution. A protocol ΠCoinFlip realizing FCoinFlip in
the FCommit-hybrid model is given in Figure 2.9.
Functionality FCoinFlip
Initialize On input (Initialize, X , sid), await further messages.
Random Element On input (RElt, sid) from all honest parties and S, sample x ← U (X ), send x
to S, and await a message OK or Abort from S. If the message is OK then send x to all parties
and continue; otherwise, send the message Abort to all honest parties and halt.
Figure 2.8: Coin-Flipping Functionality, FCoinFlip.
Protocol ΠCoinFlip
This protocol is realized in the FCommit, FRO-hybrid model.
Initialize The parties do the following:
1. Agree on a set X from which to sample, a session identifier sid and a computational security
parameter κ.
2. Call an instance of FCommit with input (Initialize, {0,1}2·κ , sid).
3. Call an instance of FRO with input (Initialize, X , sid).
Random Element To obtain a random element sampled uniformly from some set X , party Pi
does the following:
1. Sample stri ← U ({0,1}2·κ).
2. Call FCommit with input (Commit, i, stri, sid) and (Commit, j,⊥, sid) for all j ∈ [n]\{i}.
3. Await the identifiers idstr j for all j ∈ [n] from FCommit.
4. Call FCommit with input (Open, j, idstr j , sid) for all j ∈ [n] and await the set {str j} j∈[n] from
FCommit. If FCommit sends the message Abort, then (locally) output ⊥ and then halt; other-
wise, continue.







and (locally) output the returned value x.
Figure 2.9: Coin-Flipping Protocol, ΠCoinFlip.
Theorem 2.4. The protocol ΠCoinFlip UC-securely realizes FCoinFlip in the presence of a
static, active, computationally-bounded adversary in the FCommit, FRO-hybrid model.
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Proof. The simulator runs local instances of FCommit and FRO. When FCoinFlip outputs




i] := x so that when A calls FRO with input
⊕n
i=1 str
i the simulator will
return x.
Note that as there is always at least one honest party, the string in the real world is
uniformly-distributed, and as S honestly emulates the behaviour of honest parties, it is
also uniform in the simulation.
Now, as in the proof of Theorem 2.3, a problem with the simulation only occurs
if A queries FRO before S can program it with an output from FCoinFlip. Since A is
computationally-bounded, it is able to query FRO at most a number of times that is
polynomial in κ, poly(κ); since the seed string is 2 ·κ bits long and is always uniformly
random, the chance of this type of collision is at most poly(κ)2 ·(2·22·κ)−1 by the Birthday
Bound. As for the proof of ΠCommit, 12 ·poly(κ)2 < 2κ, so poly(κ)2 ·(2 ·22·κ)−1 < 2−κ. Thus no
environment can distinguish except with negligible advantage over guessing.
2.4 Secret Sharing
2.4.1 Access Structures
Two main aspects of corruption in MPC are the number of corrupted parties and the
type of corruption. Protocols usually tolerate some fixed corruption threshold, or more
generally define which sets of parties can be corrupted in a so-called access structure.
Different types of corruption will be discussed in Section 2.5.1: for now the focus is on
which sets of parties can be corrupted.
Access structures determine which parties or sets of parties are allowed to learn
specific information in a given protocol. Every secret in every protocol has an access
structure associated with it, explicitly or implicitly. Formally, given a set of parties P
indexed by a set [n], an access structure on those parties is pair of subsets of 2P , denoted
by Γ, called the qualified sets, and ∆, called the unqualified sets. The access structure
is called monotone if the superset of any set in Γ is also qualified, and the subset of
any set in ∆ is unqualified. When the specific set does not matter, a qualified set will
be denoted by Q, and an unqualified set by U . An access structure is called complete
if Γ∪∆ = 2P . With the monotonicity property, this means that they form a partition
of 2P . Consequently, complete monotone access structures can be completely specified
by the maximal sets ∆+ of ∆ (where maximal here means maximal with respect to the
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subset relation). These sets are called the maximally-unqualified sets. Similarly there
is a subset Γ− of Γ of minimally-qualified sets.
In general it is possible to consider “partial” access structures in which some sets
of unqualified parties may learn statistically-negligible but non-zero information about
the secret from the shares they hold. However, in this thesis attention is restricted to
complete monotone access structures and perfect secret-sharing schemes realizing them,
in which unqualified sets of parties have no information about the secret, and qualified
sets always learn the secret.
The term access structure refers to the set Γ since this set describes which sets of
parties should have access to secrets; in the literature, sometimes the term adversary
structure is used for the same, although this, strictly speaking, refers to ∆, but usually
complete access structures are considered so there is no ambiguity.
To be concise, the access structure will be written in terms of party indices [n] rather
than the parties themselves, P . For example, Γ− = {{1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}} describes an access
structure on a set of parties P = {P1,P2,P3}. However, a set of parties Q may also be
said to lie in Γ, i.e. Q ∈Γ (rather than the indices) where it is clear from context.
Definition 2.10 ((n, t)-Threshold Access Structure). An (n, t)-threshold access structure
is defined on n parties as an access structure in which any set of t parties or fewer is
unqualified and any set of t+1 or more is qualified.
The example given above is the (3,1)-threshold access structure. For an (n, t)-threshold
access structure, |Γ−| = ( nt+1) and |∆+| = (nt). Note that in the literature t is sometimes
defined to be the least threshold for reconstruction (so the above definition would be
considered an (n, t+1)-threshold access structure). An (n,n−1)-threshold access struc-
ture is sometimes described as full-threshold since only the collaboration of the full set
of parties enables determining the secret. An (n, t)-threshold access structure in which
t ≤ bn−12 c is called an honest majority access structure, and one in which t ≤ bn−13 c an
honest supermajority.
A protocol is said to realize or respect an access structure if it satisfies the required
security definitions even when the adversary corrupts any unqualified set of parties.
Types of Access Structure
The predicate Q` is defined in the following way.
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Definition 2.11 (Q`). An access structure (Γ,∆) satisfies the predicate Q` if for every
set {Ui}i∈I ∈ 2∆ where |I| ≤ ` it holds that ⋃i∈I Ui ( [n].
An access structure satisfying Q` is said to “be Q`”. Note that for any ` ∈ N an
(n,bn−1
`
c)-threshold access structure is Q`. Thus this notion is a generalization of thresh-
old access structures, and in particular, one can think of Q2 and Q3 as generalizations
of honest majority and honest supermajority, respectively.
Example 2.1. Let (Γ,∆) be an access structure on 4 parties, where
Minimally-qualified sets: Γ− := {{1,2}, {1,3}, {1,4}, {2,3,4}}
Maximally-unqualified sets: ∆+ := {{1}, {2,3}, {2,4}, {3,4}}.
One can check that it is complete and monotone. Moreover, (Γ,∆) is Q2.
Definition 2.12 (Dual Access Structure). Given an access structure Γ, the dual access
structure is defined as Γ∗ := {Q⊆P :P \Q 6∈Γ}.
For example, the dual of an (n, t)-threshold access structure is an (n,n−t−1)-threshold
access structure. For any Q2 access structure it holds that Γ∗ ⊆Γ, since for every Q ∈Γ∗,
by definition (P \Q) 6∈Γ, which means Q ∈Γ (otherwise Q and (P \Q) are both in ∆ and
Q∪ (P \Q)=P , contradicting the fact that Γ is Q2).
2.4.2 Access Structures to Secret-Sharing
The goal of this section is to show how to share a secret amongst a set of parties under
any access structure. The first step is to interpret the access structure as a monotone
Boolean function. Such a function can be computed using a monotone span program,
and it was shown by Karchmer and Wigdersen [KW93] that MSPs are in bijection with
linear secret-sharing schemes, which are more well known.
Access Structures to Boolean Functions
Access structures are in one-to-one correspondence with monotone Boolean functions,
whose definition is given here.
Definition 2.13 (Monotone Boolean Function). Define the relation ≺ on the set {0,1}n
by the following: for any s,s′ ∈ {0,1}n, s ≺ s′ if and only if si ≤ s′i for every i ∈ [n]. Then
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the Boolean function f : {0,1}n → {0,1} with arity n is called monotone if for every s,s′ ∈
{0,1}n, it holds that
s≺ s′ =⇒ f (s)≤ f (s′).
The relation ≺ only induces a partial ordering on {0,1}n and there is no assumption
regarding the images of incomparable elements of the domain.
The bijection between monotone Boolean functions and complete monotone access
structures is immediate by associating every coordinate of the domain with a party in-
dex: consider the standard bijective map encoding subsets as Boolean strings, g : 2[n] →
{0,1}n defined as g : S 7→ s where si = 1 ⇐⇒ i ∈S; then let
Γ := {S ∈ 2[n] : f (g(S))= 1}
∆ := {S ∈ 2[n] : f (g(S))= 0}.
Then (Γ,∆) is a complete monotone access structure on parties indexed by [n].
Boolean Functions to MSPs
Monotone span programs (MSPs) were introduced by Karchmer and Wigderson [KW93]
as a model of computation for computing monotone Boolean functions.
Definition 2.14 (Monotone Span Program). An MSP is a quadruple M = (F, M,t,ρ)
where F is a field, M ∈Fm×d is an m×d matrix over F with rank d, t ∈Fd is a non-zero
vector, and ρ : [m] [n] is a surjective map.
For s ∈ {0,1}n, let Ms denote the submatrix of M obtained by taking the rows indexed
by the set { j ∈ [m] : sρ( j) = 1}. An MSP can be used to define a Boolean function f :
{0,1}n → {0,1} in the following way: let s ∈ {0,1}n; then define
f (s) :=
1 if t ∈ coim(Ms)0 otherwise .
(Recall that for a matrix A, coim(A) is the row space of the matrix A.) The function
f is monotonic: given s and s′ such that s ≺ s′, coim(Ms) ⊆ coim(Ms′), so t ∈ coim(Ms)
=⇒ t ∈ coim(Ms′). A vector s for which f (s) = 1 is said to be accepted by the MSP, and
otherwise is said to be rejected.
The map ρ is called the row map and t the target vector. In the literature, it is
not always specified that the matrix should have full column rank; however, Beimel
et al. [BGP95] showed that performing column operations does not change the Boolean
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function that the MSP computes, so this may be assumed without loss of generality. Any
vector witnessing that t ∈ coim(Ms), i.e. a vector λ ∈ Fm satisfying Ms> ·λ= t, is called
a recombination vector. If coker(Ms) is non-zero then there are multiple recombination
vectors for s.
MSPs to Secret-Sharing
Given a Boolean function that corresponds to some access structure, one can find an
MSP that computes it; then, a secret-sharing scheme can be defined in the following
way. To share a secret x, the dealer samples x ← U (Fd) subject to the constraint that
〈t,x〉 = x, constructs a share vector [[x]] := M ·x, and for each i ∈ [n] sends [[x]]Pi := MPi ·x
to Pi, where MPi is the submatrix of rows of M indexed by the set { j ∈ [m] : ρ( j) = i}.
Here, a distinction is made between subscripts which are sets of indices and those which
are sets of parties. For example, M{1,2} denotes the submatrix formed by taking the first
two rows of M; however, M{P1,P2} denotes the submatrix indexed by all rows j ∈ [m] for
which ρ( j) ∈ {1,2}. Similarly, [[x]]1 denotes the first component of the vector M·x, whereas
[[x]]P1 denotes the vector of shares comprised of the components for which ρ( j) = 1. A
vector [[x]] is called qualified if ρ(supp([[x]])) ∈Γ and unqualified otherwise. The notation
[[ · ]] is used to encompass all of the information about the MSP – that is, the field, the
matrix, the row map and the target vector.
If a set Q is qualified then since t lies in the span of the rows of MQ, there is a linear
combination of rows expressed as the recombination vector λ ∈Fm, such that MQ>·λQ =
t; thus the parties in Q can compute 〈λQ, [[x]]Q〉 =λQ> ·MQ ·x= t> ·x= 〈t,x〉 = x.
Conversely, if a set U is unqualified then by definition the vector t does not lie in
the linear span of the rows of MU , i.e. im(MU>), so by the Fundamental Theorem of
Linear Algebra, it lies in ker(MU ). Thus there is a vector k ∈Fd satisfying 〈t,k〉 6= 0 and
MU ·k= 0; without loss of generality, choose k such that 〈t,k〉 = 1. Now given any share
vector x used to share a secret x, for any x′ ∈F define x′ := x+(x′−x)·k. Then by linearity,
〈t,x′〉 = x+(x′−x)= x′, and [[x′]]U := MU ·x′ = MU ·(x+(x′−x) ·k)= MU ·x+(x′−x) ·MU ·k=
MU ·x+ (x′− x) ·0 = MU ·x = [[x]]U . In words, this says that whatever share vector the
unqualified parties hold, every secret in F is equally as likely, and hence the set of
shares held by an unqualified set of parties reveals no information on the secret.
A summary of how an MSP realizes an LSSS is given in Figure 2.10.
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Realizing an LSSS from an MSP
Initialize
1. Agree on the access structure Γ and an MSP that realizes it, M= (F, M,t,ρ).
2. For each minimally-qualified set Q ∈ Γ−, fix λQ ∈ Fm to be any vector such that{
Pi ∈P : i ∈ ρ(supp(λQ))
}
⊆Q satisfying MQ>λQ = t.
Share To share a secret x,
1. Sample x ← U ({x ∈Fd : 〈x,t〉 = x}).
2. Compute [[x]] := M ·x.
3. For each j ∈ [m], send [[x]]ρ( j) to Pρ( j) over a secure channel.
Reconstruct For a set of parties Q ∈Γ to reconstruct, they do the following:
1. Retrieve from memory λQ
′
where Q′ ∈Γ− is the lexicographically first set satisfying Q⊇Q′,
2. Compute the secret as x = 〈[[x]]Q′ ,λQ
′
Q′〉.
Figure 2.10: Realizing an LSSS from an MSP.
Linearity
Parties can compute any linear function on secrets shared using an LSSS as above by
computing the same linear function on their shares. To say that the parties “add” shared
secrets [[x]] and [[y]] means that for all i ∈ [n], Pi computes [[x]]Pi + [[y]]Pi . Additionally,
parties can add a public value a to a secret x that is secret-shared as [[x]] by agreeing
at the start of the protocol on some sharing of 1, [[1]], and computing [[x]]+ a · [[1]]. No
secrecy of this sharing need be assumed.
2.4.3 Examples
The sharing and reconstruction methods for the LSSSs used in this thesis are given in
this section, along with an example MSP that realizes each type. The initialization step
requires the parties to agree on the access structure, and they also agree on a sharing
of 1.
Additive Secret-Sharing An additive sharing is denoted by [[v]]A. To share a se-
cret v, the dealer, party Pi, samples {[[v]]AP j } j 6=i ← U (F), sends [[v]]
A
P j to P j over a secure
channel, and fixes [[v]]APi := v−
∑












1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 · · · 0 0
...
... . . .
...
...
0 0 · · · 1 0
−1 −1 · · · −1 1

and t= (1,1, · · · ,1)> ∈Fn, where the labels to the left of the matrix indicate ρ.
Replicated Secret-Sharing
Ito et al. [ISN93] gave an explicit, constructive method for generating an LSSS for any
monotone access structure, called replicated secret-sharing. (It is derived from the con-
junctive normal form (CNF) of the access structure and is therefore sometimes called
CNF sharing.)
In this scheme, given in Figure 2.11, the secret is split into one share for every set
in ∆+ and every party receives some subset of these shares. It is convenient to talk
about the set ∇ := {G ∈ 2P : P \G ∈ ∆+}, that is, the set of complements of sets in ∆+,
rather than ∆+ itself, because then a party receives a share if and only if it is indexed
by some G ∈∇.
Since each party obtains a set of shares and different parties may receive the same
share (if the dealer is honest), the scheme is said to contain replication. The notation xRG
will be used to denote the summand corresponding to set G ∈∇, xR∇ to denote the vector
(xRG :G ∈∇), and [[x]]R to denote the full vector with replication. Thus the vector of shares
held by Pi is [[x]]RPi = (xRG :G ∈∇∧G 3Pi).
Replicated Secret-Sharing
Initialize
1. The parties agree on an access structure, Γ, and compute ∇ := {G ∈ 2P :P \G ∈∆+}.
2. The parties agree on a sharing of 1 by agreeing on any G∗ ∈ ∇, setting 1RG∗ := 1 and 1RG := 0
for all G ∈∇\{G∗}. Set this sharing to be [[1]]R.
Share For party Pi to share a secret x, it does the following:
1. Sample a set {xRG }G∈∇ ← U (F) subject to
∑
G∈∇ xRG = x.
2. For every G ∈∇, for every P j ∈G, send xRG to P j over a secure channel.






Reconstruct For a qualified set of parties Q to learn a secret x amongst themselves,
1. For every G ∈ ∇, for any Pi ∈Q∩G, for every P j ∈Q\G, Pi sends xRG to P j over a secure
channel.
2. Each party in Q computes x =∑G∈∇ xRG .
Figure 2.11: Replicated Secret-Sharing.
Replicated secret-sharing is perfect: an unqualified set of parties is contained in at
least one maximally-unqualified set, and is therefore missing at least one share. Since
the shares are uniform subject to the constraint that they sum to the secret, this set of
parties has no information on the secret. Conversely, any qualified set of parties Q is
not contained in any maximally unqualified set, so for each maximally unqualified set
U there is at least one party Pi that is in Q and not in U (otherwise every party in Q is
also in U , so Q is unqualified). Thus the parties in Q collectively hold all shares for all
secrets.
DNF Secret-Sharing




1. The parties agree on an access structure, Γ.
2. For each Q ∈ Γ−, order the parties in Q by their party index and set 1QPi := 1 where Pi is
the first party in set Q and 1QP j := 0 for all j where P j ∈Q and j > i. Set this sharing to be
[[1]]DNF.
Share For party Pi to share a secret x, it does the following:




P j = x.
2. For each Q ∈Γ−, for each P j ∈Q, send xQP j to P j over a secure channel.
Reconstruct For a qualified set of parties Q to open a secret x,
1. A qualified set Q of parties has all shares in the set {xQPi }Pi∈Q. For every Pi ∈Q, for every
P j ∈Q\Pi, Pi sends xQPi to P j over a secure channel.
2. Each party in Q computes x =∑Pi∈Q xQPi .




Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme, developed independently by Blakley [Bla79] and Shamir
[Sha79], is given in Figure 2.13.
Shamir’s Secret-Sharing
Initialize
1. The parties agree on an (n, t)-threshold access structure.
2. The parties assign one distinct element of F to each party and one for the secret. For sim-
plicity, usually Pi is assigned the value i ∈F and the secret is assigned 0.
3. The parties agree on a sharing of 1 defined using the constant polynomial u(X ) := 1.
Share For party Pi to share a secret x, it does the following:
1. Sample a polynomial f ← U (F[X ]) of degree at most t subject to f (0)= x.
2. For each P j ∈P \{Pi}, send f (i) to P j over a secure channel.
Reconstruct For a qualified set of parties Q of size at least t+1 to open a secret x shared via
polynomial f ,
1. Each party Pi ∈Q sends their share f (i) to all other parties in Q over authenticated chan-
nels.
2. Each party in Q interpolates a polynomial f of degree at most t through the points {(i, f (i)) :
Pi ∈Q} and computes x := f (0).
Figure 2.13: Shamir’s Secret-Sharing.







10 11 · · · 1t
20 21 · · · 2t
...
... . . .
...
n0 n1 · · · nt

i.e. a Vandermonde matrix, where the parties on the left of the matrix indicate the
row map, and t = (1,0, · · · ,0)>. In this example, when sharing secret s, the vector x
corresponds exactly to the vector of coefficients of the randomly-sampled polynomial.
2.4.4 Multiplicativity
Some of the protocols in this thesis rely on a property of certain LSSSs called multiplica-
tivity. If an access structure is Q2 then there exists an LSSS for which the parties can
compute an additive secret-sharing of the product of two secrets (shared in the LSSS)
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by local computations. In fact, one can derive a new MSP that realizes a new access
structure. This MSP will be denoted by [[ · ]][2] and will be called the product MSP (or
LSSS).
In order to determine how to combine shares to obtain an additive sharing, one
can use the following method. Recall the definition of the tensor product, ⊗ : Fd1×d2 ×
Fe1×e2 →Fd1e1×d2e2 , where for A = (ai, j) and B = (bi, j),
A⊗B 7→

a1,1B · · · a1,d2B
... . . .
...






b1,1 · · · b1,e2
... . . .
...
be1,1 · · · be1,e2
 · · · a1,d2

b1,1 · · · b1,e2
... . . .
...
be1,1 · · · be1,e2





b1,1 · · · b1,e2
... . . .
...
be1,1 · · · be1,e2
 · · · ad1,d2

b1,1 · · · b1,e2
... . . .
...










This matrix has height m[2] :=∑ni=1 |ρ−1(i)|2 and width d[2] := d2. The map ρ is assumed
monotonic (i.e. the rows of M are grouped according to ownership, and are ordered
according to party index). Define an augmented rowmap ρ[2] as:
ρ[2]( j) := ρ(i) for all j satisfying ∑
k<i
|ρ−1(k)|2 < j < ∑
k≤i
|ρ−1(k)|2.
Then the original MSP is said to be multiplicative if t⊗ t lies in coim(M[2]). In other
words, if there exist (µ(i))i∈[n] such that
〈λ, [[a]]〉 · 〈λ, [[b]]〉 = ∑
i∈[n]
〈µ(i), [[a]]Pi ⊗ [[b]]Pi〉.
The vector µ := (µ(i))i∈[n] from above is a recombination vector for the product MSP.
Example 2.4. Replicated secret-sharing is always multiplicative if the access structure
is Q2: given two secrets x and y shared using replicated secret-sharing, for every pair
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of shares (xRG1 , y
R
G2), there is a party that holds both shares. To see this, recall that a
party receives the share indexed by the set G if and only if it is in G, and observe that
if G1 ∩G2 = ∅ then since G1 = P \U1 and G2 = P \U2 for some U1,U2 ∈ ∆+, it holds
that ∅ = (P \U1)∩ (P \U2) = P \ (U1 ∪U2); i.e. U1 ∪U2 = P , violating the Q2 predicate.
Thus every cross and diagonal term can be computed locally, which means parties can
compute an additive sharing of the product by (arbitrarily) assigning each mixed term
to one party.
Example 2.5. It is easy to see that Shamir’s secret-sharing can be used to obtain an
additive sharing of the product of ` secrets by local computations if it computes a Q`
access structure – that is, an (n,bn−1
`
c)-threshold access structure – since each party can
locally multiply the ` shares they hold to obtain a point on a polynomial of degree at
most most ` · bn−1
`
c ≤ n. This was noted by Ben-Or et al. [BGW88].
Product Access Structure
One can compute the access structure of the product by inspecting the matrix M[2].
Let this access structure be Γ[2]. It clearly holds that Γ[2] ⊆ Γ since the product MSP
is constructed from the original MSP, so any set of parties learning the product of two
secrets also knows the original shares.
2.5 MPC
The goal of MPC is to realize the so-called arithmetic black box introduced by Damgård
and Nielsen [DN03], the active variant of which, denoted by FABB, is given in Fig-
ure 2.14.
The two requirements of MPC protocols are that they must be correct and secure:
that is, the output of the protocol must be correct based on the initial inputs, and the
protocol must “be secure”, which depends on the definition of the security model. Indeed,
security is a nebulous term and is multi-faceted, and often defined on an ad hoc basis:
for example, protocols may be robust – all honest parties obtain the correct output –
or just secure “with abort” – the honest parties either receive the correct output, or
the adversary causes the protocol to abort. The privacy (or secrecy4) of honest parties’
4Some consider privacy to be “passive” and secrecy “active” in the sense that the former is general,
whereas the latter implies the existence of particular information a person wishes to keep hidden.
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inputs is almost always required. In this section, an overview of some of the prevailing
techniques and the meaning of security and correctness in MPC is given.
Functionality FABB
Initialize On input (Initialize,F, sid) from all parties, initialize a new database DB with in-
dexing set DB.Ids and store the field as DB.Field :=F.
Input On input (Input, i, id , x, sid) from party Pi and (Input, i, id ,⊥, sid) from all other parties,
where i ∈ [n], id is a new identifier, and x ∈ DB.Field, set DB[id] := x and insert id into DB.Ids.
Add On input (Add, idx, idy, idz, sid) from all parties, if idx, idy ∈ DB.Ids and idz is a new iden-
tifier, set DB[idz] := DB[idx]+DB[idy] and insert id into DB.Ids
Multiply On command (Multiply, idx, idy, idz, sid) from all parties, if idx, idy ∈ DB.Ids and idz
is a new identifier, store DB[idz] := DB[idx] ·DB[idy] and insert idz into DB.Ids
Output To One On input (Output, i, id , sid) from all parties where id ∈ DB.Ids, if i ∈ A then
send DB[id] to the simulator S. If S responds with OK then continue and otherwise send the
message Abort to all parties, and then halt. Otherwise if i ∈ [n] \ A await a message OK or
Abort from S. If the message is OK then send DB[id] to Pi and continue; otherwise send the
message Abort to all parties, and then halt.
Output To All On input (Output,0, id , sid) from all parties, if id ∈ DB.Ids, send DB[id] to the
simulator S. If S responds with OK then send the value DB[id] to all parties continue, and
otherwise send the message Abort to all parties, and then halt.
Figure 2.14: Arithmetic Black Box Functionality, FABB.
2.5.1 Correctness
The correctness of a protocol Π is defined in terms of whether or not honest parties re-
ceive the same outputs they would in the ideal-world experiment in which they interact
with a functionality F that Π should emulate.
Definition 2.15 (Protocol Correctness). Given a protocol Π realizing an n-party func-
tionality F, for every distinguisher D that is handed the inputs and outputs of all par-
ties, for every initial input x ∈ {0,1}n·poly(σ) where poly ∈ Z[X ] is a polynomial, it holds
that ∣∣Pr[D(x,Π(x))= 1]−Pr[D(x,F(x))= 1]∣∣≤ negl(σ)
where negl :N→R is a negligible function and the probability is taken over the random
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coins of the honest parties and A. The correctness is said to be perfect if negl ≡ 0, or
statistical otherwise.
In the UC framework, the environment Z has strictly more information than the
distinguisher D in the above definition, so correctness is subsumed into security.
There are multiple ways of relaxing correctness:
Security with abort The adversary obtains output and can cause honest parties to
abort before they receive output.
Security with identifiable abort As above, but the honest parties can identify at
least one of the corrupt parties when an abort occurs.
Fairness Either all parties obtain correct output or none of them do.
Guaranteed output delivery/Robustness The adversary cannot prevent honest par-
ties from obtaining output once the inputs have been given.
The focus in this thesis is on providing security with abort, primarily because stronger
guarantees require heavier machinery (i.e. they typically incur greater computation and
communication complexity), leading to less efficient protocols, and because in real-world
applications it is considered a “good enough” level of security.
Adversary Types
Monolithic The corrupt parties operate under a global strategy defined by a PPT Tur-
ing machine called the adversary.
Rushing In a given round5, the adversary receives all honest parties’ communication
before sending its own.
Passive/Active Corruption of parties can be either passive or active. A passively-corrupt
party follows the protocol honestly but may try to glean information from the com-
munication tapes (i.e. the transcript) about other parties’ inputs. An actively-corrupt
party may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. Protocols secure in the presence of
active adversaries are said to provide the strongest security guarantees since they
require the fewest assumptions on the adversary. Security against passive adver-
saries is essential for any MPC protocol to satisfy the secrecy property. Passive
5See Section 2.3.4 for the definition of round.
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security is also known as Semi-honest, Honest-but-curious, Eavesdropping, Fault-
tolerance, and active as Malicious and Byzantine.
Static/Adaptive A static adversary corrupts a set of parties at the beginning of the
protocol and cannot later corrupt other parties. An adaptive adversary can corrupt
parties arbitrarily throughout the protocol.
Computationally-bounded/unbounded The adversary is either assumed to be comp-
utationally-bounded, or unbounded. A computationally-bounded adversary’s com-
puting power is parameterized by the computational security parameter κ.
Remark 2.1. It is possible for multiple adversaries to be working independently in any
given protocol execution, each corrupting different sets of parties. However, any mono-
lithic adversary learns at least as much as any subset of corruptions since it can corre-
late the information and so in the literature this assumption is almost always made.
Remark 2.2. A rushing adversary can be dealt with trivially by all parties first commit-
ting to their message in one round, and then in the next round opening the commitment.
Actively-secure protocols often amortize this cost by opening secrets optimistically and
deferring correctness checks to a single check at the end of the protocol.
2.5.2 Privacy
At a high level, an MPC protocol is said to achieve privacy if no party can learn anything
more about other parties’ inputs than what can be deduced from the final output and
its own inputs alone. As with correctness, privacy is implied in the UC framework,
since if the environment can determine the inputs of honest parties from the protocol
transcript, then it can use this to distinguish between simulator’s emulated inputs and
the real honest parties’ inputs.
It is necessary to think carefully about what functions should be permitted when
performing MPC. For example, any protocol securely computing the XOR of two secret
field elements, one input from each of two parties, will always reveal the other party’s
secret input. A less trivial example is computing the intersection of two private sets:
a malicious party could simply provide as input set to the protocol the whole universe
of inputs, and will then learn exactly the set provided as input by the other party. Un-
der the definition of privacy provided it is possible to create protocols to realize these
functionalities securely, but they are always susceptible to these attacks unless one is
careful to impose restrictions on the parties’ inputs.
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2.5.3 Main Techniques and Paradigms
Since MPC involves interaction amongst sets of parties, communication efficiency is
crucial. Round complexity divides the literature into two broad categories: constant-
round protocols that use so-called garbled circuits, and variable-round protocols that
use an LSSS. In the former, no communication is required to evaluate the circuit: it is
only required for the initial “garbling” and for decoding the result. In the latter, par-
ties continually communicate during circuit evaluation until the result is obtained. One
advantage in LSSS-based solutions is that they directly allow reactive computation,
meaning that parties can compute a circuit, reveal the output, and then compute fur-
ther on secret data not yet revealed; garbled circuits tend to be non-reactive since they
require (highly) function-dependent preprocessing. Generally speaking, garbled circuits
are more efficient in a wide-area network (WAN) setting, where latency is the main bot-
tleneck, and LSSS-based MPC is more efficient in a local-area network (LAN), though
this is not a hard-and-fast rule. As this thesis deals with LSSS-based MPC protocols
until Chapter 8, discussion of garbled circuits (GCs) is deferred until then.
Preprocessing Model: SPDZ Family of Protocols
Perhaps the most common technique employed in MPC protocols to improve their effi-
ciency is to generate preprocessed data that is essentially the desired circuit or function
evaluated on random inputs, and then to “derandomize” it later using the real inputs.
The advantage of doing this is that since the randomized version reveals nothing about
the real circuit inputs (indeed, they may not even be known prior to the derandomiza-
tion step), the parties can perform checks to ensure that the randomized versions are
correct with overwhelming probability in σ. This leaves very little room for the adver-
sary to deviate from the protocol when derandomizing the circuit.
Another advantage to this technique is that while actually computing the circuit
or function may be expensive – for full-threshold MPC, public-key cryptography (PKC)
is needed, for example somewhat-homomorphic encryption (SHE) [BDOZ11, DPSZ12,
KPR18] or oblivious transfer (OT) [NNOB12, FKOS15, KOS16] – the derandomization
process is generally very cheap and is information-theoretic (IT)6.
Beaver’s Circuit Randomization A common technique amongst LSSS-based MPC
protocols is that of circuit randomization. This technique due to Beaver [Bea92] allows
6While the evaluation is IT, the generation of Beaver triples may require a computational assump-
tion, in which case the complete protocol only has computational security.
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a circuit to be evaluated with IT security assuming the existence of so-called Beaver
triples. These are triples of secret-shared values(
[[a]], [[b]], [[a ·b]])
where usually one denotes c := a · b. Together with any sharing of 1, denoted by [[1]],
two secrets [[x]] and [[y]] may be multiplied as follows: the parties reveal the values
[[x−a]] := [[x]]− [[a]] as a public value r and [[y− b]] := [[y]]− [[b]] as a public value s, and
compute
[[x · y]] := r · s · [[1]]+ s · [[a]]+ r · [[b]]+ [[a ·b]].
The security of the protocol comes from the fact that the secrets a and b are uni-
formly random and therefore essentially one-time-pad-encrypt the inputs when they
are opened.
Squaring secrets can be computed using triples, but can also be done with a special
type of preprocessing that can be cheaper to generate, given by [DKL+13]. Suppose the
parties have a pair ([[a]], [[a2]]). Then the parties open r := x−a and compute
[[x2]] := r · ([[x]]+ [[a]])+ [[a2]].
When making use of Beaver’s circuit randomization, circuit evaluation is split into
a preprocessing phase in which one Beaver triple is generated for each multiplication
in the arithmetic circuit, and an online phase in which the triple is derandomized as
described above.
This circuit randomization trivially extends to any multiplicative depth d by com-




as preprocessing, and then derandomizing by broadcasting secrets [[xi]] − [[ai]] for all
i ∈ [d], where [[xi]] are the secrets to be multiplied. However, the length of the tuples
increases exponentially in d and generating them becomes impractical.
Authentication In order to be secure in the presence of an active adversary, triples
are generated using some form of authentication, which ensures that any additive er-
ror introduced on the triple after its generation can be detected. Indeed, notice that
if Beaver’s circuit randomization technique is used, then circuit evaluation on actual
circuit inputs involves only opening secrets and then computing linear operations on
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secret-shared data. Thus, for active security in the online phase (i.e. when the actual
circuit is being evaluated), it suffices to ensure that corrupt parties do not introduce
additive errors on secrets.
The precise method of authentication used generally depends on the access structure
and secret-sharing scheme being used. Some LSSSs contain a sort of internal redun-
dancy that precludes such tampering of secrets essentially “for free”; this is explored in
detail in Chapter 3. Another way to guarantee correctness is to use a verifiable secret-
sharing (VSS) scheme, in which secrets are shared “robustly”: the honest parties can
always reconstruct secrets if the adversary chooses to corrupt shares or to abort.
In full-threshold LSSS-based protocols, authentication is achieved using IT MACs.
The SPDZ protocol due to Damgård et al. [DPSZ12] uses SHE to generate Beaver triples
with IT MACs; an overview of the MACs now follows. In the SPDZ protocol, additive
secret-sharing is used, denoted here by [[ · ]]A. In addition to holding a secret x as a
secret-sharing [[x]]A, parties also hold a sharing of the MAC [[γ(x)]]A := [[α ·x]]A where α is
a MAC “key” sampled uniformly at random from the field, held by the parties as another
sharing [[α]]A. This MAC is linear, so any linear function on the secret – which can be
computed without communication by linearity of the LSSS – can also be evaluated on
the shares of the MAC to obtain a sharing of a MAC on the output. The authenticated
sharing comprising both the secret and its MAC is denoted by [[ · ]] =
(
[[ · ]]A, [[γ(·)]]A
)
.
Remark 2.3. It is important to note that to say the parties hold the sharing [[γ(x)]]A is not
the same as saying Pi holds [[α]]APi ·x for all i ∈ [n] (though this is indeed a valid sharing







i∈[n] [[α · x]]APi =α · x.
Recall that for Beaver multiplication, a sharing of 1 is required, which means that
the parties must have an authenticated sharing of 1, and not just some additive sharing
[[1]]A. For SPDZ, since the global MAC key α is additively shared as [[α]]A, an authenti-
cated sharing of 1 can be obtained by P1 setting [[1]]P1 := (1, [[α]]
A
P1) and all other parties
setting [[1]]Pi := (0, [[α]]
A
Pi ).
Another issue is that of how parties provide inputs with authentication. This has a
simple solution: in order to obtain a MAC on an actual secret, parties can derandomize a
random sharing which already has a MAC: suppose the parties hold [[r]] :=
(
[[r]]A, [[α · r]]A
)
for some uniformly random r unknown to any party; then for party Pi to input a secret x,
the parties send the shares of [[r]]A (but not the shares of the MAC) to Pi, then Pi
reconstructs r, computes ε := x− r, and broadcasts, and then all parties set [[x]] := [[r]]+
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ε · [[1]]; i.e. they compute [[x]]A := [[r]]A+ε · [[1]]A and [[γ(x)]]A := [[γ(r)]]A+ε · [[α]]A.
The process of verifying MACs is not a costly operation and is performed infre-
quently. Further detail is given in Section 4.7.
Sacrifice The process of generating triples with authentication as used in SPDZ is not
the focus of this work. However, the technique known as sacrificing used in [DPSZ12]
and other works will be used later on, and so the outline is given here.
Authentication alone does not not ensure that that the relation c = a · b holds for
each triple. This verification is performed by “sacrificing” one triple to check the correct-
ness of another: parties execute a coin-flipping protocol to agree on some random field
element ρ, open [[r]] := [[a]]− [[a′]] and [[s]] := [[b]]−ρ · [[b′]], and open
[[t]] := r · s · [[1]]+ s · [[a′]]+ r ·ρ · [[b′]]+ρ · [[c′]]− [[c]]
and check that t = 0. If this check passes then the parties output ([[a]], [[b]], [[c]]) and
discard ([[a′]], [[b′]], [[c′]]). If the coin-flipping was unbiased then the probability that c 6=
a · b but it holds that t = 0 is the probability that the adversary sets c+ε and manages
to choose δ to add to c′ so that ρ ·δ−ε= 0, which can be done with probability at most
1/|F| by guessing ρ ahead of time and modifying shares accordingly before the triples
are authenticated.
Techniques have been developed to amortize the sacrifice checks in certain settings:
For example, in the honest majority threshold setting, Choudhury and Patra [CP17]
give a probabilistic approach to verifying the correctness of Beaver triples shared using
Shamir’s secret-sharing. However, the cost of generating extra triples and sacrificing
them to obtain full active security is generally substantial.
Opening secrets efficiently The derandomization procedure involves “opening” se-
crets. In many actively-secure MPC protocols, this is not the same as all parties broad-
casting their share(s) since correctness is not guaranteed until a later point in the pro-
tocol execution as an amortized batch check. For example, if MACs are used to authen-
ticate as described above, then multiple secrets can be revealed, and their MACs can
be verified at a later point in time. With this perspective, the apparent O(n2) overhead
can be avoided: the opening procedure can be performed in two rounds by opening to
a single party and having that party broadcast the reconstructed secret, as shown in
Figure 2.15.
If such a technique is used, it must be possible for the parties to detect if P1 de-






















(b) Two rounds, O(n) communication.
Figure 2.15: Complexity of Broadcasting.
used in MPC protocols designed to scale well with the number of parties; for exam-
ple, Damgård and Nielsen [DN07] offered IT protocols for different types of adversaries
using this procedure.
Authentication and Sacrifice in smaller fields Recall that the chance that the
adversary cheats but the honest parties do not abort depends on the size of the field, as
|F|−1. To obtain statistical security 2−σ for the sacrifice check, dσ/ log |F|e triples must be
used to check each triple; for authentication, the parties must hold dσ/ log |F|e MACs on
every secret (or, equivalently, one MAC in an extension field of degree dσ/ log |F|e).
2.6 Literature Overview
This section contains an overview – which is far from exhaustive – of articles important
for understanding the heritage of protocols in this thesis. A timeline is presented in
Figure 2.16.
The secret-sharing scheme due to Blakley and Shamir [Sha79,Bla79] based on poly-
nomial interpolation is ubiquitous in the literature of MPC protocols for threshold ac-
cess structures. Independently and concurrently, they showed how a secret could be split
up into n pieces and one piece given to each party so that any coalition of parties of size
larger than some fixed threshold t could recover the secret. The linearity of the scheme
– that is, that the sum of the shares of secrets is a sharing of the sum of secrets – makes
it suitable for use in MPC. One of the benefits of Shamir’s scheme over many others is
that each party need only hold a single share per secret; the main disadvantage is that
it only works for threshold access structures.
Goldreich et al. [GMW87] showed that any function is computable assuming a comp-


























































Figure 2.16: Highlights in the Timeline of MPC.
a passive protocol and bootstrap to active security by proving in zero-knowledge7 that
local operations were performed according to the protocol specification. The protocol
requires authenticated channels and a broadcast channel.
Shortly after this, Chaum et al. [CCD88b] showed that assuming parties are con-
7It suffices to understand this as a type of proof in which a prover proves it knows the witness to an
NP statement to a verifier without the verifier learning anything about the witness.
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nected by secure channels, then with no cryptographic assumptions parties can com-
pute a function on their combined secret inputs, even if the adversary corrupts up to
one third of the total number of parties actively, or up to one half passively. The proto-
col relies on a procedure known as cut and choose to ensure secrets are dealt correctly,
which incurs a negligible probability of erroneous output. Concurrently, the protocol of
Ben-Or et al. [BGW88], known as the BGW protocol, showed essentially the same result
(indeed, exactly the same result in the passive case). However, in the active case, CCD
is correct except with negligible probability in σ, whereas BGW uses error-correcting
codes to correct any errors. Another distinction is that BGW computes an arithmetic cir-
cuit whereas CCD computes a Boolean circuit. An efficient implementation of threshold
protocols was given in VIFF [DGKN09].
Following this, Kilian [Kil88] showed that any circuit in NC1 can be computed by two
players using a primitive known as OT. The advantage of this construction over others
is that it does not require generic zero-knowledge proofs for NP statements, instead only
depending on the existence of OT (which is well-established) and a result due to Bar-
rington [Bar86] that gives a method for constructing a branching program of bounded
width and polynomial size for any NC1 circuit. Two decades later, in the same vein of
work founding MPC on OT, Ishai et al. [IPS08] showed how to use OT more efficiently
to overlay passively-secure protocols with a “consistency checking” procedure to obtain
active security in the full-threshold setting.
Secret-sharing has long been of interest independently of MPC. Ito et al. [ISN87]
showed how to construct a LSSS for any access structure. Karchmer and Wigdersen
[KW93] gave a mathematical description of secret-sharing schemes in terms of lin-
ear spaces and generating matrices, known as MSPs. It was shown by Hirt and Mau-
rer [HM97, HM00] and Beaver and Wool [BW98] that if an access structure is Q2 then
fault-tolerant protocols without cryptographic assumptions exist for these access struc-
tures. Maurer [Mau06] showed the same result using replicated secret sharing, where
if the access structure is Q2 then the protocols roughly coincide, and then showed that
assuming the access structure is Q3, by using a VSS scheme a robust protocol can be
constructed also using replicated secret-sharing, which is essentially a generalization
of the actively-secure (n,bn−13 c)-threshold protocols from [CCD88b,BGW88]. Various re-
sults in the secret-sharing literature, such as [CDM00] have led to efficiency improve-
ments in LSSS-based MPC.
Beaver [Bea92] showed how to evaluate a circuit on random inputs in such a way
that it may be derandomized later inexpensively, which has recently been a boon to
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the world of MPC, for example in [BDOZ11, DPSZ12, DKL+13, KOS16, KPR18]. More
generally, the idea of using preprocessing has also been used in the context of evaluating
Boolean circuits [NNOB12,DZ13,FKOS15].
In a line of work quite independent from LSSS-based MPC, in 1986, Yao [Yao86, Oral
presentation] introduced a technique called circuit garbling and showed that two par-
ties could use it to evaluate a Boolean circuit securely on their combined input, assum-
ing passive corruption. The protocol requires only a constant number of rounds and uses
OT. Later, Beaver et al. [BMR90] showed how to garble circuits in the n-party honest-
majority setting assuming secure channels and a broadcast channel. The advantage of
the GC approach over the LSSS approach is that a circuit can be garbled in a constant
number of rounds (i.e. independently of the multiplicative depth of the circuit, on which
LSSS-based MPC protocols typically depend). They also showed how to garble in such
a way that the evaluator need only decrypt one ciphertext per gate, instead of all four,
in a technique called point-and-permute. To select a few highlights in the recent history
of circuit garbling: Lindell and Pinkas [LP07] showed how to obtain an efficient 2-party
protocol secure against active adversaries; Kolesnikov and Schneider [KS08] showed
how to garble XOR gates essentially for free with a stronger assumption on the PRF
used for encryption – a technique called FreeXOR; Pinkas et al. [PSSW09] used polyno-
mial interpolation to reduce the number of ciphertexts that need to be sent per gate; Bel-
lare et al. [BHKR13] showed how to use a fixed-key block cipher to generate the cipher-
texts; and Zahur et al. [ZRE15] used the asymmetry of the garbler/evaluator dichotomy
to halve the communication costs involved in garbling AND gates. More recently, secu-
rity against active adversaries in the n-party setting [HSS17,WRK17b,KY18] has been






This chapter is based on work published at CT-RSA 2019 under the title Error Detection
in Monotone Span Programs with Application to Communication-Efficient Multi-party
Computation [SW19] and was joint work with Nigel Smart. The main contribution of
that work – error-detection for Q2 access structures – is discussed here; its application to
multi-party computation (MPC) is more the focus of Chapter 7.
This chapter In this chapter, some important properties of linear secret-sharing
schemes (LSSSs) that compute Q2 access structures are explored – in particular, they
offer a form of “free authentication”. One can view this as part-way towards a verifiable
secret-sharing (VSS) scheme, except that errors can only be detected, not corrected.
The notion of share reconstructability is also defined and explored, which is a prop-
erty of certain LSSSs and can be viewed as a relaxation of VSS where honest parties can
always determine all shares if they collaborate. It differs from VSS as honest parties do
not know the set of honest parties, so a given honest party does not know which set of
shares of other parties to collaborate to determine the remaining shares. LSSSs that
are share reconstructable provide optimal communication for the protocols described in
the following chapters of this thesis.
3.1 Overview
In the full-threshold SPDZ protocol [DPSZ12] and its successors, e.g. [DKL+13,KOS16],
authentication is achieved with additively-homomorphic message authentication codes
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(MACs), as was outlined in Section 2.5.3: for each secret that is shared amongst the
parties, the parties also share a MAC on that secret. Since the authentication is addi-
tively homomorphic and the sharing scheme is linear, the sum (and consequently scalar
multiple) of authenticated shares is authenticated “for free” by performing the addition
(or scalar multiplication) on the associated MACs. It was shown in Section 2.5.3 that,
assuming the parties are provided with authenticated Beaver triples, multiplication is
also just a linear operation.
One important branch of the authentication methodology contributing significantly
to its practical efficiency is the amortization of verification costs by batch-checking
MACs, a technique developed in [BFO12,DPSZ12,DKL+13], amongst other works. The
idea is that one can check the correctness of multiple linear relations by performing a
single check on a random linear combination of the data items, which has statistical
security if the random coefficients are from a set of size O(2σ).
An orthogonal approach to batch verification for (3,1)-threshold access structures
was introduced by Furakawa et al. [FLNW17]. There they used redundancy in repli-
cated secret-sharing to reduce verification of multiple secrets to a simple procedure in
which parties checked the consistency of (a hash of) their views of the execution.
In the following chapters, full MPC protocols generalizing [FLNW17] are given.
These generalizations depend on the work in this chapter, which extends the “view
comparison” methodology to any Q2 access structure on any number of parties. This is
achieved by proving a folklore result that roughly says that an LSSS is error-detecting
if and only if it is Q2. While this result was fairly-well understood by the community, its
precise formulation and its use in making MPC protocols more efficient was neglected.
Indeed, it was noted by Fehr [Feh99] that a share vector is accepted in an monotone
span program (MSP) if and only if it is rejected by its dual, but the result in this chapter
that shows that the adversary is unable to change share vectors (non-trivially) without
detection for Q2 access structure was not shown, since this fact is of limited interest
outside of MPC.
This chapter explores the two instances in which error-detecting can be performed
if the access structure is Q2 (which occur frequently MPC protocols), which occur when
secrets are revealed:
• If a single party Pi is required to learn a secret, a form of error-detection can be done
on the shares it receives from other parties.
• If all parties are required to learn a secret, the parties engage in a round of commu-
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nication in which not all parties need to communicate with each other. The parties
each reconstruct a view of what they think other parties have received, even if they
have not communicated with all other parties, and then after opening many secrets,
each party hashes the reconstructed view and checks every other party’s hash value
against their own, and aborts if they differ.
Motivating Example
To motivate a study of error-detection, and to aid intuition, consider the following exam-
ple that uses error-correction. Suppose the (7,2)-threshold access structure, which is Q3,
is computed using Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme. Any 3 parties together hold 3 dis-
tinct points on a quadratic, and so they can uniquely identify the polynomial and hence
the secret (defined as the polynomial evaluated at 0). If the adversary corrupts any 2
parties (i.e. an unqualified set) and corrupts their shares, then there are 5 correct shares
remaining. This means that if all parties broadcast their share, the honest parties can
always identify which shares are correct and which are not, since there is only one set
of 5 shares all lying on the same quadratic, and hence the erroneous shares may be
recomputed and the error thereby corrected. This is shown in Figure 3.1a, where every
honest party can determine the correct sharing and hence the correct secret regardless
of what corrupt parties broadcast.
This property allows the construction of an MPC protocol with identifiable abort,
and hence (via a VSS scheme), robust MPC. In fact, Cramer et al. [CDG+05] showed
how the correspondence between LSSSs and linear codes reveals an efficient method by
which qualified parties can correct any errors in a set of shares for some secret if the
access structure is Q3, since if this holds then a strongly-multiplicative LSSS realizing
it allows honest parties to correct any errors introduced by the adversary1. This is not
a direct connection to error-correction codes since such LSSSs do not necessarily allow
unique decoding of the entire share vector: it is only the component of the share vector
corresponding to the secret that is guaranteed to be correct.
The results presented here are parallel, but for Q2. If the access structure is Q2 then
any LSSS realizing it allows honest parties to agree on whether or not the secret is cor-
rect: thus one obtains a form of error-detection. This reveals why the hash-verification
procedure enables error-detection and hence security with abort. Again, an example is
1In a strongly-multiplicative LSSS, any set of parties whose complement is an unqualified set can
compute the product of two secrets. Replicated secret-sharing is strongly multiplicative if the access
structure is Q3.
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Figure 3.1: Errors in Secret-Sharing.
instructive: consider the Q2 access structure (7,3)-threshold and Shamir’s scheme. Any
4 parties hold 4 distinct points on a cubic, so they can uniquely identify the polynomial
and hence the secret. If the adversary corrupts 3 parties and alters their shares, then
there are 4 correct shares remaining. Unlike in the above example, every 4 shares lie
on a cubic (since 4 distinct points determine a unique cubic). If all parties broadcast
their shares, the honest parties cannot know which 3 of the other 6 shares it sees are
correct. In Figure 3.1b, honest party P4 cannot decide which polynomial is correct from
the broadcasted shares alone. However, P4 does know that if not all 7 shares lie on the
same cubic, then some shares must be incorrect: since at least 4 shares are correct (held
by honest parties), there is no possible corruption of 3 shares which causes all 7 points
to lie on the same cubic but for the cubic to be different from the original equation.
In the example above, the error can be detected since the honest parties’ shares
determine the cubic, but this is because the only way all 7 points lie on the same cubic
is if the shares are correct. In different secret-sharing schemes, it is possible for an
unqualified set of shares to be altered so that the resulting share vector is still “valid”,
but in this section it will be shown that “valid” alterations cannot change the encoded
secret if the access structure is Q2.
Dispensing with MACs, the protocol presented here can be instantiated with au-
thentication over small finite fields, or use an LSSS over a ring. In the latter case MSP
must be defined over the ring, and it should be noted that while authentication is now
possible in a ring rather than just a field, the protocols in this thesis are still not (im-
mediately) amenable to computation over arbitrary rings as some procedures (such as
the sacrifice step of generating Beaver triples, outlined in Section 2.5.3) require that the
ring be an integral domain.
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3.2 Opening to One Party
In this section, it will be shown that for an LSSS realizing a Q2 access structure, if
the share vector [[x]] for some secret x is modified with an error vector e ∈ Fm with
unqualified support then [[x]]+e is either no longer a valid share vector (i.e. is not in
im(M)), or the error vector encodes 0, and so by linearity [[x]]+e also encodes x. This
immediately gives an efficient method by which a party to whom a secret is opened (by
all other parties sending that party all of their shares) can check whether or not the
adversary has introduced an error. This process is described at the end of this section.
The procedure of opening to a single party is used in MPC protocols for the parties to
provide input and obtain output in an actively-secure manner.
In more detail, it will be shown that for any MSP computing any Q2 access structure,
there exists a matrix N such that for any vector e 6= 0 for which {Pi : i ∈ ρ (supp(e))} 6∈Γ,
it holds that either N ·e 6= 0, or N ·e= 0 and 〈e,t〉 = 0.
Lemma 3.1. For any MSP M = (F, M,t,ρ) computing a Q2 access structure Γ, for any
vector [[x]] ∈Fm, define X := {Pi : i ∈ ρ (supp([[x]]))}; then
X 6∈Γ =⇒
[[x]] 6∈ im(M), or[[x]] ∈ im(M) and [[x]] = M ·x for some x ∈Fd where 〈x,t〉 = 0.
Proof. If X 6∈ Γ then P \X ∈ Γ since the access structure is Q2. Thus there is at least
one set Q ∈ Γ where Q⊆P \X for which [[x]]Q = 0, by definition of X . Recall that for a
qualified set Q of parties to reconstruct the secret, they take the appropriate recombi-
nation vector λ (which has the property that
{
Pi ∈P : i ∈ ρ(supp(λ))
}⊆Q) and compute
s = 〈λ, [[x]]〉. For this particular Q and corresponding recombination vector λ, it holds
that 〈λ, [[x]]〉 = 〈λQ, [[x]]Q〉 and 〈λQ, [[x]]Q〉 = 〈λQ,0〉 = 0 by the above, so the secret is 0.
Finally, if [[x]] ∈ im(M), then [[x]] = M ·x for some x ∈Fd where 〈t,x〉 = 0, since at least
one qualified set, Q, computes the secret as 0. Otherwise, [[x]] 6∈ im(M), as claimed.
The following lemma shows that if the adversary, controlling an unqualified set of
parties, adds an error vector e to a share vector [[x]], the resulting vector c := [[x]]+e will
either not be a valid share vector, or will encode the same secret as [[x]] (by linearity).
Adding in an error e that does not change the value of the secret can be viewed as the
adversary rerandomizing the shares of corrupt parties.
Lemma 3.2. Let M = (F, M,t,ρ) be an MSP computing Q2 access structure Γ and c :=
[[x]]+e be the observed set of shares, given as a valid share vector [[x]] encoding secret x,
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with error e ∈Fm. Then there exists a matrix N such that{
Pi ∈P : i ∈ ρ(supp(e))
} 6∈Γ =⇒ either e encodes the error e = 0, or N ·c 6= 0
Proof. Let N be any matrix whose rows form a basis of ker(M>) and let e ∈ Fm. By
the Fundamental Theorem of Linear Algebra, ker(M>)= im(M)⊥, so [[x]] ∈ im(M) if and
only if N · [[x]] = 0. Since {Pi ∈P : i ∈ ρ(supp(e))} 6∈ Γ, it holds by Lemma 3.1 that either
e 6∈ im(M), or e ∈ im(M) and e = 0.
If e ∈ im(M) then e = 0 as required, while if e 6∈ im(M) then N ·e 6= 0. In the latter case,
since [[x]] ∈ im(M), it holds that N ·[[x]] = 0 and hence N ·c= N ·([[x]]+e)= N ·[[x]]+N ·e=
0+N ·e 6= 0.
The matrix N is called the cokernel of M, and is analogous to the parity-check matrix
of the code defined by generator matrix M from Coding Theory. The method to open a
secret to a single party Pi is then immediate: all parties send their shares to Pi, who
then concatenates the shares into a share vector [[x]] and computes N · [[x]]. Since the
adversary controls an unqualified set of parties, if N · [[x]] = 0 then by Lemma 3.2 the
share vector [[x]] encodes the correct secret. In this case, Pi recalls any recombination
vector λ and computes the secret as s = 〈λ, [[x]]〉, and otherwise tells the parties to abort.
It was shown in a report by Fehr [Feh99] that the matrix N in fact realizes the dual
access structure by associating to it the same row map ρ as for M. Thus the result
given is a special case of this observation. However, Lemma 3.1 only holds for Q2 access
structures and is the crucial property needed for constructing an MPC protocol secure
with abort.
3.3 Opening to All Parties
In this section, the method for opening secrets to all parties with authentication is given.
To open a secret in a passively-secure protocol, all parties can broadcast all of their
shares so that all parties can reconstruct the secret. This method contains redundancy if
the access structure is not full-threshold since proper subsets of parties can reconstruct
the secret by definition of the access structure. This implies the existence of “minimal”
communication patterns for each access structure and LSSS, in which parties only com-
municate sufficiently for every party to have all shares corresponding to a qualified set
of parties.
In the active setting, the redundancy allows verification of opened secrets: honest
parties can check all parties’ broadcasted shares for correctness – for example, that
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all shares lie on a polynomial of the appropriate degree for Shamir’s secret-sharing.
When reducing communication with the aim of avoiding the redundancy of broadcast-
ing, honest parties must still be able to detect when the adversary sends inconsistent or
erroneous shares.
The trick of the protocol presented here (for arbitrary LSSSs) is for parties to receive
just enough shares to reconstruct the shares they did not see (which is at least the same
as the number of shares they require to reconstruct the secret), and then at the end
check that every party reconstructed the same share vector. To understand this more
concretely, consider Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme once more: a set of t+ 1 distinct
points determines a unique polynomial of degree at most t that passes through them.
This fact not only enables the secret to be computed using t+1 shares, but additionally
allows the entire polynomial, and consequently all other shares, to be determined. The
opening protocol then simply involves each party sending its share to its t left neigh-
bours; by symmetry, each party will receive t shares, and hence can interpolate a poly-
nomial, and thus determine the secret as well as all shares. After doing this possibly
many times, the parties can take a hash of the concatenation of the polynomials (say,
by concatenating the coefficient vectors) and at a later point in time comparing these
hashes. If the hashes are all the same, then all reconstructed vectors are the same, and
hence all parties must have computed the correct secrets. This, in essence, is the idea
behind the protocol of Furakawa et al. [FLNW17] tailored to replicated secret-sharing
in the (3,1)-threshold setting.
For a given LSSS, there is no reason a priori why parties should be able to recon-
struct shares of all parties given just enough shares to reconstruct the secret (though
in Shamir’s secret-sharing this is indeed the case). To allow parties to perform recon-
struction, each party is assigned a set of shares that it will receive, encoded as a map
q : [n]→ 2[m] defined as follows: for each Pi ∈P , define q(i) to be a set Si ⊆ [m] such that:
• ker(MSi )= {0}; that is, the kernel of the submatrix M restricted to the rows indexed
by Si, is trivial; and
• ρ−1({i}) ⊆ Si, where ρ−1 denotes the preimage of the row map ρ; that is, each party
includes all of their own shares in the set Si.
Remark 3.1. If ker(M) 6= {0}, such a map does not necessarily exist. In this situation, the
MSP admits sharings of 0 with unqualified support. In other words, for some LSSSs it
is not the case that any qualified set of parties have enough information to reconstruct
all shares, though obviously the full set of parties suffices and in this case one can set
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q(i) := [m] for every i ∈ [n]. On the other extreme, a formal description of MSPs in which
all qualified sets of parties can reconstruct the entire share vector is given in Section 3.6.
In Section 3.5 a somewhat-optimized algorithm for finding a map q is given. These
sets are used as follows. Each Pi receives a set of shares, denoted by [[xi]]q(i), for a given
secret x, where one hopes that xi = x j for every i, j ∈ [n]. Then in order to reconstruct all
shares, Pi tries to find xi such that [[xi]]q(i) = Mq(i) ·xi and then computes [[xi]] := M ·xi as
the reconstructed share vector, which is then used to update the hash function (locally).
Trivially, one can take q(i)= [m] for every Pi ∈P , which corresponds to broadcasting all
shares; however, better choices of q result in better communication efficiency.
If such an xi does not exist then it must be because the adversary sent one or more
incorrect shares, because [[xi]]q(i) should be a subvector of some share vector. In this
case, the party or parties unable to reconstruct send a message to all parties to abort.
If such an xi does exist for each party then the adversary could still cause different
parties to reconstruct different share vectors (and thus output different secrets), but
then the hashes would differ and the honest parties would abort. The first condition,
ker(MSi ) = {0}, ensures that if all parties follow the protocol, they all reconstruct the
same share vector, since there are multiple possible share vectors for a given secret,
otherwise an honest execution may lead to an abort.
Indeed, the only thing the adversary can do without causing abort – either when
opening secrets or later on when hashes are compared – is to change its shares so that
when they are combined with the honest parties’ shares, they form a valid share vector.
Intuitively, one can think of this as the adversary rerandomizing the shares owned only
by corrupt parties, which is not possible in Shamir or replicated secret-sharing, but in
general is possible if and only if the LSSS admits non-trivial share vectors with un-
qualified support (for example, in disjunctive normal form (DNF)-based secret-sharing
that was described in Section 2.4.3). Note that Lemma 3.2 prevents the adversary from
changing the secret by changing shares of corrupt parties (without this being detected).
If the adversary does choose to force different honest parties to compute different share
vectors (albeit sharing the same secret), then the honest parties will only abort after
comparing hash outputs, instead of during the opening procedure; note that if this is
the only form of cheating then the output will actually be correct, even though the par-
ties abort, which is undesirable as it offers “more ways” the adversary can cause the
protocol to abort, but does not make a difference since the adversary can always abort
just before output is given.
The intuition above can be summarized in the following lemma, that says that if all
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parties are able to reconstruct share vectors and the share vectors are consistent, then
the adversary cannot have introduced an error.
Lemma 3.3. Let q : [n] → 2[m] be any map satisfying ker(MSi ) = {0} and ρ−1({i}) ⊆ Si
for all i ∈ [n] for an LSSS realizing a Q2 access structure, and let [[xi]]q(i) denote the
subvector of shares received by party Pi for a given secret. Suppose it is possible for each
party Pi ∈ P to find a vector xi such that [[xi]]q(i) = Mq(i) ·xi and let [[xi]] := M ·xi for
each i ∈ [n]. If [[xi]] = [[x j]] for every pair of honest parties Pi and P j, then xi = x j for all
i, j ∈ [n].
Proof. The existence of q follows from the fact that “at worst” one can take q(i) = [m]
for every Pi ∈P . Since each party Pi can find some xi such that [[xi]]q(i) = Mq(i) ·xi, and
ker(Mq(i))= {0} for every Pi ∈P by the first requirement in the definition of q, in fact xi
is the unique solution in each case.
Let A denote the set of corrupt parties. Since A is unqualified, the honest parties
form a qualified set Q=P \A since the access structure is Q2.
Each honest party uses their own shares in the reconstruction process by the sec-
ond requirement in the definition of q, so if [[xi]] = [[x j]] for every pair of honest parties
Pi and P j, then in particular they all agree on a qualified subvector defined by honest
shares – i.e. [[xi]]Q = [[x j]]Q for every pair of honest parties Pi and P j. Thus some qual-
ified subvector of the share vector is well defined, which uniquely defines the secret by
definition of MSP.
As mentioned in the introduction, the results in the last two sections are somewhat
analogous to the result of Cramer et al. [CDG+05, Thm 1] which roughly shows that for
a strongly multiplicative LSSS implementing a Q3 access structure, honest parties can
always agree on the correct secret (when all parties broadcast their shares).
Why not hash the secrets? In light of the fact that parties are merely agreeing on
the opened value each time a secret is opened, intuitively one might think it suffices to
compare the secrets reconstructed each time, and not the share vectors. However, this
is not sufficient as one must account for a rushing adversary (see Section 2.5.1) as in
the following example.
Example 3.1. This example demonstrates that hashing the secrets opened to all par-
ties is insufficient to prevent an adversary from causing honest parties to agree on the
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where the labels of the rows indicate the row map and where t= (1,1,1). One can check
that the associated access structure is defined by
Γ− = {{1,2}, {1,3}, {1,4}, {2,3,4}}.





One can check that it satisfies the requisite properties. Suppose the adversary corrupts
party P1. In this case, since q specifies that every other party receives a share only from
P1, A can easily cause the parties to open the secret ŝ of its choosing as follows:
When A receives P2’s share s3, it samples x′ subject to 〈t,x′〉 = ŝ and 〈(1,0,1),x′〉 =










and sends s′1 and s
′
2 to P2.
When A receives P3’s share s4, it samples x′′ subject to 〈t,x′′〉 = ŝ and 〈(0,1,1),x′′〉 =










and sends s′′1 and s
′′
2 to P3.
2Note that system is underconstrained so x′ certainly exists.
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Finally, when A receives P4’s share s5, it samples x′′′ subject to 〈t,x′′′〉 = ŝ and










and sends s′′′1 and s
′′′
2 to P4.
Now P2, P3 and P4 agree on a secret ŝ. While the shares are now inconsistent (i.e. it
does not hold that s′1 = s′′1 = s′′′1 and s′2 = s′′2 = s′′′2 ), a comparison of the hash of the secret
would not reveal this cheating behaviour.
3.4 Error-detection in Standard LSSSs
Perhaps the four most well-known LSSSs are additive, Shamir’s, replicated, and DNF-
based, as were outlined in Section 2.4.3. In this section, the error-detection property is
explained as it applies to the last three LSSSs (since additive secret-sharing cannot be
used to realize a Q2 access structure).
3.4.1 Shamir’s Secret-Sharing
In the language of Coding Theory, error-detection for Shamir’s secret-sharing is just
checking whether or not the syndrome of the codeword (i.e. the share vector) is 0. For
a (5,2)-threshold access structure, Shamir’s secret-sharing can be expressed as an MSP













and t= (1,0,0)>. The cokernel can be written as the image of the matrix
N =
(
1 0 −6 8 −3
0 1 −3 3 −1
)
.
Now observe that if it holds for some vector e that {Pi ∈ P : i ∈ ρ(supp(e))} 6∈ Γ, then e
encodes the evaluations of a polynomial f of degree at most 2 that has at least three
zeroes, so f ≡ 0 and hence e= 0, and so trivially N ·e= 0.
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3.4.2 Replicated Secret-Sharing
Consider the replicated secret-sharing for the (3,1)-threshold access structure, described















where t= (1,1,1)> ∈F3. Let N be the cokernel of M; one possible choice is:
N =

1 0 0 −1 0 0
0 1 0 0 −1 0
0 0 1 0 0 −1
 .
As with Shamir’s secret-sharing, there are no share vectors with unqualified support:
if N ·e = 0, then e is of the form (e1,e2,e3,e1,e2,e3)> where ei ∈ F. However, the image
under ρ of the support of an error with this form (for which the encoded secret is non-
zero) is necessarily qualified: for example, ρ(supp((1,0,0,1,0,0)>))= {1,2} ∈Γ). Thus the
adversary cannot change the share vector so that the new shares encode the same se-
cret, let alone change the share so that it shares a different secret, without the resulting
vector not being in im(M).
3.4.3 DNF-based Sharing
Consider the Q2 access structure given by
Γ− = {{1,2}, {1,3}, {1,4}, {2,3,4}}
∆+ = {{1}, {2,3}, {2,4}, {3,4}}.
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1 −1 0 0 0 0
1 0 −1 0 0 0
1 0 0 −1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 −1 −1
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1





−1 1 0 −1 0 1 0 0 0
−1 0 1 −1 0 0 0 1 0
−1 0 0 −1 1 0 1 0 1
 .
For example, the vector (0,0,0,0,0,0,e5,0,−e5)> ∈ F9 is the image of (0,0,0,0,e5,−e5)>
for any e5 ∈ F, and it has unqualified support, namely {3,4}. However, observe that its
image under N is 0, as required.
3.5 Finding a Reconstruction Map
Before providing the opening protocol, first an algorithm to find a map q such that
|supp(q(i))| is “quite small”, for all i, is given. See Section 3.3 for the definition of q.
In the MPC protocols later, each party computes this algorithm and selects the lexico-
graphically first map, having already agreed on the access structure Γ and ordering its
sets lexicographically. There is a choice as to whether to minimize the number of im-
plied uni- or bi-directional channels. In the algorithm, by choosing the qualified sets as
described one (crudely) optimizes the number of uni-directional channels.
For the algorithm given in Figure 3.2, the MSP matrix M is assumed to have linearly-
independent columns, since if not then a linearly-independent subset can be taken to
obtain a new LSSS which realizes the same access structure [BGP95]. It is also assumed
that ρ is monotonically increasing so that each party owns a contiguous submatrix of
M. If it is not, the rows can be interchanged so that this is true.
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Algorithm for Determining Map q
Input MSP (F, M,t,ρ) and corresponding access structure Γ. Recall M ∈Fm×d .
Output Map q.
Algorithm
1. For each Pi ∈P ,
a) Set A := MPi , S :=∅, k := 1.
b) Set Q ∈Γ− to be a smallest minimally qualified set containing Pi.
c) Set k := 1.
d) While rank(A)< d and k ≤ m Do
i. While Pρ(k) 6∈Q and k < m Do
A. Set k := k+1.
ii. End While.
iii. If k ≤ m and the row Mk of M is linearly independent of the rows of A then
A. Append Mk as a new row of A.
B. S := S∪ {k}.
iv. End If.
v. Set k := k+1.
e) End While.
f) k := 1.
g) While rank(A)< d and k ≤ m Do
i. While Pρ(k) ∈Q and k < m Do
A. Set k := k+1.
ii. End While.
iii. If k ≤ m and the row Mk of M is linearly independent of the rows of A then
A. Insert Mk into A.
B. S := S∪ {k}.
iv. End If.
v. k := k+1.
h) End While.
i) Set q(i) := S.
2. End For.
3. Output q.
Figure 3.2: Algorithm for Determining Map q.
3.6 Share-Reconstructability
To conclude this chapter, the notion of share-reconstructability is defined. An MSP that
is share-reconstructable is one in which share vectors can be reconstructed entirely from
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any qualified subvector. They are of interest because their use offers particularly good
communication efficiency inΠOpen, as q(i) is “as small as possible” for each Pi ∈P , which
minimizes communication. If an MSP that is both share-reconstructable and ideal (such
as Shamir’s scheme) is used, then the communication cost attains its minimum for that
access structure.
Definition 3.1. Let M = (F, M,t,ρ) be an MSP, where ker(M) = {0}, computing a Q2
access structure Γ. M is called share-reconstructable if for every s ∈ im(M), for every
Q ∈Γ, sQ uniquely determines the vector s.
The following lemma is a restatement but provides a more concrete check of whether
or not a given MSP is share-reconstructable, though it requires the computation of
exponentially-many submatrices (naïvely).
Lemma 3.4. Let M= (F, M,t,ρ) be an MSP, where ker(M)= {0}, computing a Q2 access
structure Γ. Then M is share-reconstructable if and only if for every Q ∈ Γ it holds that
ker(MQ)= {0}.
Proof. Suppose MQ has full column rank for all Q ∈Γ, and that there exist s,s′ ∈ im(M)
such that s 6= s′ but sQ = s′Q for some Q ∈ Γ. Then let M ·x = s and M ·x′ = s′. Then
MQ · (x−x′) = MQ ·x−MQ ·x′ = sQ−s′Q = 0, so since ker(MQ) = {0}, we have x = x′. But
then s = M ·x = M ·x′ = s′, which is a contradiction. Thus no such pair of share vectors
exist, so M is share-reconstructable.
Suppose there exists some Q ∈ Γ such that ker(MQ) 6= {0} and suppose we are given
sQ 6= 0. Fix some x such that sQ = MQ ·x and fix k ∈ ker(MQ)\{0}. We have MQ ·(x+k)=
MQ ·x+MQ ·k= sQ+0= sQ. Let s= M ·x and s′ = M ·(x+k). Since ker(M)= {0} and k 6= 0
it holds that M ·k 6= 0, so s′ = M · (x+k)= M ·x+M ·k 6= M ·x= s; but sQ = s′Q, so sQ does
not have a unique reconstruction, and hence M is not share-reconstructable.
Example 3.2. Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme is an example of a share-reconstructable
LSSS since any t rows of the Vandermonde matrix are linearly independent.
Example 3.3. Consider the access structure defined by Γ− = {{1,2}, {1,3}, {1,4}, {2,3,4}}
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where t = (1,1,1)>. The reader may check that ker(MQ) = {0} for every Q ∈ Γ−, so given
sQ there is always a unique solution to MQ ·x= sQ for x, and hence s can be determined
from sQ by finding x and computing s= M ·x.
We know by Lemma 3.1 that for any MSP computing a Q2 access structure, share
vectors all have qualified support unless they encode the secret 0; to allow a unique
construction of each share vector from qualified subsets, share-reconstructable MSPs
are those for which the secret 0 is only encoded via the zero vector or with share vectors
with qualified support.
Lemma 3.5. Let M= (F, M,t,ρ) be an MSP, where ker(M)= {0}, computing a Q2 access
structure Γ. Then M is share-reconstructable if and only if
s ∈ im(M) =⇒ ρ(supp(s)) ∈Γ∪ {∅}
for all s ∈Fm.
In other words, M is share-reconstructable if and only if the only share vector with
unqualified support which encodes the secret 0 is the zero vector. For intuition, one
can think of Shamir’s scheme: the only polynomial of degree at most t which has at
least n− t > t zeros is the zero polynomial. The statement is corollary to the previous
lemmata by linearity of the MSP, but we give the formal proof below.
Proof. Suppose that M is not share-reconstructable. Then there exists Q ∈ Γ for which
∃ x ∈ ker(MQ) such that x 6= 0. Since MQ ·x = 0 it holds that ρ(supp(Mx)) ⊆ P \Q,
which is unqualified, since Γ is Q2. Since ker(M)= {0} and x 6= 0, it holds that M ·x 6= 0.
Now M ·x ∈ im(M), is non-zero, and has unqualified support. In other words, we have
M ·x ∈ im(M) and supp(M ·x) 6∈Γ∪ {∅}.
Conversely, suppose there exists some s ∈ im(M) such that supp(s) 6∈Γ∪{∅}, i.e., s 6= 0
and supp(s) is unqualified. Let x be such that s = M ·x, which exists since s ∈ im(M).
Then Q :=P\ρ(supp(s)) is qualified since Γ is Q2. Since sQ = 0, we have MQ ·x= sQ = 0,
so x ∈ ker(MQ). If x= 0 then s= M ·x= 0; but supp(s) 6=∅, so this is not the case, and so
ker(MQ) 6= {0}, and thus M is not share-reconstructable by Lemma 3.4.
Share-reconstructable MSPs yield comparatively communication-efficient instanti-




Theorem 3.1. For every Q2 access structure there exists a share-reconstructable MSP
computing it.
Proof. Replicated secret-sharing is always share-reconstructable since a qualified set of
parties together hold all shares by definition and so can vacuously compute the shares





This chapter is based on results from [SW19], as detailed in Section 1.2, which was joint
work with Nigel Smart.
This chapter This chapter describes how to model secret-sharing-based multi-party
computation (MPC) (with active security) less abstractly than previous work, by the
functionalities explicitly referencing the linear secret-sharing schemes (LSSSs) being
used to execute MPC. Modelling in this way provides a framework for the MPC protocols
described later which is crucial for the protocol presented in Chapter 5.
4.1 Overview
In this chapter, a preprocessing functionality is built up from an “opening” functional-
ity, which takes a LSSS and adds authentication. This allows one to talk of shares held
by parties as in [DPSZ12] instead of handles of elements in an “authenticated dictio-
nary” as in MASCOT [KOS16] and Overdrive [KPR18]. One of the benefits of modelling
using linear authentication functionalities was that it apparently helped to unify the
somewhat-homomorphic encryption (SHE) and oblivious transfer (OT) approaches of
preprocessing in the full-threshold context.
Concretely, the reasons for talking about shares rather than identifiers are as fol-
lows.
• Abstracting from the view that the secrets are shared using a form of authenticated
LSSS makes it difficult to build protocols that use this data explicitly. If the protocol
is built with a particular functionality in mind (as is the case for many protocols),
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it is logical to built up in this way. However, if a modular approach is taken with
the view in mind of allowing greater latitude in what protocols can be realized from
more basic subprotocols, modelling in this way imposes unnecessary restriction. For
example, in the outsourcing protocol in Chapter 5, the natural process of resharing
a secret amongst a different set of parties is not possible when treating preprocessed
data merely as a dictionary.
• By modelling the “opening” of secrets specifically, an asynchronous protocol can be
obtained by changing the opening functionality. So far the discussion has been lim-
ited to synchronous networks, but in the functionality FOpen presented in this chap-
ter, communication in online protocols exclusively uses commands in FPrep (as an ex-
tension of FOpen). Consequently, any asynchronous protocol securely realizing FOpen
should give an asynchronous protocol realizing FABB.
The compromise taken in this chapter is to treat the authentication as black-box but
to retain the shares, which reflects the fact that there exist different ways of authenti-
cating depending on the access structure and LSSS. For example, it was shown in Chap-
ter 3 that a LSSS realizing a Q2 access structure is in a sense “self-authenticating”; in
the full-threshold context, different types of information-theoretic (IT) message authen-
tication code (MAC) can be used – for example, the global MAC used in SPDZ, described
in Section 2.5.3. This modelling also dovetails well with non-LSSS-based MPC protocols
(i.e. garbled circuits [LPSY15,LSS16,WRK17a,WRK17b,HSS17,HOSS18b,HOSS18a])
which often realize functionalities generating authenticated secret-shared bits.
In more detail, the parties will realize an “opening” functionality FOpen that checks
whether or not shares are correct as the parties open secrets. The main difference be-
tween this functionality and the linear authentication functionality is that it does not
store secrets itself: instead, an initialization step “commits” the parties to open only
“valid” secrets in the scheme. (One can think of this as commitments to shares of the
MAC in the full-threshold setting, which is achieved in SPDZ by the parties broadcast-
ing an encryption of their share of the MAC key.) This is closer to what actually happens
in a protocol execution since shares can be locally modified by an active adversary: in-
stead of the functionality storing secrets and the simulator introducing an error, the
functionality accepts shares and causes an error specifically by sending an invalid set
of shares.
The benefits of modelling in this way manifest themselves throughout the remainder
of this thesis, allowing all of the protocols to be phrased in the same language, realizing
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the same functionalities with respect to different access structures. This does not make
the modelling here better per se, but it enables description of a wider range of protocols
in the same language, which is very helpful for the protocols in this thesis. In previous
works such as [DPSZ12,DKL+13], shares (not handles to secrets) were modelled but the
functionalities were specific to the LSSS and method of authentication.
4.2 Opening Functionality
In this section the functionality FOpen is presented, which is generic in the sense that it
allows any linear secret-sharing scheme combined with a linear authentication scheme
to check secrets are opened correctly.
The degree of abstraction of a functionality is a design choice. For example, the clas-
sical arithmetic black box from Section 2.5 could more succinctly be described as a box
accepting any arithmetic circuit as input and providing the parties with output. Instead,
in practice cryptographers choose to realize a black box in which more fundamental op-
erations, specifically, addition and multiplication, can be computed separately.
The functionality FOpen that will be presented in this section is not a significant
abstraction from the protocol that will realize it in Chapter 3: its purpose is to encode all
information about secret-sharing, and error-detection therein, with high-level function
calls. Abstracting to this degree, and no further, has the advantage of allowing both
abstract references to opening secrets with authentication, and low-level manipulation
of the secret-shared data, without the need to fiddle around with the details of how
secrets are authenticated.
The functionality is not a full verifiable secret-sharing (VSS) scheme as the secret
may not necessarily be learnt by honest parties if the adversary causes an abort to
occur. This relaxation matches the technique common to MPC literature of conceding
full robustness to “security with abort”. The functionality also involves a “checking”
procedure – that is, secrets are opened optimistically and then checked later – which
is analogous to the verification step of a VSS scheme. The key difference between this
“authenticated opening” functionality and a full VSS scheme is its failure to achieve
robustness.
Authentication During initialization of the functionality, the parties specify the LSSS
they wish to use. In the context of an LSSS realizing a Q2 access structure, the results
of Chapter 3 show that no further information beyond the description of the LSSS is
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required to allow secrets to be authenticated. However, it may be that parties wish to
authenticate in a different way – for example, using an IT MAC, such as in the full-
threshold setting. For clarity of notation, this detail is omitted from the functionality
description, for which the focus is the Q2 setting, but one can think of the LSSS pro-
vided in the command (as [[·]]) as “containing” information regarding the authentication.
A high-level view of how this works is given in Section 4.7.
From this point onwards, [[ · ]] is taken to mean a secret is secret-shared and au-
thenticated – be that “for free” in the Q2 setting, or with MACs in the full-threshold
setting.
The functionality FOpen can be viewed as an extension FBroadcast but for clarity is
kept as a separate functionality. For now, the map q : [n]→ 2[m] can be defined as q(i)=
[m] for all i ∈ [n] and encodes which shares should be received by Pi for all i ∈ [n];
in Section 3.3, it is shown that it is not necessary for all parties to receive all shares





Initialize On input (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]], sid) from each honest party and from S on behalf of
corrupt parties, set Abort to false. Compute the error matrix N for [[ · ]].
Send On input (Send, x, j, sid) from Pi, or from S if i ∈ A, send x to P j, or to S if j ∈ A.
Broadcast On input (Broadcast, x, sid) from Pi, or from S if i ∈ A, await n−1 further calls with
input (Send, x j, j, sid) for all j ∈ [n]\ (A∪ {i}). If xi 6= x j for any i 6= j, set Abort to true.
Open To One On input (Open, i, id , sid) from all honest parties and S, do the following:
1. For each j ∈ [n]\ A, await a vector of shares [[x]]P j from honest party P j.
2. If i ∈ [n]\ A,
a) Await a vector of shares [[x]]A from S. If N · [[x]] 6= 0 then set Abort to true.a
b) Set x := 〈λ, [[x]]〉 and send x to Pi.
If i ∈ A,
a) Send [[x]]P\A to S.
b) Await a message OK or Abort from S. If the message is OK then continue; otherwise
send the message Abort to all honest parties, and then halt.
Open To All On input (Open,0, id , sid), the functionality does the following:
1. For each i ∈ [n]\ A, await a vector of shares [[x]]Pi from honest party Pi.
2. Send {[[x]]k : ρ(k) ∈ [n]\ A and k ∈ q(A)} to S.
3. Await a message OK or Abort from S. If the message is Abort, then send the message Abort
to all honest parties, and then halt; otherwise, continue.
4. Await a set of vectors of shares {[[xi]]k : ρ(k) ∈ A and k ∈ q([n]\ A)}i∈[n]\A or a message Abort
from S. If the message is Abort, then send the message Abort to all honest parties, and then
halt; otherwise, continue.
5. For each i ∈ [n]\ A, set xi = 〈λiq(i), [[xi]]q(i)〉, solve Mq(i) ·xi = [[xi]]q(i) for xi and send xi to Pi;
if there are no solutions, send the message Abort to all honest parties, and then halt. If
xi 6= x j for any i, j ∈ [n]\ A then set Abort to true.
Verify On input (Verify, sid) from all honest parties and S, await a message OK or Abort from S.
If the message is OK and Abort is false then send the message OK to all honest parties and
continue; otherwise send the message Abort to all honest parties, and then halt.
aNote that for a full-threshold access structure, N is the zero matrix.
Figure 4.1: Opening Functionality, FOpen.
Notice that the honest parties send all of their shares to FOpen. This reflects the fact
that FOpen is essentially a subroutine to which the parties send their shares: the fact
that they only actually “send” a subset of shares to other parties is acknowledged in the
protocol realizing FOpen.
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It is also important to note that the adversary may send erroneous share vectors to
honest parties when providing input: if the adversary corrects this error later on, the
parties should not abort, which is why the functionality does not flag for an abort to
occur on receiving shares for honest parties as in input for a corrupt party. This makes
the simulation more “natural” in the sense that S need not keep a record of whether
or not it should abort after each input: it merely executes exactly as the honest parties
would, aborting as appropriate.
4.3 Opening Protocol
The protocol ΠOpen given in Figure 4.5 uses the results of Chapter 3 to define a sort of
“authenticated opening” protocol. Note that although the hash function is not guaran-
teed to be hiding, parties only hash shares of secrets that are being made public, so no
secret information is leaked when the hashes are revealed. Indeed, it would suffice for
parties to send the reconstructed share vectors to each other and verify they are the
same as what each computed itself: the hash function is used simply to amortize this
cost. This also means it does not matter if the hash function is evaluated on “short”
inputs (say, where the string is fewer than κ bits long) since the only thing that matters
is that honest parties agree on what the output is (and will abort if not the case). This
is one advantage of only requiring security with abort rather than full robustness.
4.3.1 Agreement Protocol
The agreement of parties on local secrets is dependent both on broadcasted elements
and on reconstructed elements which are computed from local data and are expected
(optimistically) to be the same for all honest parties. In the context of security with
abort, “broadcast” can be achieved over point-to-point secure channels, as was discussed
in Section 2.3.4; it is abstracted as the functionality FBroadcast.




Initialize On input (Initialize, sid) from all parties, where sid is a new session identifier, set
Abort to false.
Add To Agreement On input (Agree, xi, sid) from Pi for all i ∈ [n], or from S if i ∈ A, if xi 6= x j
for some j 6= i then set Abort to true.
Verify On input (Verify, sid) from all parties and S, await a message Abort or OK from S. If
the message is OK and Abort is false, send the message OK to all honest parties and continue;
otherwise, send the message Abort to all honest parties, and then and halt.
Figure 4.2: Agreement Functionality, FAgreement.
The protocol to realize FAgreement makes use of a hash function. When implementing
the hash function in practice, while one could write that the parties store the string str
as the protocol is executed (which may be of arbitrary length and appended through-
out) and that they evaluate the hash function at the end; instead, in order to model
real-world practice, in the protocol as soon as this string is larger than some length
parameter, parties begin to evaluate. This can be expressed by writing that the hash
function is initialized and then its state is updated using consecutive chunks of the
string, i.e. by writing str = str1‖· · ·‖str t and to evaluate one executes H.Initialize()
and then a sequence of updates
H.Update(str1), . . . ,H.Update(str t)
and finally compute h :=H.Finalize(). This application programming interface (API)
is given in Figure 4.3.
Hash Function Interface
Given an efficiently-computable function H : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}κ, a stateful object H is defined to have
the following three procedures. To evaluate H on an input m = m1‖· · ·‖mt−1‖Padd(mt) where
Padd denotes a padding function, where each mi is of the correct block size len, do the following:
Initialize When H.Initialize() is called, set state(IV ) where IV is the initialization vector.
Update When H.Update(mi) is called, update state according to the description of the hash
function.
Output When H.Finalize() is called, perform any finalization procedure prescribed by the hash
function definition and then return state.
Figure 4.3: Hash Function Interface.
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Finally, the protocol is given in Figure 4.4. It uses the algorithm given in Figure 3.2
to determine a map q.
Protocol ΠAgreement
This protocol is realized in the FBroadcast-hybrid model.
Initialize
1. The parties agree on a new session identifier sid and call FBroadcast with input
(Initialize, sid).
2. The parties agree on and initialize a hash function H : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}κ implemented by the
stateful object H (see Figure 4.3) and each party initializes it by executing H.Initialize().
They obtain a parameter len.
3. For each i ∈ [n], party Pi locally sets stri := ε (the empty word).
Add To Agreement If each party holds xi and they want to check that xi = x j for all i, j ∈ [n],
each party Pi does the following:
1. Interpret xi as a binary string and append it to the current string to check, stri := stri‖xi,
where ‖ denotes concatenation of strings.
2. If |stri| > len then set s to be the first len bits of stri, compute H.Update(s), and truncate
the first len bits off stri.
Verify To verify all values so far, each Pi ∈P does the following:
1. Execute H.Update(stri) (multiple times, with padding if necessary) and then set hi :=
H.Finalize().
2. Call FBroadcast with input (Broadcast,hi, sid) and await the messages {h j} j∈[n]\{i} from
other parties.
3. Call FBroadcast with input (Verify, sid), and if it aborts, or if h j 6= hi for any j ∈ [n] \ {i},
then (locally) output ⊥, and then halt; otherwise, continue.




This protocol is realized in the FAgreement-hybrid model. If at any point a party receives the mes-
sage Abort, it runs the subprotocol Abort.
Initialize
1. Agree on a session identifier sid , and then agree on the Q2 access structure, Γ, and an
monotone span program (MSP) [[ · ]] realizing it.
2. Execute the algorithm in Figure 3.2 to obtain the map q.
3. For each i ∈ [n], each party computes λi as the lexicographically first recombination vector
such that supp(λi)⊆ q(i).
4. Call an instance of FAgreement with input (Initialize, sid).
Send Party Pi sends a secret x to P j over a secure channel.
Broadcast When Pi calls this procedure to broadcast a value x,
1. Party Pi sends the secret x to all other players over pair-wise secure channels; let x j denote
the value received by P j.
2. All parties call FAgreement with input (Agree, x j, sid).
Open To One To open a secret [[x]] to one party Pi, the parties do the following:
1. Each P j ∈ P \ {Pi} sends [[x]]P j to Pi, who concatenates local and received shares into a
vector [[x]].
2. Party Pi computes N · [[x]]; if it is equal to 0, Pi (locally) outputs s = 〈λi, [[x]]〉, and otherwise
runs Abort.
Open To All To open a secret [[x]] to all parties, each Pi ∈P does the following:
1. Retrieve from memory the recombination vector λi.
2. For each P j ∈P , for each k ∈ q( j)⊆ [m], if ρ(k)= i then Pi sends [[x]]k to P j over an authen-
ticated channel.
3. For each k ∈ q(i), wait to receive [[x]]k from party Pρ(k).
4. Concatenate local and received shares into a vector [[x]]iq(i) ∈F|q(i)|.
5. Solve Mq(i) ·xi = [[x]]iq(i) for xi. If there are no solutions, run Abort.
6. Call FAgreement with input (Agree,xi, sid).
7. (Locally) output x = 〈λiq(i), [[x]]iq(i)〉.
Verify The parties call FAgreement with input (Verify, sid). If the functionality sends the mes-
sage Abort then the parties run Abort; otherwise they continue.
Abort If a party calls this subroutine, or if it receives a message Abort from any other party, it
sends a message Abort to each other party over a secure channel, (locally) outputs ⊥, and then
halts.
Figure 4.5: Opening Protocol, ΠOpen.
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Theorem 4.1. The protocol ΠOpen universal composability (UC)-securely realizes the
functionality FOpen against a static, active adversary in the FAgreement-hybrid model.
Simulator SOpen
Initialize
1. Agree on a session identifier sid with A, and then agree on the Q2 access structure, Γ, and
an MSP [[ · ]] realizing it, with A; then call FOpen with input (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]], sid).
2. Execute the algorithm in Figure 3.2 to obtain the map q.
3. For each i ∈ [n], compute λi as the lexicographically first recombination vector such that
supp(λi)⊆ q(i).
4. Await the call to FAgreement with input (Initialize, sid) from A and initialize a local
instance.
Send If Pi ∈A is sending a message to P j ∈P \A, then await x from A and then call FOpen with
input (Send, x, j, sid). If P j ∈A is awaiting a message from honest party Pi ∈P \A, then await
a message x from FOpen and forward x to A.
Broadcast
1. When Pi calls this procedure to broadcast a value ε,
If i ∈ [n]\ A, await ε from FOpen and forward this to A.
If i ∈ A, await a set of inputs {εi}i∈[n]\A from A, and then call FOpen with input
(Broadcast,εi, sid) for any i followed by inputs (Send,εi, i, sid)i∈[n]\A .
2. Await the call to FAgreement with input (Agree, x j, sid) and execute it honestly with A.
Open To One To open [[x]] to Pi,
If Pi ∈P \A,
1. Await a vector of shares [[x]]A from A.
2. Send the vector [[x]]A to FOpen.
If Pi ∈A,
1. Await the share vector [[x]]P\A from FOpen and send [[x]]P\A to A.
2. If A sends the message Abort then send the message Abort to FOpen; otherwise send the
message OK.
Open To All
1. For each emulated honest party Pi ∈ P \A, retrieve from memory the recombination vec-
tor λi.
2. Await a set of share vectors {[[x]]q(i)∩ρ−1([n]\A) : i ∈ [n]\ A} from FOpen and send these to A.
3. Await a message set of vectors of shares {[[x]]q(i)∩ρ−1(A) : i ∈ [n]\ A} from A. If the shares are
not sent, or if A sends a message Abort, then send the message Abort to FOpen; otherwise,
send the message OK and forward the share vectors to FOpen.




5. Solve Mq(i) ·xi = [[xi]]q(i) for xi. If there are no solutions, then send the message Abort to A
(emulating an honest party’s message) and halt; otherwise, continue.
6. Await the call to FAgreement with input (Agree,xi, sid) from A and execute it honestly.
7. Set xi := 〈λiq(i), [[xi]]q(i)〉.
Verify Await the call to FAgreement with input (Verify, sid) and execute it honestly. If A sends
the message Abort then send the message Abort to FOpen and halt. Otherwise, if Abort is
true, then send the message Abort to A on behalf of an (emulated) honest party and send the
message Abort to FOpen.
Figure 4.6: Simulator SOpen for FOpen.
Proof. The simulator is given in Figure 4.6. It essentially acts as a relay between the
real honest parties and A, via FOpen. Thus there is nothing to do to extract inputs of
corrupt parties.
The “inputs” of this protocol are share vectors that the environment provides to the
honest parties ahead of time. Indeed, this is exactly what the functionality aims to
achieve: the parties can generate secrets outside of this process, and check them inside
it.
Note that while the functionality has an abort flag, which is slightly unconventional,
this is merely a way of encoding that the adversary has behaved in such a way that
means the functionality will eventually abort. The reason for modelling in this way is
that the real protocol allows incorrect share vectors to be introduced at various points
in the execution, and the parties can choose to complete the protocol without running
the verification subroutine, which means that if the functionality were cut off without
running it, the environment should observe invalid share vectors as were specified by
the adversary.
4.4 Preprocessing Functionality
The functionality FPrep, that extends the functionality FOpen, is given in Figure 4.7,
which aims to capture all actively-secure LSSS-based MPC, that is, including the full-
threshold SPDZ protocol and the variants we described in this paper for Q2 access
structures.
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Functionality FPrep
This functionality extends FOpen. (See Section 2.2 for the definition of extension in this context.)
Mask On input (Mask, i, idr, sid), the functionality does the following:
1. If i ∈ [n]\ A, then sample r ← U (F); otherwise await the input r from S.
2. Execute the macro Sample(idr).
3. Await a message Abort or OK from S. If the message is OK and Abort is false, then for all
j ∈ [n]\A send [[r]]P j to P j and send r to Pi; otherwise, send the message Abort to all honest
parties, and then halt.
Triples On input (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )
T
k=1, sid) the functionality does the following:
1. For k = 1, . . . ,T, the functionality does the following:
a) Sample ak,bk ← U (F) and set ck := ak ·bk.
b) Execute the macro Sample(idak ), Sample(idbk ) and Sample(idck ).
2. Await a message Abort or OK from S. If the message is OK and Abort is false then for each
i ∈ [n] \ A, send ([[ak]]Pi , [[bk]]Pi , [[ck]]Pi )Tk=1 to Pi; otherwise, send the message Abort to all
honest parties, and then halt.
Internal procedure
Sample When an internal procedure calls Sample(idv), the functionality does the following:
1. Await shares [[v]]A from S.
2. Retrieve v from memory, sample a vector v ← U ({v ∈Fd : MA ·v= [[v]]A∧〈t,v〉 = v}) to cre-
ate [[v]] := M ·v, and then return this vector.
Figure 4.7: Preprocessing Functionality, FPrep.
4.5 Arithmetic Black Box
The protocol ΠOnline is given in Figure 4.8; then follows a proof that it UC-securely
realizes the arithmetic black box FABB, given in Figure 2.14, in the FPrep-hybrid model.
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Protocol ΠOnline
This protocol is realized in the FPrep-hybrid model.
Initialize The parties do the following:
1. Agree on a session identifier sid .
2. Agree on the circuit to compute, with T multiplication gates and M =∑i∈[n] Mi total inputs,
where Mi is the number of inputs for Pi.
3. Call an instance of FPrep with input (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]], sid).
4. Call FPrep with input (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )Tk=1, sid) where T is the number of multipli-
cation gates in the circuit. If FPrep sends the message Abort, then (locally) output ⊥ and
halt; otherwise continue.
5. Call FPrep with input (Mask, i, idrk , sid) for each k ∈ Mi, for each party Pi. If FPrep sends
the message Abort, then (locally) output ⊥ and halt; otherwise continue.
6. Agree on a sharing of 1, [[1]].
Input For party Pi to provide input x,
1. The parties retrieve from memory the agreed mask (r, [[r]]) where Pi holds r.
2. Party Pi calls FPrep with input (Broadcast, x− r, sid) so all parties obtain x− r.
3. The parties compute a new identifier idx and set [[x]] := [[r]]+ (x− r) · [[1]].
Add To add secrets [[x]] and [[y]], the parties compute a new identifier idz for the result and set
[[z]] := [[x]]+ [[y]].
Multiply To multiply secrets [[x]] and [[y]], the parties do the following:
1. Retrieve from memory one unused multiplication triple ([[a]], [[b]], [[c]]).
2. Compute new identifiers idr and ids and set [[r]] := [[x]]− [[a]] and [[s]] := [[y]]− [[b]].
3. Call FPrep with input (Open,0, idr, sid) and (Open,0, ids, sid) to open r and s.
4. Compute a new identifier idz and set [[z]] := r · s · [[1]]+ s · [[a]]+ r · [[b]]+ [[c]].
Output to one To output a secret [[x]] to Pi, the parties do the following:a
1. Retrieve from memory the agreed mask (r, [[r]]) where Pi holds r.
2. Compute a new identifier idε and set [[ε]] := [[x]]− [[r]].
3. Call FPrep with input (Open,0, idε, sid) to open ε.
4. Party Pi computes x := r+ε.
5. Call FPrep with input (Verify, sid). If FPrep sends the message OK, then Pi (locally) out-
puts x; otherwise, the parties (locally) output ⊥ and halt.
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Protocol ΠOnline (continued)
Output to all To output a secret [[x]] to all parties, the parties do the following:
1. Call FPrep with input (Verify, sid) and execute it honestly with A. If FPrep sends the
message OK, then continue; otherwise, (locally) output ⊥ and halt.
2. Call FPrep with input (Open,0, idx, sid).
3. Call FPrep input (Verify, sid). If FPrep sends the message OK then all parties, then (locally)
output x; otherwise, (locally) output ⊥ and halt.
aAn alternative method is to call FPrep with inputs (Verify, sid) and then (Open, i, idx, sid).
Figure 4.8: Online Protocol, ΠOnline.
Theorem 4.2. The protocol ΠOnline UC-securely realizes the functionality FABB against
a static, active adversary in the FPrep-hybrid model.
Proof. The simulator is given in Figure 4.9 and the transcript is given in Figure 4.10.
Simulator SABB
Initialize Set Abort to true, call FABB with input (Initialize,F, sid), and then do the follow-
ing:
1. Agree on a session identifier sid with A.
2. Agree on the circuit to compute with A, with T multiplication gates and M =∑i∈[n] Mi total
inputs, where Mi is the number of inputs for Pi.
3. Await the call to FPrep with input (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]], sid) from A and initialize a local
instance.
4. Await the call to FPrep with input (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )Tk=1, sid) from A where T is
the number of multiplication gates in the circuit, and execute it honestly with A. If FPrep
aborts, then send the message Abort to A and halt.
5. Await the call to FPrep with input (Mask, i, idrk , sid) for each k ∈ Mi, for each corrupt party
Pi with i ∈ A, and execute it honestly with A. If FPrep aborts, then send the message Abort
to A and halt.
6. Agree on a sharing of 1, [[1]], with A.
Input For party Pi to provide input x,
If i ∈ A,
1. Retrieve from memory the mask (r, [[r]]) generated in the local execution of FPrep.
2. Await the call to FPrep with input (Broadcast,ε, sid) from A.
• Await the calls (Send,ε j, j, sid) from A for j ∈ [n]\ A; if ε j 6= εi for all j, set Abort to true
and set ε := ε j for any j.
3. Set [[x]] := ε · [[1]]+ [[r]], set x := ε+ r, and then compute a new identifier and call FABB with
input (Input, i, id , x, sid).
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Simulator SABB (continued)
If i ∈ [n]\ A,
1. Retrieve from memory the agreed mask (r, [[r]]) generated in the local execution of FPrep.
2. Call the internal copy of FPrep with input (Broadcast,−r, sid) and send the appropriate
outputs to A.
3. Set [[x]] := [[r]]− r · [[1]] and call FABB with input (Input, i, id ,⊥, sid).
Add Compute a new identifier idz, retrieve from memory the associated identifiers idx and idy,
set [[z]] := [[x]]+ [[y]], and call FABB with input (Add, idx, idy, idz, sid).
Multiply
1. Retrieve from memory one unused multiplication triple ([[a]], [[b]], [[c]]) generated in the ex-
ecution of FPrep.
2. Compute new identifiers idr and ids and set [[r]] := [[x]]− [[a]] and [[s]] := [[y]]− [[b]].
3. Await the call to FPrep with input (Open,0, idr, sid) and (Open,0, ids, sid) from A and exe-
cute the procedures honestly.
4. Compute a new identifier idz, set [[z]] := r · s · [[1]]+ s · [[a]]+ r · [[b]]+ [[c]] and call FABB with
input (Multiply, idx, idy, idz, sid).
Output to one To open some secret with identifier idx shared as [[x]] to a party Pi,
If i ∈ [n]\ A,
1. Retrieve from memory the mask (r, [[r]]) where Pi holds r.
2. Compute a new identifier idε and set [[ε]] := [[x]]− [[r]].
3. Await the call to FPrep with input (Open,0, idε, sid) and shares [[ε]]A from A.
4. Set x := r+〈λ, [[ε]]〉.
5. Await the call to FPrep with input (Verify, sid). If FPrep aborts, or if Abort is true, then
send the message Abort to FABB; otherwise, continue.
If i ∈ A,
1. Retrieve from memory the mask (r, [[r]]) where corrupt party Pi holds r.
2. Compute a new identifier idε and set [[ε]] := [[x]]− [[r]].
• Call FABB with input (Output, i, idx, sid) and await the output x.
• Sample a vector x ← U ({x ∈Fd : M ·x= [[ε]]∧〈t,x〉 = x− r}) and set [[x− r]] = M ·x.
• Send [[x− r]]P\A to A.
3. Await a message Abort or OK from A, and if the message is Abort then set Abort to true.
Then await the call to FPrep with input (Verify, sid). If the returned message is Abort or
Abort is true, then send the message Abort to FABB; otherwise, send the message OK to
FABB.
Output to all
1. Await the call FPrep with input (Verify, sid) from A. If the returned message is Abort then
send the message Abort to A and FPrep; otherwise, continue.
2. Await the call to FPrep with input (Open, idx, sid) from A and then do the following:
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Simulator SABB (continued)
• Call FABB with input (Output,0, id , sid) to receive the output x.
• Sample a vector x ← U ({x ∈Fd : M ·x= [[ε]]∧〈t,x〉 = x}) and set [[x]] = M ·x.
• Send [[x]]P\A to A.
3. Await the call to FPrep with input (Verify, sid) from A and execute it honestly with A.
If the returned message is Abort or Abort is true, then send the message Abort to A and
FABB; otherwise, continue.
Figure 4.9: Simulator SABB for FABB.
Procedure From To Message
Initialize A FPrep (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]], sid)i∈A
A FPrep (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )Tk=1, sid)
A FPrep Abort/OK
FPrep A ([[ak]]A, [[bk]]A, [[ck]]A)Tk=1








Input A FPrep (Broadcast,ε, sid)
A FPrep Abort/OK
Add n/a n/a n/a
Multiply A FPrep (Open,0, idr, sid)
S A {[[r]]k : ρ(k) ∈ [n]\ A and k ∈ q(A)}
A FPrep (Open,0, ids, sid)
S A {[[s]]k : ρ(k) ∈ [n]\ A and k ∈ q(A)}
A FPrep Abort/OK
Output To All A FPrep (Verify, sid)
A FPrep Abort/OK
A FPrep (Open,0, id , sid)
S A {[[x]]k : ρ(k) ∈ [n]\ A and k ∈ q(A)}
A FPrep (Verify, sid)
A FPrep Abort/OK
Output To One A FPrep (Verify, sid)
A FPrep Abort/OK
A FPrep (Open,0, id , sid)
S A {[[ε]]k : ρ(k) ∈ [n]\ A and k ∈ q(A)}
A FPrep (Verify, sid)
A FPrep Abort/OK
Figure 4.10: Transcript for ΠOnline.
It is clear from the transcript that the only difficulty is to ensure the following: S
manages to extract corrupt parties’ inputs; that the broadcasted value ε by the simu-
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lator when providing inputs for emulated honest parties is indistinguishable from the
broadcast in a real execution; and that the simulator can send a share vector for the cor-
rect final output instead of the simulated output. The rest of the interactions are calls
to FPrep and are identical to a real-world execution as S emulates a real instantiation
of the functionality.
Firstly, the ability of S to extract is ensured by the fact that since S executed FPrep
locally, it knows the mask and can compute the corrupt party’s (implicit) input. If A
“broadcasts” different values to different honest parties then they abort later in the
protocol, so the simulator sets a flag and aborts when the check in the real protocol
would occur. Secondly, the mask r is uniform and unknown to A (or indeed Z) so the
distributions of x+ r and r, where x is the real honest party’s input, are perfectly indis-
tinguishable. Thirdly, note that every share held by A is established from share vectors
generated by FPrep (i.e. S) and the agreed sharing of [[1]], which means that S knows
all the shares A would hold if it behaved honestly. Now, since A is unqualified, a set of
shares held by A for a given secret provides no information on the secret, which means
S can always replace shares for emulated honest parties so that A sees the output of
S’s choosing; thus it can modify the share vectors to encode the correct outputs of FABB
instead of the simulated outputs.
Hence the simulation is perfect, and so no environment can distinguish between
worlds.
4.6 Reactive Computation
In some applications, additional forms of preprocessing are useful, such as random bits
when using MPC for circuit garbling [LPSY15] (discussed in detail in Chapter 8). More-
over, the exact circuit to be computed may not be known ahead of time, so the execution
of an arithmetic black-box does not model the desired computation. In order to eval-
uate continuously – called reactive computation – an extended form of FPrep, denoted
by FRPrep, is given in Figure 4.11, and a protocol ΠRPrep realizing it is given in Fig-
ure 4.12. The functionality FRPrep is essentially the same as the functionality FMPC
given in [LPSY15, KY18] and offers essentially all of the commands of FABB, but in-
volves shares of secrets explicitly.
The purpose ΠRPrep here is only to show that it is possible to realize FRPrep, as it is
an essential ingredient for circuit garbling in Chapter 8. However, the method by which
this is achieved in ΠRPrep – namely, by extending the black box FPrep – is not necessarily
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the optimal way of obtaining FRPrep.
Notice that unlike FABB, no procedure Output is given: instead, the notion of “open-
ing” and later verifying is retained, which more closely resembles real-world execution
of the preprocessing protocol. The procedure for generating a random shared bit via
these steps was given in [DKL+13].
Functionality FRPrep
This functionality extends FPrep in Figure 4.7.
Input On input (Input, i, id , x, sid) from party Pi, or S if i ∈ A, and (Input, i, id ,⊥, sid) from all
other parties, execute Sample(id) and for all i ∈ [n]\ A, send [[x]]Pi to Pi.
Add On input (Add, idx, idy, idz, sid) from all honest parties and S, await [[x]]Pi and [[y]]Pi from
each honest party i ∈ [n]\A, compute [[z]] := [[x]]Pi +[[y]]Pi and send [[z]]Pi to Pi for all i ∈ [n]\A.
Multiply On input (Multiply, idx, idy, idz, sid) from all honest parties and S, for all i ∈ [n] await
shares [[x]]Pi and [[y]]Pi from Pi, or from S if i ∈ A, compute z := 〈λ, [[x]]〉 · 〈λ, [[y]]〉, execute
Sample(idz), and for all i ∈ [n]\ A, send [[z]]Pi to Pi.
Random Element On input (RElt, idr, sid), sample r ← U (F), execute Sample(idr) and await
a message Abort or OK from S. If the message is OK, then for all i ∈ [n] \ A send [[r]]Pi to Pi;
otherwise, send the message Abort to all honest parties, and then halt.
Random Bit On input (RBit, idb, sid), sample b ← U ({0,1}), execute Sample(idb), and await a
message Abort or OK from S. If the message is OK, then for all i ∈ [n] \ A send [[b]]Pi to Pi;
otherwise, send the message Abort to all honest parties, (locally) output ⊥, and then halt.




This protocol is realized in the FPrep-hybrid model.
Initialize The parties do the following:
1. Agree on a session identifier sid .
2. Call FPrep with input (Initialize,Γ,auxi, sid).
3. Set [[1]] to be any sharing of 1.
FPrep subroutines
Send[–] For Pi to send x to P j, call FPrep with input (Send, x, j, sid).
Broadcast[<] To broadcast x, call FPrep with input (Broadcast, x, sid).
Open[>] To open a secret with identifier id to Pi, call FPrep with input (Open, i, id , sid).
Open[<>] To open a secret with identifier id to all parties, call FPrep with input (Open,0, id , sid).
Verify The parties call FPrep with input (Verify, sid).
Masks To generate masks, call FPrep with input (Mask, i, id , sid) several times, for each i ∈ [n].
If FPrep aborts, then the parties abort.
Triples To generate T triples, call FPrep with input (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )Tk=1, sid) where T is
the batch-size. If FPrep aborts, then the parties abort.
ΠOnline subroutines
Input For party Pi to provide input x,
1. The parties call FPrep with input (Mask, i, id , sid) so that they obtain (r, [[r]]) where Pi
holds r.
2. Party Pi calls FPrep with input (Broadcast, x− r, sid) so all parties obtain x− r.
3. The parties compute a new identifier idx and set [[x]] := [[r]]+ (x− r) · [[1]].
Add To add secrets [[x]] and [[y]], the parties compute a new identifier idz for the result and set
[[z]] := [[x]]+ [[y]].
Multiply To multiply secrets [[x]] and [[y]], the parties do the following:
1. Compute new identifiers ida, idb, and idc and call FPrep with input
(Triple, (ida, idb, idc), sid) to obtain ([[a]], [[b]], [[c]]).
2. Compute new identifiers idr and ids and set [[r]] := [[x]]− [[a]] and [[s]] := [[y]]− [[b]].
3. Call FPrep with input (Open,0, idr, sid) and (Open,0, ids, sid) to open r and s.
4. Compute a new identifier idz and set [[z]] := r · s · [[1]]+ s · [[a]]+ r · [[b]]+ [[c]].
Additional commands
Random Bits To generate T shared bits, the parties do the following:
1. Call FPrep with input (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )
3
2 ·T




2. For each k = T +1 to 32 ·T, relabel [[ak]] as [[d2(k−T)−1]] and [[bk]] as [[d2(k−T)]] and discard
[[ck]].
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Protocol ΠRPrep (continued)
3. For each k = 1 to T,
a) Compute new identifiers idrk and idsk and set [[rk]] := [[dk]]− [[ak]] and [[sk]] := [[dk]]−
[[bk]].
b) Call FPrep with input (Open,0, idrk , sid) and (Open,0, idsk , sid).
c) Compute a new identifier idek and set [[ek]] := rk · sk · [[1]]+ sk · [[ak]]+ r · [[bk]]+ [[ck]].
d) Call FPrep with input (Open,0, idek , sid).
e) Compute a new identifier idbk and set [[bk]] := 12 · ( 1pek · [[dk]]+1).
4. Call FPrep with input (Verify, sid).
5. If FPrep sent the message OK, then {[[bk]]}Tk=1; otherwise, call FPrep with input
(Broadcast,Abort, sid).
Random Element The parties FPrep with input (Triple, (ida, idb, idc), sid) to obtain
([[a]], [[b]], [[c]]) and output [[a]].
Figure 4.12: Reactive Preprocessing Protocol, ΠRPrep.
Theorem 4.3. The protocol ΠRPrep UC-securely realizes the functionality FRPrep against
a static, active adversary in the FPrep-hybrid model.
Proof. The simulator is given in Figure 4.13 but the transcript is omitted as it is very
similar to the transcript provided in the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Simulator SRPrep
Initialize
1. Agree on a session identifier sid with A.
2. Await the call to FPrep with input (Initialize,Γ, [[·]], sid) from A on behalf of each corrupt
party and send (Initialize,Γ, sid) to FRPrep.
3. Set [[1]] to be any sharing of 1.
FPrep subroutines
Send[–] Await the call to FPrep with input (Send, x, j, sid) from A, forward the message to
FRPrep, and relay any response back to A.
Broadcast[<] Await the call to FPrep with input (Broadcast,ε, sid) from A, forward the mes-
sage to FRPrep, and relay any response back to A.
Open[>] Await the call to FPrep with input (Open, id , i, sid) from A, forward the message to
FRPrep, and relay any response back to A.
Open[<>] Await the call to FPrep with input (Open, id , sid) from A, forward the message to




Triples Await the call to FPrep with input (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )Tk=1, sid) from A, forward the
message to FRPrep, and relay any response back to A.
Masks Await the call to FPrep with input (Mask, i, id , sid) from A, forward the message to FRPrep,
and relay any response back to A. Additionally, for any i ∈ A store mask value r sent by A in
the interaction.
Verify The parties call FPrep with input (Verify, sid).
ΠOnline subroutines
Input If Pi is to provide input,
If i ∈ A,
1. Await the call to FPrep with input (Mask, i, id , sid) and execute it using the local instance
of FPrep.
2. Await the call to FPrep with input (Broadcast,ε, sid), retrieve from memory the mask r,
and send the command (Input, i,ε+ r, sid) to FRPrep and (Input, i,⊥, sid) on behalf of all
corrupt parties P j where j ∈ A \{i}.
3. Compute a new identifier idx and set [[x]] := [[r]] + ε · [[1]], and when FRPrep executes
Sample(idx), send [[x]]A to FRPrep.
If i ∈ [n]\ A,
• Await the call to FPrep with input (Mask, i, id , sid) and execute it using the local instance
of FPrep and send the message (Input, i,⊥, sid) to FRPrep for each i ∈ A.
• Retrieve from memory the mask r and send −r to A to emulate the broadcast via FPrep.
• Compute a new identifier idx and set [[x]] := [[r]]− r · [[1]].
Add To add x and y, the simulator computes [[z]] := [[x]]+ [[y]].
Multiply To multiply secrets [[x]] and [[y]],
1. Compute new identifiers ida, idb, and idc and await a call to FPrep with input
(Triple, (ida, idb, idc), sid) from A.
2. Compute new identifiers idr and ids and set [[r]] := [[x]]− [[a]] and [[s]] := [[y]]− [[b]].
3. Await the call to FPrep with input (Open, idr, sid) and (Open, ids, sid) and execute the pro-
tocols honestly.
4. Compute a new identifier idz and set [[z]] := r · s · [[1]]+ s · [[a]]+ r · [[b]]+ [[c]] and call FRPrep
with input (Multiply, idx, idy, idz, sid)i∈A and when FRPrep executes Sample(id), send the
vector [[z]]A.
Additional commands
Random Bits To generate T shared bits, the parties do the following:
1. Call FPrep with input (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )
3
2 ·T




2. For each k = T +1 to 32 ·T, relabel [[ak]] as [[d2(k−T)−1]] and [[bk]] as [[d2(k−T)]] and discard
[[ck]].
3. For each k = 1 to T,
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Simulator SRPrep (continued)
a) Set [[rk]] := [[dk]]− [[ak]].
b) Set [[sk]] := [[dk]]− [[bk]].
c) Call FPrep with input (Open, [[rk]], sid) and (Open, [[sk]], sid).
d) Set [[ek]] := rk · sk · [[1]]+ sk · [[ak]]+ r · [[bk]]+ [[ck]].
e) Call FPrep with input (Open, [[ek]], sid).
f) Set [[bk]] := 12 · ( 1pek · [[dk]]+1).
4. Await the call to FPrep with input (Verify, sid) and execute it honestly with A. If FPrep
returns the message Abort then send the message Abort to FRPrep and halt; otherwise,
{[[bk]]}Tk=1; otherwise, call FPrep with input (Broadcast,Abort, sid).
Random Element The parties FPrep with input (Triple, (ida, idb, idc), sid) to obtain
([[a]], [[b]], [[c]]) and output [[a]].
Figure 4.13: Simulator SRPrep for FRPrep.
A subtle, technical point in the simulation is that because FPrep is being extended
and the simulator just relays information between A and FRPrep for commands to FPrep,
the simulator does not know masks for inputs, or the secret values of the triples. How-
ever, the environment does know these secrets, as the final outputs of the honest parties
include shares that will allow Z to reconstruct the secrets (since it will hold shares for
all honest parties and A). Thus in order to be able to simulate (specifically, to extract
inputs from A to pass on to FRPrep, and to provide messages on behalf of honest parties
that do not reveal the fact that S is emulating their inputs), it is crucial that any masks
and triples used in the real-world protocol to provide input and to multiply in this re-
alization of FRPrep should not be output by the honest parties at the end of the whole
execution.
This is achieved in the protocol by requiring that the procedures Mask and Triples
be called every time Input and Multiply are called, instead of the parties generating
these as a form of preprocessing. This ensures that the honest parties do not provide
the shares of the masks and triples that are used up in the execution as part of their
final output to the environment. This means the simulator can generate the shares of
the masks and triples itself by running the local instance of FPrep, and can thus extract
inputs, and can generate a transcript as if from real honest parties without knowing
their secret inputs. Note that if FRPrep is later used to realize FABB using ΠOnline, say,
then triples and masks may be generated as part of preprocessing.
As for Random Bits, the transcript for this part is exactly the same as for Multiply
as given in the proof of security for the protocol ΠOnline. Finally, note that since the only
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way parties obtain any shares throughout the whole protocol is to take linear combi-
nations of shares generated by FPrep (or FRPrep), S knows what the adversary would
compute, if it were to behave honestly, at all times. This means that in the execution of
Random Bits and of Random Element, S can provide FRPrep with the correct shares
during the execution of Sample(idb) and Sample(idr), respectively.
The remainder of the simulation is trivial as the simulator merely relays information
between A and FRPrep.
4.7 Modelling SPDZ
The main focus of this thesis concerns MPC for Q2 access structures. However, the aim
is to describe the functionalities obliviously to the access structure (which is particularly
useful for the protocols in Chapter 8), so it is helpful to understand how a protocol for a
full-threshold access structure can be used to realize these functionalities. The purpose
of this section is to give high-level intuition for this realization.
As outlined in Section 2.5.3, authentication for SPDZ is achieved with an IT MAC.
To initialize FOpen in this context, in the command (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]], sid), the symbol
[[ · ]] is interpreted as the additive secret-sharing MSP and information regarding the
MAC being used. More specifically, the parties agree on an “authenticated” LSSS,
[[ · ]] :=
(
[[ · ]]A, [[γ(·)]]A
)
,




. Then the initialization involves










Opening to One Party When secrets are opened, only the first component of the
share is sent; i.e. [[x]]APi but not [[γ(x)]]
A
Pi , as opening both secrets would reveal the global
MAC key and prohibit further computation with active security. The error-detection
matrix N for additive secret-sharing is the all-zeroes matrix in F1×n, which means that
a party to whom a secret is revealed never aborts in the full-threshold setting. The
intuition for this is that authentication is established via the MACs and not by the
LSSS as in the Q2 setting. This “optimistic” opening of secrets is exactly what happens
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in SPDZ, where a distinction is made between opening secrets, and providing output:
the correctness check is deferred to the verification stage.
Opening to All Parties The map q : [n] → [m] (where m = n for additive secret-
sharing) is defined as q(i) = [n] for all i ∈ [n].1 While the functionality checks that the
shares being sent correspond to a valid share vector in the general setting (by computing
a preimage of [[x]]Aq(i) under Mq(i)), for additive secret-sharing every set of shares is a
valid share vector since the matrix is invertible, and therefore in the protocol the parties
do not need to emulate this check.
Verification In addition to calling FAgreement to verify consistency of broadcasts, the
parties execute a procedure for checking MACs without revealing the global MAC key,
allowing computation to continue even after this check is performed. This was first given
in [DKL+13] and is presented in Figure 4.14 for completeness.
1By considering the codomain of q to be [2 ·n] instead of [n], q can be viewed as encoding the fact that




Parties use this subprotocol to check that a set of secret values {[[vk]]}tk=1 are correct given a set
{[[vk]]}t+1k=1 where [[vt+1]] is a random mask to be discarded (for example, this can be taken from
an unused triple). This subprotocol assumes there are running instances of FPrep and FCommit.
Recall [[v]] := ([[v]]A, [[γ(v)]]A) and that the parties also hold [[α]]A.
MAC Check
1. Agree on a new session identifier sid′ for a new instance of FCoinFlip.
2. Call a new instance of FCoinFlip with input (Initialize,Ft+1, sid′).
3. Call FCoinFlip with input (RElt, sid′) to obtain {rk}t+1k=1 and compute [[v]] :=
∑t+1
k=1 rk · [[vk]] and
agree on a new identifier, idv.
4. Call FPrep with input (Open,0, idv, sid).
5. Compute a new identifier idz.







rk · [[γ(vk)]]APi .
b) Call FCommit with input (Commit, i, [[z]]APi , sid) and (Commit, j,⊥, sid) for all j ∈ [n]\{i}.
7. Await identifiers {id
[[z]]APi
}i∈[n] from FCommit.
8. Call FCommit with input (Open, i, id[[z]]APi
, sid) for all i ∈ [n]. If FCommit sends the message
Abort, then each party calls FPrep with input (Broadcast,Abort, sid), (locally) outputs ⊥,
and then halts.
9. Each party computes z =∑i∈[n] [[z]]APi . If every party computes z = 0 then they continue with
{[[vk]]}tk=1 and discard [[vt+1]], and if any party computes z 6= 0 then that party calls FPrep
with input (Broadcast,Abort, sid), (locally) outputs ⊥, and then halts.
Figure 4.14: MAC-Checking Subprotocol, ΠMACCheck.
4.7.1 Errors on MACs
As a slight digression, the security of the MAC checking procedure is now analysed.
It is important in the protocols in Chapter 5 that the adversary should be allowed to
introduce errors onto the shares of the secret or on the MACs. In [DPSZ12], it was only
shown that errors on the secrets could be detected, but it is trivial to show that errors
on either the secret or the MAC (or both) still cause the honest parties to abort with
overwhelming probability in the statistical security parameter, as demonstrated in the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. If the adversary cheats on either the MAC or on the secret, then the protocol
ΠMACCheck aborts with probability at least 1−|F|−1.
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Recall that in SPDZ it is assumed that the field is of size O(2σ), and if not then
the parties generate several MACs for every secret as outlined in Section 2.5.3, and
so the probability that cheating is undetected is negligible in the statistical security
parameter.
Proof. Let Pi be the honest party. (Recall that in the full-threshold setting, the adver-
sary can corrupt all parties but one.) Since the shares of z are committed to before being
opened, the (rushing) adversary cannot wait for the honest party to send its share and in
return send its negative. Indeed, the only way to cheat without detection is to introduce
errors in such a way that z = 0 holds.














P j = γ(vk)+δk.
Then since the random coefficients {rk}t+1k=1 are not known before ΠMACCheck is executed,




























This means that choosing the correct errors is equivalent to guessing the MAC key,
which can only be done correctly with probability at most |F|−1.
4.7.2 FPrep with MACs
For realizing FPrep with MACs, it is necessary to alter the sampling procedure as fol-
lows.
Sample When an internal procedure calls Sample(idv), the functionality does the fol-
lowing:
1. Await shares [[v]]AA and [[γ(v)]]
A
A from S.
2. Retrieve v and α from memory, sample shares {[[v]]APi , [[γ(x)]]
A
Pi }i∈[n]\A ← U (F)
subject to v = ∑i∈[n] [[v]]APi and α · v = ∑i∈[n] [[γ(v)]]APi , and (locally) return the pair
([[v]]A, [[γ(v)]]A).
Notice that this procedure does not allow errors to be introduced on MACs. This is
because the simulator always has the opportunity to abort after Sample is executed (as
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shown in the description of FPrep). One could alternatively define FPrep to allow errors
to be introduced during Sample, and then argue that any time ΠMACCheck is executed
later will abort if the adversary introduced errors on the MACs. This is the approach
that is taken in Section 5.4.
4.7.3 Viewing MACs as Part of the MSP
An alternative way to interpret the initialization of FOpen with IT MACs is as an MSP










1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
0 1 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
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... . . .
...
0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 1





















with target vector t= (1, . . . ,1,0, . . . ,0)> ∈F2n−1. Here, x ∈F2n−1 is the randomness vector
satisfying 〈x,t〉 = x, and the vector on the right is the complete vector of shares. The
(secret) error-detecting matrix N can be written as
N =
(
α α · · · α −1 · · · −1
)
.
However, interpreting the LSSS in this way interferes with other aspects of the
description of FOpen. For instance, if a secret is opened to one party, this party cannot
perform the error-detection procedure (premultiplying the share vector by N) because





This chapter is based on work published at IMACC 2017 under the title When It’s All
Just Too Much: Outsourcing MPC-Preprocessing [SSW17] and was joint work with Peter
Scholl and Nigel Smart. A protocol generalizing these results, to allow preprocessing
generated by a set of parties under a Q2 access structure, has also been given, employing
the error-detection results from Chapter 3.
This chapter Since the preprocessing is by far the costliest part of multi-party com-
putation (MPC), it is natural to wonder if this work may be outsourced. The benefits
are clear: for example, low-powered devices without access to strong entropy sources
(which are required for cryptography) can simply receive the preprocessed data and use
it to execute the cheap online protocol. It is shown in this chapter that there is a very
natural way to achieve this for SPDZ preprocessing. In fact, any form of secret-sharing
that makes use of linear message authentication codes (MACs) or another form of linear
authentication for a linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) is amenable to the transfor-
mation described here.
5.1 Overview
The idea is very simple: one set of parties, which will be denoted by R, produces prepro-
cessing – that is, the correlated randomness of Beaver’s circuit randomization technique
(see Section 2.5.3) – and sends it to a second set of parties, which will be denoted by Q, so
that the latter set can realize the arithmetic black box FABB in the FPrep-hybrid model
by executing the protocol ΠOnline given in Chapter 4. The strength of the universal com-
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posability (UC) framework comes to the fore in this chapter, as the secure realization of
FABB for the parties in Q is immediate.
The motivation behind outsourcing is that while the preprocessing phase requires
expensive public-key cryptography (PKC) in the full-threshold setting, the online com-
putation is much less costly. Thus a set of low-powered devices can outsource the heavy
cost of preprocessing and then run the low-cost online phase to evaluate circuits. In-
deed, it makes sense for protocols in the preprocessing model to be designed with a view
to outsourcing in this way, as without outsourcing it may be more efficient to evaluate
the circuit directly.
The idea of the protocols in this chapter is that the parties executing the prepro-
cessing will send their data over a network to the parties that want to use it. The chal-
lenging part is to prove in the UC framework that the second set of parties will abort
if any of the parties producing preprocessing cheat when sending their data. Beyond
the resharing itself, transferring the preprocessing requires essentially no additional
communication cost because an inexpensive checking procedure can be performed. The
randomness required to verify the correctness of the outsourced data can also be out-
sourced, if indeed the use case is low-powered clients without access to good sources of
entropy.1 Following the protocol ΠOnline, whenever parties in Q require a preprocessed
data-item, they can request R to provide one. This may be necessary if the low-powered
devices have little memory, but this data could equally well be sent all at once.
All that is required is a methodology for translating [[·]]R sharings into [[·]]Q sharings
with active security. The principal idea of the protocol is for each party Ri in R to
reshare their share and send the shares to the parties in Q. Two different scenarios will
be considered:
• from a Q2 access structure to a Q2 access structure; and
• from full-threshold to full-threshold.
Because the preprocessed data from the source set of parties is shared using an LSSS
with a form of authentication, there is a low-cost method for the parties in Q to ver-
ify that no errors were introduced during resharing: in the case of a Q2 access struc-
ture on the parties in R this is achieved by the self-authentication of the LSSS; in the
1Low-powered devices often generate random data by using a pseudorandom function (PRF) to extend
a short seed, since high-entropy sources may not be available. Doing so drains power resources, which is
a crucial factor for protocols for battery-powered clients.
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full-threshold setting where authentication is achieved through the use of information-
theoretic (IT) MACs, if parties cheat in what they send then the MAC will be incorrect
with high probability, and so the standard MAC verification procedure may be per-
formed to check this. The main differences between these two scenarios is caused by
this difference in the method of authentication; the rest of the protocol is essentially the
same. An optimization for the full-threshold to full-threshold case will also be explored
in which parties in R do not need to communicate with all parties in Q.
In the literature, there are several works that show how to outsource preprocessing
from a set of low-powered clients, typically through the use of a third party. In his thesis,
Yan Huang [Hua12] explained how to use a “partially” trusted third party to generate
preprocessed data for two computing parties to garble and evaluate circuits. Demmler
et al. [DSZ14] investigated how to generate preprocessed data on low-powered devices
cheaply through the use of hardware tokens. In their protocol known as Chameleon,
Riazi et al. [RWT+18] also looked at how to use a third party to generate correlated
randomness for both garbled circuits and LSSS-based MPC. The work in this chapter
can be seen as using MPC to replace the third party.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Network
The complete set of parties is denoted by P and parties are indexed by [n]. The set P is
considered to be the union of two parts, R and Q, indexed by R and Q respectively (so
R,Q ⊆ [n] are not necessarily disjoint). To avoid confusion, parties in R will always be
indexed by the letter i, and parties in Q by the letter j. The variables nR and nQ denote
the number of parties in R and Q, respectively. The set A ⊆ R∪Q denotes the indexing
set of corrupt parties in the complete network.
It is assumed that there is a complete network of authenticated channels amongst
the parties in R, and amongst the parties in Q, and that each party in R is connected via
a secure channel to each party in Q. This last network assumption is replaced with the
notion of a secure cover in the full-threshold to full-threshold case, defined and discussed
in Section 5.4.
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5.2.2 Preprocessing Functionality
The process of “outsourcing” MPC preprocessing is defined as a protocol realizing the
functionality FPrep for a set of parties Q given the functionality FPrep provided to a set
of parties R. In the language of the UC framework, a protocol ΠR→Q
Outsource
will be said to
realize FPrep for Q in the FPrep-hybrid model, where in the protocol the oracle FPrep is
used to generate preprocessing for R. To avoid ambiguity, the oracle is called FRPrep and
the functionality the outsourcing protocol will realize is called FQ
Prep
.
Much of the remainder of this thesis deals with how to generate preprocessing ef-
ficiently for a set of parties in a Q2 access structure. For full-threshold MPC, FPrep
can more-or-less be realized by the SPDZ protocol as described in the original pa-
per [DPSZ12] and outlined in Section 2.5.3. This chapter demonstrates why modelling
of FPrep in terms of concrete realization of the “authenticated dictionary” via linear au-
thentication of secrets in an LSSS as described in Chapter 4 is useful: if FPrep were
expressed in terms of identifiers and not in terms of an LSSS then there would be no
way for parties to manipulate the shares, which is necessary in order for the “resharing”
to take place. Because the shares are explicit, the access structure on Q is determined
entirely by the LSSS used in the resharing.
The focus here is restricted to input and output masks and Beaver triples, rather
than other forms of correlated randomness such as shared squares and shared bits, as
the security of resharing these other kinds follows immediately from the security of the
first kinds.
5.2.3 Types of Secret-Sharing
Secrets shared amongst parties in R are denoted by [[ · ]]R, which is notation that en-
compasses all the information regarding the monotone span program (MSP) used. That
is, there is a matrix MR ∈ FmR×dR , a target vector tR, and a row map ρR. Analogous
notation is used for secrets shared amongst parties in Q.
5.3 Outsourcing Q2 to Q2
Before the protocol is given, first the resharing and verification procedures are described
and their correctness is justified. Then the protocol ΠR→Q
Outsource
for outsourcing is pre-
sented, followed by a proof that it can be used to realize FPrep for the parties in Q.
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5.3.1 Correctness
Resharing
The protocol involves sharings in Q of sharings in R: in the protocol, parties in Q will
















































Given a matrix A ∈FmR×k with k ≥ 1, the vector A> ·[[[[v]]R]]Q is defined as [[A> ·[[v]]R]]Q;
i.e. (1>⊗ A>) · [[[[v]]R]]Q where 1 ∈FmQ×1.
Each party reshares every component of the share vector they hold as a [[·]]Q sharing
and distributes the shares. More concretely, party Ri computes [[[[v]]RRi ]]
Q and sends the
shares to the parties in Q. To obtain a single sharing of the same secret, each party Q j






i∈R as a share vector [[[[v]]
R]]QQ j , and then the parties
in Q compute
λ> · [[[[v]]R]]Q = [[λ> · [[v]]R]]Q = [[v]]Q
where party Q j computes [[v]]QQ j = [[λ> · [[v]]
R]]QQ j .
Verifying a Resharing
To reduce communication costs for the parties in Q, verification of the resharing is
performed by computing a random linear combination of secrets and performing a single
check. To minimize the amount of randomness parties in Q need to generate, either
these parties can execute the checks individually instead of in batches, or they can use
a trusted source of randomness such as a blockchain, lottery or random beacon2, or
they can receive randomness from the parties in R via a sort of “outsourced FCoinFlip”
by initializing an agreement functionality FAgreement and doing the following:
1. Each party Ri in R samples r i and sends a commitment to r i to all Q j in Q.
2See, for example, the Interoperable Randomness Beacon project [KBPB19].
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2. When all commitments have been received, the parties in R send the decommit-
ments.
3. Each party in Q fixes r :=∑i∈R r i.
4. The parties in Q call FAgreement with input (Agree, r, sid).
The naïve way of resharing would be for each party Ri to compute an additive shar-
ing [[v]]ARi := 〈λRi , [[v]]
R
Ri〉, to compute a sharing [[[[v]]
A
Ri ]]
Q and distribute shares to parties
in Q, who could then set [[v]]Q := ∑nRi=1 [[[[v]]ARi ]]Q. However, in the Q2 setting the error-
detection in the [[ · ]]R sharing is lost; in the protocol presented, the parties in R instead
reshare every component of the share vector they hold, and then the parties in Q recom-
bine as outlined above, but now they can additionally compute a sharing of the error
vector ε ∈FmR−dR for the secret as follows:
NR · [[[[v]]R]]Q = [[NR · [[v]]R]]Q = [[ε]]Q ∈FmQ·(mR−dR)
where NR is the cokernel of the MSP matrix M, as described in Chapter 3. To verify
that this vector is 0, the parties in Q combine the (secret-shared) entries of the error
vector into a single field element by taking a random linear combination, and check it
is equal to zero. This check can be further amortized by combining error vectors from
several resharings together in a random linear combination first. The subprotocol for
verification is given in Figure 5.1.
Subprotocol ΠErrorCheck
Error Check The parties check the correctness of a set {[[vk]]Q}tk=1 with errors {[[ε
k]]Q}tk=1:
1. Compute a new session identifier sid and call a new instance of FCoinFlip with input
(Initialize,F, sid).







3. For each k ∈ [t], retrieve from memory the shares of [[εk]]Q and let [[εkl ]]
Q be the sharing of
the lth component of εk.
4. Compute [[ε]]Q :=∑tk=1 ∑mR−dRl=1 rk,l · [[εkl ]]Q and agree on a new identifier idε.
5. Call FQ
Open
with input (Open,0, idε, sidQ) followed by (Verify, sidQ). If ε 6= 0 or FQPrep re-
turned the message Abort, then send the message Abort to all other parties, (locally) out-
put ⊥, and then halt; otherwise continue.
Figure 5.1: Error-Checking Subprotocol, ΠErrorCheck.
The security proof later relies on the assumption that the protocolΠR→Q
Outsource
aborts if
one or more invalid [[ · ]]R sharings are generated or if one or more invalid [[ · ]]Q sharings
are generated, and hence the following lemma is required.
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Lemma 5.1. The probability that εk 6= 0 for some k ∈ [t] but that ε = 0 is at most 1/|F|.
The probability that NQ · [[vk]]Q 6= 0 for some k ∈ [t] but that NQ · [[ε]]Q = 0 is at most 1/|F|.
Proof. When ε is opened in the call to FQ
Open
with input (Open,0, idε, sid), error-detection
is performed, meaning that once the resharing has taken place, the adversary cannot
change the value of ε.
Since the multipliers used in the linear combination are not known before the re-









l=1 rk,l ·δkl = 0. This is equivalent to fixing all {δkl } but
one and then guessing the correct way to fix the final component, which can be done with
probability at most 1/|F|, the size of the set from which the multipliers were sampled.
For the second probability, note that again the adversary must guess the random
multipliers ahead of time to generate one or more invalid [[ · ]]Q sharings and correct
them in the combination. The probability of this is again at most 1/|F| by the same
argument.
For simplicity, the field is assumed O(2σ) so that this probability is negligible in the
statistical security parameter. When this is not the case, similar repetition techniques
as for sacrifice and MACs can be used, as described in Section 2.5.3.
5.3.2 Security
The goal is to show that if the set of parties R∪Q is provided the functionality FRPrep
and FQ
Open
and executes the protocol ΠR→Q
Outsource
, then this “looks the same” to the parties





This protocol is realized in the FCoinFlip, FQOpen, F
R
Prep
-hybrid model and makes use of the subpro-
tocol ΠErrorCheck (where FCoinFlip is used).
Initialize
1. The parties agree on a session identifier, sid ; the parties in Q agree on a session identifier
sidQ and the parties in R agree on a session identifier sidR.
2. The parties in Q call an instance of FOpen with input (Initialize,ΓQ, [[ · ]]Q, sidQ). This
instance is denoted by FQ
Open
.
3. The parties in R call an instance of FPrep with input (Initialize,ΓR, [[ · ]]R, sidR). This
instance is denoted by FR
Prep
. The parties in R send the error-detecting matrix NR to the
parties in Q and any recombination vector λR.a
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Mask To compute a mask for Q j, the parties do the following:
1. The parties in R compute new identifiers ida, idb and idc and call FRPrep with input
(Triple, (ida, idb, idc), sidR) to obtain some [[a]]
R and relabel ida as idr( j) and the shares
as [[r( j)]]R.
2. The parties in R execute FeedValue(idr( j) ).
3. Each Ri ∈R sends their share vector [[r( j)]]RRi to Q j.
4. Party Q j computes NR · [[r( j)]]R and if it is equal to 0 then it computes r( j) := 〈λR, [[r( j)]]R〉;
otherwise Q j calls FQOpen with input (Broadcast,Abort, sidQ), (locally) outputs ⊥, and then
halts.
Triple To compute T triples for parties in Q, the parties do the following:
1. Parties in R compute new identifiers idak , idbk and idck for k ∈ [T] and call FRPrep with
input (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )
T




2. For each v ∈ {ak,bk, ck}Tk=1 the parties in R execute FeedValue(idv).
Feed Value When the parties call FeedValue(idv), they do the following:
1. Each Ri ∈R does the following:
a) For each k ∈ ρ−1({i}),
i. Compute a sharing [[[[v]]Rk ]]
Q.
ii. For each j ∈Q, send [[[[v]]Rk ]]QQ j to Q j over a secure channel.
2. Each Q j ∈Q does the following:




k=1 into a share vector [[[[v]]
R]]QQ j .
b) Set [[v]]QQ j := 〈λ
R, [[[[v]]R]]QQ j 〉.
c) Store a vector of secret-shared values [[ε]]QQ j := N
R · [[[[v]]R]]QQ j ∈F
mQ·(mR−dR)×1.
Error Check To check the correctness of a set {[[vk]]Q}tk=1, the parties execute ΠErrorCheck. If the




The parties call FQ
Open
with the appropriate input.
aFor example, they can take the first recombination vector for the first minimally-qualified
set, where both orderings are lexicographic.
Figure 5.2: Outsourcing Protocol, ΠR→Q
Outsource
.
Theorem 5.1. The protocol ΠR→Q
Outsource
UC-securely realizes the functionality FQ
Prep
with




Proof of Theorem 5.1. The simulator is given in Figure 5.3.
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Simulator SR→Q
Outsource
Initialize The simulator and adversary agree on a session identifier sid and then the simuator
does the following:
1. The simulator agrees on a session identifier with A.
2. Await the call to FOpen with input (Initialize,Q, [[ · ]]Q, sidQ) from A for each j ∈ Q ∩ A
and forward the commands to FQ
Prep
.
3. Await the call to FPrep with input (Initialize,R, [[ · ]]R, sidR) from A for each i ∈ R ∩ A
and initialize a local instance to be the oracle FR
Prep
.
Mask When the parties are to produce a mask for Q j in Q,
1. Await a call to FR
Prep
with input (Triple, (ida, idb, idc), sidR) and execute the procedure
from the local instace of FR
Prep
with A to obtain some [[r( j)]]R with identifier idr( j) .
2. Execute SFeedValue([[r( j)]]R) with A.
3. If j ∈ Q \ A, then await a set of shares [[r( j)]]RR∩A from A; if j ∈ Q ∩ A, then send [[r( j)]]RR\A
to A.
4. Send the message (Mask, j, idr( j) , sidQ) to F
Q
Prep




cutes Sample(idr( j) ). If j ∈Q \ A, and if N · [[r( j)]] = 0 then send the message Abort to A and
to FQ
Prep
, and otherwise continue. If j ∈ Q ∩ A, then await a message Abort or OK; forward
this message to FQ
Prep
, and if the message is Abort then halt; otherwise, continue.
5. Execute Error Check.
Triples
1. Await the call to FR
Prep
with input (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )
T
k=1, sidR) from A and execute
the procedure from the local instance of FR
Prep
with A to obtain {[[ak]]R, [[bk]]R, [[ck]]R}Tk=1.
2. For each v ∈ {ak,bk, ck}Tk=1, execute SFeedValue(idv) with A.
3. Execute Error Check.
Feed Value The macro SFeedValue(idv), simulating FeedValue(), is defined as follows:
1. For each i ∈ R \ A, sample a (complete) share vector [[[[v]]RRi ]]
Q and send [[[[v]]RRi ]]
Q
Q\A to A.
2. For each j ∈Q \ A,
a) For each i ∈ R∩ A, await a share vector [[[[v]]RRi ]]
Q
Q j from A.
b) Combine {[[[[v]]RRi ]]
Q
Q j }i∈R into a share vector [[[[v]]
R]]QQ j and set [[v]]
Q
Q j :=λ
R · [[[[v]]R]]QQ j .
c) Set [[ε]]QP j := N
Q · [[[[v]]R]]QQ j .
Finally, sample a vector v ← U
(




, set [[v]]Q := MQ ·v, return
the share vector [[v]]Q locally, and send [[v]]QA to F
Q
Prep
when it executes Sample(idv).
Error Check The simulator awaits the call (RElt, sid) to FCoinFlip and then executes ΠErrorCheck






Relay commands between A and FQ
Prep
.
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The transcript produced during the protocol execution in the FCoinFlip, FQOpen, F
R
Prep-
hybrid world is given in Figure 5.4.
Procedure From To Message
Initialize A FCommit (Initialize,P , sid)
A FQ
Open
(Initialize,ΓQ, [[ · ]]Q, sidQ) j∈Q∩A
A FR
Prep
(Initialize,ΓR, [[ · ]]R, sidR)i∈R∩A
Mask A FR
Prep




































































(Open,0, idε, sidQ) j∈Q\A
S A Abort/OK
A S Abort/OK
Figure 5.4: Transcript for ΠR→Q
Outsource
.
The honest parties in both R and Q have no inputs as the preprocessed data is de-
termined by the random tapes. Additionally, in the ideal world, the honest parties in R
have no input, no output, and do nothing in the execution of the functionality FQ
Prep
, and
thus can be perfectly emulated by the simulator. Moreover, all calls to the functionali-
ties are distributed identically in both worlds as the simulator emulates these oracles
honestly.
It only remains to show that the reshares sent from S to A are consistent with the
final outputs of honest parties in Q in the ideal world (as chosen by FQ
Prep
) despite S
having to sample share vectors to provide input to FQ
Prep
when the procedure Sample is
called. The difficulty comes from the fact that S does not see the reshares [[[[v]]RR∩A]]
Q
Q∩A,




The idea is that it does not matter what shares the simulator chooses. Since at least
one honest party in R reshares its share vector, the final shares held by honest parties
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are not known to A in the protocol execution. Thus, provided the final share vector of
shares output by honest parties in the ideal world [[v′]]Q\A concatenated with the shares
the adversary would compute [[v]]Q∩A forms a valid share vector, the distribution of
shares output by the parties in both worlds is the same.
To see this explicitly, recall that in the simulation, S samples
v ← U
({
v ∈FdQ : MQQ\A ·v= [[v]]QQ\A
})
,
sets [[v]]Q := MQ ·v, and sends [[v]]QA to FQPrep when it executes Sample(idv). Next, the
functionality uses these shares [[v]]A to sample a vector
v′ ← U
({
v ∈FdQ : MQA ·v= [[v]]A
})


























=MQ ·v+MQ ·ker(MQQ\A)+MQ ·ker(MQA)
where MQ−1 here denotes the preimage, not the inverse (which may not be well-defined).
Vectors in the second summand are non-zero only on components owned by corrupt
parties. Thus the total share vector generated by FQ
Prep
may differ on corrupt parties’
shares by a share vector supported by rows owned by Q∩A, but this is still a valid share
vector. Furthermore, vectors in the third summand are non-zero only on components
owned by honest parties, and therefore the share vector plausibly shares any secret
from the point of view of A, which in the real world corresponds to the fact that there
is at least one honest party in R that generates a share vector, so the shares of honest
parties are unknown to A.
Finally, observe that if A does not faithfully reshare the vector [[v]]R∩A, then by
Lemma 5.1, the honest parties abort with overwhelming probability in σ= log |F|. Addi-
tionally, if the share vector [[[[v]]R∩A]]Q\A is invalid, then this is detected when opening
the secret [[ε]]Q. In either of these cases, S sends the message Abort to FQ
Prep
and so Z
does not see the erroneous share vectors.
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5.4 Outsourcing Full-Threshold to Full-Threshold
To avoid overloading the notation used for shares [[ · ]]Q with a superscript A as has been
used previously to indicate the use of additive secret-sharing, in this section, all secret
sharing is assumed to be additive.
In the Q2 case, every party in R was required to reshare their shares under the
LSSS of the parties in Q. However additive resharing can be much more flexible: each
party in R can reshare its summand additively to some proper subset of parties in Q,
and if all parties in Q compute the sum of all shares they receive, then they will still
obtain an additive sharing of the original secret. In this case, secrecy (against the envi-
ronment) will hold if and only if at least one honest party in R reshares to at least one
honest party in Q. The intuition behind this requirement is that if it does not hold, then
every share held by parties in R is either known by A (if the party is corrupt), or each
honest party in R sends only to corrupt parties in Q, so A can reconstruct the share.
Thus, knowing all shares in R, A (and hence the distinguisher Z) can compute the se-
cret. This is problematic as it means the simulator cannot emulate the final outputs of
real honest parties without Z observing a difference with high probability. Conversely,
if this requirement does hold then at “worst” A obtains all reshares but one; then since
all reshares are sampled uniformly at random so that they sum to shares in R, and
these shares are themselves sampled so that they sum to the secret, this set of shares is
indistinguishable from a uniformly randomly sampled set. This trust assumption is for-
malized with the definition of secure cover {Q(i)}i∈R of Q, which defines to which parties
in Q the party Ri reshares.
Definition 5.1 (Secure Cover). A set {Q(i)}i∈R of (not necessarily disjoint) subsets of Q
is called a secure cover if the following conditions hold:





i∈R is a cover for Q, i.e. Q=
⋃
i∈R Q(i).
3. Every party Q j in Q(i) is connected to the party Ri ∈R via a secure channel.
4. There is at least one pair (Ri,Q(i)) where Ri is honest in R, and Q(i) contains at





i∈R is defined to be the corresponding cover on indexing set Q, and
similarly for R. While it is always possible to define a secure cover by setting Q(i) :=Q
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for all i ∈ R, there may be better (i.e. more communication-efficient) ways of defining it,
such as in the following ways:
• If R ⊆Q then for each i ∈ R, one can define Q(i) to be any subset of Q containing
Ri and ensure that
⋃
i∈R Q(i) =Q. In this case, since at least one party Ri in R is
honest, it is also honest in Q, and so Ri is the honest party in R that “sends” the
data to itself as the honest party in Q.
• If R and Q are disjoint but each party in Q believes that some proper subset of
parties in R contains at least one honest party then the cover can potentially be
created respecting this knowledge, provided the trusted sets form a cover.
One can also consider the set of parties in R connected to each party in Q. Let R( j)
denote the set of parties in R which are connected to party Q j ∈Q. Since Q(i) 6=∅ for all





is a cover for R. The last two properties are symmetrical, which means that in fact{
R( j)
}
j∈Q is a secure cover for R.
5.4.1 Modified Preprocessing Functionality
The functionality FPrep must be modified in a few superficial ways. The altered function-
ality is denoted by FPrep and is given in Figure 5.5, and the reasons for the modifications
are described below.
It is very important to notice that honest parties in Q use shares they receive in an
entirely deterministic manner, and, as such, if some party Q j ∈Q is honest but receives
shares from only corrupt parties in R, then A has complete control over this party’s
share. For this reason, hereafter such parties are deemed “effectively” corrupt and are
called effectively-corrupt honest parties, which are added to the set of corrupt parties A,
which becomes the extended adversary set A. This means the functionality FPrep must
be modified to allow for this form of corruption, although it does not significantly change
the functionality except that the simulator will always choose the messages output by
FPrep to these parties. Note that this type of corruption is not the same as passive
corruption as A will not learn the inputs of such parties since the random masks used
for inputs are generated by all parties in R. In terms of the secure cover, an effectively-
corrupt honest party is an honest party Q j in Q for which R( j) \A=∅.
In order to make the outsourcing more efficient, it is not necessary for parties to
executeΠMACCheck to verify the correctness of secrets sent across the network: instead, it
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suffices for these checks to be combined with checks executed during the online phase of
the protocol. Despite this, the ability of the simulator to cause the functionality to abort
may be retained as the adversary in the real world can cause honest parties to abort at
any time during the protocol execution. However, during Sample, the functionality now
allows the simulator to introduce errors on secrets and so the honest parties in Q may
end up with incorrect share vectors. It will be shown in the simulation that such errors
can be “carried through” from the real execution into the ideal world. The online phase
of the protocol remains secure since introducing errors during resharing is equivalent
to introducing errors during the execution of the online phase, which is detected in the
execution of ΠMACCheck.
Functionality FPrep
This functionality is identical to FPrep in Figure 4.7 except for the following modifications:
Whenever outputs are to be sent to effectively-corrupt honest parties, allow the adversary to
choose the outputs they receive.




i∈R from all parties and S and set
A :=A∪
{
Q j ∈Q :R( j) \A=∅
}
.
Additionally, the simulator is allowed to choose shares of the MAC key not only for corrupt
parties, but also for effectively-corrupt honest parties.
Sample In addition to accepting the vector of shares ([[v]]QA, [[γ(v)]]
Q
A), the functionality also re-
ceives shares for effectively-corrupt honest parties, and then does the following:




and errors εv and εγ(v) from S .
2. Retrieve v and α from memory, sample shares {[[v]]QPi , [[γ(x)]]
Q
Pi }i∈[n]\A ← U (F) subject to
v =∑i∈[n] [[v]]APi +εv and α ·v =∑i∈[n] [[γ(v)]]APi +εγ(v), and (locally) return ([[v]]A, [[γ(v)]]A).
Figure 5.5: Modified Preprocessing Functionality, FPrep.
5.4.2 Correctness
Resharing
To reshare, each party Ri in R additively shares their share amongst the parties in Q(i),
i.e. samples {[[[[v]]RRi ]]
Q(i)






Q j = [[v]]
R
Ri . Then each






Q j . Correctness
holds by observing that
⋃
i∈R R×Q(i) =⋃ j∈Q R( j)×Q so the limits can be switched below
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During initialization, the global MAC key α is reshared as above. Then for any secret x
that is shared as a pair ([[x]]R, [[γ(x)]]R), both [[x]]R and [[γ(x)]]R are reshared. Thus the
parties in Q hold secrets shared under the same global MAC key α.
Verification of Resharing
In contrast to the protocol outsourcing to a set of parties under an Q2 access struc-
ture, the protocol presented here does not involve an “error-checking” procedure. This
is because if the parties in R are dishonest in sending their data, any MAC-checking
procedure in the online phase will abort with high probability. (The checking proce-
dure involves verifying the correctness of the MACs and was given in Figure 4.14 in
Section 4.7.) This makes the protocol more straightforward, but the security analysis
a little more complicated: shares must now be consistently erroneous in the ideal and
real worlds. It will be shown that it is indeed possible to simulate.
A subtle point to be aware of is that while in the proof in the original SPDZ pa-
per [DPSZ12] errors were permitted on secrets but not MACs, the adversary now has
freedom to introduce errors on either. Thus a minor tweak to the proof of security of
the online phase (regarding the MAC check) is required, but was dealt with in detail in
Section 4.7 and so it is not explained here.
5.4.3 Security
The protocol is given in Figure 5.6 and the goal is to realize the functionality FPrep. The
access structures ΓR and ΓQ are full-threshold. The algorithm for finding a secure cover
is discussed in Section 5.5 and is used in the initialization of the protocol, but for now it
suffices to know that the parties can find a cover.
Theorem 5.2. The protocol ΠR→QOutsource UC-securely realizes the functionality FPrep with
perfect security against a static, active adversary in the FCoinFlip, FCommit, FQOpen, F
R
Prep-
hybrid model, assuming a secure cover of Q is given.
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Protocol ΠR→QOutsource
Initialize
1. The parties agree on a session identifier, sid ; the parties in Q agree on a session identifier
sidQ and the parties in R agree on a session identifier sidR.
2. The parties execute the algorithm in Figure 5.10 to obtain a secure cover, {Q(i)}i∈R .
3. The parties compute a new identifier idα, then each Ri samples [[α]]RRi ← U (F) and they











instance is denoted by FR
Prep
.
4. The parties in R execute FeedValue(idα).
5. The parties in Q call an instance of FOpen where Q j provides input(
Initialize,ΓQ,
(






. This instance is denoted by FQ
Open
.
Mask To compute a mask for Q j, the parties do the following:
1. The parties in R compute new identifiers ida, idb and idc and call FRPrep with input
(Triple, (ida, idb, idc), sidR) to obtain some [[a]]
R and relabel ida as idr( j) and the shares
as [[r( j)]]R.
2. The parties in R execute FeedValue(idr( j) ).
3. Each Ri sends their share [[r( j)]]RRi to Q j.
Triple To compute T triples for parties in Q, the parties do the following:
1. Parties in R compute new identifiers idak , idbk and idck for k ∈ [T] and call FRPrep with
input (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )
T




2. For each v ∈ {ak,bk, ck}Tk=1 the parties in R execute FeedValue(idv).
Feed Value When the parties call FeedValue(idv), where idv is the identifier for a sharing [[v]]R,
they do the following on [[v]]R and then on [[γ(v)]]R:
1. Each Ri ∈R does the following:
a) Sample a sharing [[[[v]]RRi ]]
Q(i) .
b) For each j ∈Q(i), send [[[[v]]RRi ]]
Q(i)
Q j to Q j over a secure channel.
2. Each Q j ∈Q does the following:
a) Await shares {[[[[v]]RRi ]]
Q(i)
Q j }i∈R( j) .







Figure 5.6: Optimized Outsourcing Protocol, Π
R→Q
Outsource.
Proof. The simulator is given in Figure 5.7.
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Simulator SR→QOutsource
Initialize
1. Agree on a session identifiers sid , sidQ and sidR with A.
2. Execute the algorithm in Figure 5.10 to obtain a secure cover, {Q(i)}i∈R .
3. Compute a new identifier idα and then on behalf of emulated honest par-









from A and initialize a local instance to be the ora-
cle FR
Prep
. Let [[α]]RR\A be the shares of the MAC key held by (emulated) honest parties.
4. Execute the simulated routine SFeedValue(idα) with A to obtain {[[α̃]]QQ j } j∈Q and ∆α.









for j ∈ Q∩A
from A, redefine [[α̃]]QQ j := [[α
′]]QQ j for all j ∈ Q ∩ A, and then call FPrep with input(
Initialize,ΓQ,
(






for j ∈Q∩ A.
Mask To generate a mask for Q j,
1. Compute new identifiers ida, idb and idc and call FRPrep with input
(Triple, (ida, idb, idc), sidR) to obtain some [[a]]
R and relabel ida as idr( j) and the
shares as [[r( j)]]R.
2. Execute SFeedValue(idr( j) ) with A to obtain [[r̃( j)]]
Q, ∆r( j) , [[
γ(r( j))]]Q, and ∆γ(r( j)).
3. If j ∈Q \ A,
• Await shares [[r̃′( j)]]RR∩A from A.
• Set δr( j) :=
∑
i∈R∩A [[r̃
′( j)]]RRi − [[r( j)]]
R
Ri .
• Retrieve from memory [[r̃( j)]]Q
Q∩A and ∆r( j) and send [[r̃
( j)]]Q
Q∩A and ∆r( j) −δr( j) to FPrep.
• Retrieve from memory [[ γ(r( j))]]Q
Q∩A and ∆γ(r( j)) and send these to to FPrep.
If j ∈Q∩ A,
• Send [[r( j)]]RR\A to A.
• Send r( j) to FPrep.
• Retrieve from memory [[r( j)]]Q
Q∩A and ∆r( j) and send these to FPrep.
• Retrieve from memory [[γ(r( j))]]Q
Q∩A and ∆γ(r( j)) and send these to FPrep.
Triples
1. Parties in R compute new identifiers idak , idbk and idck for k ∈ [T] and call FRPrep with
input (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )
T




2. For each v ∈ {ak,bk, ck}Tk=1, execute SFeedValue(idv) with A to obtain [[ṽ]]Q, ∆v, [[γ̃(v)]]Q,
and ∆γ(v).
Then call FPrep with input (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )Tk=1, sidQ), and when FPrep executes




Feed Value For the simulated macro SFeedValue(idv), where idv is the identifier for a sharing
[[v]]R, the simulator does the following on [[v]]R and then on [[γ(v)]]R:
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Simulator SR→QOutsource (continued)
• For each i ∈ R \ A,
– Sample {[[[[v̂]]RRi ]]
Q(i)






Q j = [[v]]
R
Ri .
– Send {[[[[v̂]]RRi ]]
Q(i)
Q j } j∈Q(i)∩A to A.
– Set ∆i := 0.
• For each i ∈ R∩ A,
– If Ri sends only to honest parties,













Q j for all j ∈Q
(i).









– If Ri sends to at least one corrupt party,




Q j } j∈Q(i)\A from A.













Q j = [[v]]
R
Ri .
* Set ∆i := 0.


























• Compute the error ∆ :=∑i∈R∆i.
• (Locally) output ([[w]]Q,∆).
Figure 5.7: Simulator SR→QOutsource for FPrep.
Since the cover is secure, for every secret shared amongst R and reshared amongst
Q there is a share held by an honest party in R for which at least one reshare is held by
an honest party in Q. This means that every set of shares for every secret during the ex-
ecution of the protocol is statistically indistinguishable from uniform, which means that
throughout the protocol execution the environment cannot learn the value of any secret.
For example, consider that a secret a sampled by S during the execution of Triples in
FRPrep is not the same as the value a
′ sampled by FPrep during the corresponding execu-
tion in the ideal world (with high probability). The point is that this difference cannot
be observed by the environment.
However, after the execution, the environment learns all shares of parties in Q.
Since S honestly executes FRPrep locally, the MACs will be correct according to the MAC
key sampled by S, but the secrets and MACs held by parties in Q at the end of the
execution should be correct with respect to the MAC key generated by FPrep. This is
not a problem because in the definition of FPrep, whatever shares are sent to it by S
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Procedure From To Message
Initialize A FR
Prep









(Initialize,ΓQ, [[α̃]]QQ j , sidQ) j∈Q∩A
Mask A FR
Prep


















S A [[[[r( j)]]RR\A]]
Q
Q∩A (N.B. r
( j) := a)
S A [[[[γ(r( j))]]RR\A]]
Q
Q∩A
A S [[[[r̃( j)]]RR∩A]]
Q
Q\A
A S [[[[ γ(r( j))]]RR∩A]]QQ\A
S A [[r( j)]]RR\A
Triples A FR
Prep



































































A S ([[[[γ(ak)]]RR∩A]]QQ\A, [[[[γ(bk)]]RR∩A]]QQ\A, [[[[ γ(ck)]]RR∩A]]QQ\A)Tk=1
Figure 5.8: Transcript for Π
R→Q
Outsource.
on behalf of corrupt and effectively-corrupt honest parties, FPrep will create sharings of
secrets with MACs corresponding to its own MAC key. The only job of the simulator is
to ensure the same errors are introduced in the ideal world as in the real (hybrid) world.
Note that the adversary can cheat during initialization of the MAC key by call-
ing FRPrep with one set of MAC key shares, then introducing errors in the execution of
FeedValue(α), and then sending different secrets to FOpen. In the simulation, the sim-
ulator just takes the shares provided as input to FOpen and passes these on to FPrep on
behalf of corrupt parties, and then, since FPrep expects shares from effectively-corrupt
honest parties, the simulator also passes on the shares generated during the execution
of SFeedValue(). There is therefore no difference between the MAC shares held by cor-
rupt and effectively-corrupt parties in Q in the real world (with respect to FOpen) and
the ideal world (with respect to FPrep).
Since there are no computational assumptions being exploited in the simulation,
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the only strategy the environment can employ is to introduce errors and see how they
affect the final outputs of all parties, since this means the simulator must correctly
and consistently pass errors through into the ideal world. It only remains to argue that
errors can be carried through from the real world to the ideal world, since this ensures
that ΠMACCheck aborts with the correct distribution if it is executed later.
The only way to observe such errors is to inspect distributions on the sum of sets of
shares in Q, since any such set missing one share or more is indistinguishable from uni-
form. By the time the macro FeedValue() is called, S has a complete share vector [[v]]R
produced by the local execution of FRPrep. With each share, S behaves differently depend-
ing on the secure cover. The only time the simulator considers the adversary to have
contributed an error is when all shares of a corrupt party are sent to honest parties.
The intuition is that if a corrupt party in Q, receiving from at least one corrupt party
in R, introduces an error and sends it to FPrep, this is equivalent to the corrupt sender
in R sending a different reshare to the corrupt party in Q. In other words, no error is
“committed” to unless the adversary sends all reshares of a given share only to honest
parties. The correctness of simulation regarding the errors the simulator computes will
now be explained in detail.
Note that in the simulation, there are three “types” of reshare:
1. v̂: honest to honest and honest to corrupt;
2. ṽ: corrupt to honest and corrupt to corrupt;
3. v̄: corrupt to corrupt, but simulated.












Q j . Since the
simulator does not receive the reshares of corrupt parties in R to corrupt parties in Q,









that the adversary computes (or would compute).
Let [[w]]Q




note the shares sampled by FPrep, which are sent to (real) honest parties. Consider the
variable defined as the sum of the shares of (real) honest parties in Q, i.e. the sum of
the shares [[w]]QP j for j ∈Q \ A, with the sum of the shares [[w̃]]
Q
Q j for j ∈Q∩A generated
















































































































































This shows that the shares sampled by the functionality for honest parties during this
procedure, namely the (vector of) shares [[w]]Q
Q\A
, sum with the shares the adversary
would compute to differ from the secret by precisely the error the adversary introduced
on the shares when resharing.
When masks are generated for parties in Q, there are two opportunities for parties
in R to produce errors: first, in the resharing during FeedValue(), and second, when
the parties in R open the mask to the party in Q. However, since at least one party





Pi to observe any errors. This means that in the simulation it is sufficient
to “imply” an error in opening by subtracting the error introduced in opening from the
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5.5 Probabilistically Choosing a Secure Cover
In order to cut the costs of resharing, the parties can attempt to agree on a secure
cover by a probabilistic process. In this section, it will be assumed that R and Q are
under threshold access structures but that they will execute full-threshold protocols,
for simplicity.
Let tR and tQ be the number of corrupt parties in R and Q respectively. Let εR :=
tR/nR and εQ := tQ/nQ be the associated ratios. To help with the analysis and for effi-
ciency and load-balancing reasons, it will be assumed that each party in R sends to the
same number of parties `≥ dnQ/nRe in Q. Any assignment of sets to parties in R which
covers Q where `= tQ+1 is secure since every party in R necessarily sends to at least
one honest party in Q.
Figure 5.9 shows an example of a load-balanced topology when nQ ≈ 2nR. Note that
it is not necessarily the case that each party in Q receives the same number of shares,















Figure 5.9: Load-Balanced Topology.
An algorithm for creating a cover probabilistically is given in Figure 5.10. The high-
level idea is the following:
1. Randomly assign parties in Q to each party in R so that each party in R has exactly
dnQ/nRe parties in Q assigned to it. For ease of exposition, it is assumed that nR|nQ.
2. For each party in R, assign random parties in Q until each party in R is assigned a
total of ` parties.
Note that in Step 12, the assignment can be made by cycling through only the entries
Mi, j of row i for which Mi, j = 0 to reduce the expected number of loops, but, since the
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random oracle is evaluated locally, this would not significantly improve runtime unless
there is a large number of parties.
Algorithm for Computing a Secure Cover
Recall that Mi, j denotes the (i, j)th entry of M and Mi denotes the ith row. The macro Shuffle()
denotes the Knuth Shuffle in Figure 2.1, Section 2.1.4.
Input R, Q, and `. For the purposes of this algorithm, R := [nR] and Q := [nQ] and are distin-
guished by using i to index R and j to index Q.
Output A cover, {Q(i)}i∈R , where each set has cardinality `.
Method
1. Call an instance of FCoinFlip with input (Initialize, {0,1}κ sid).
2. Call an instance of FRO with input (Initialize,Q, sid).
3. Let M ∈FnR×nQ .
4. For each i ∈ R,
a) For each j ∈Q,
i. Set Mi, j := 0.
b) End For.
5. End For.
6. Set count := 1.
7. Call FCoinFlip with input (RElt, sid) to obtain seedQ .
8. Call FCoinFlip with input (RElt, sid) to obtain seedπ.
9. Set π := Shuffle(seedπ,nQ).
10. For each i ∈ R,
a) For each j where dnQ/nRe · (i−1)< j ≤ dnQ/nRe · i,
i. Set Mi,π( j) := 1.
b) End For.
11. End For.
12. For each i ∈ R,
a) While HW(Mi>)< `,
i. Do
A. Call FRO with input (seedQ‖count, sid) to obtain j.
B. Set count := count+1.
ii. Until Mi, j = 0
iii. Set Mi, j := 1.
b) End While.
13. End For.
14. For each i ∈ R,
a) For each j ∈Q,
i. If Mi, j = 1 then
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Algorithm for Computing a Secure Cover (continued)




16. Output {Q(i)}i∈R .
Figure 5.10: Algorithm for Computing a Secure Cover.
Correctness
The algorithm allows different parties in Q to receive from different numbers of parties
in R, whilst parties in R always send to the same number of parties in Q. One of the
reasons for doing this is that it lends itself better to analysis of probabilities below. Let
X be the event that every good party in R is assigned only dishonest parties in Step 10,
and let Y be the event that every good party in R is assigned only dishonest parties
in Step 12. Since these events are independent, the probability that the algorithm pro-
duces a secure cover is given by
1−Pr[X ∧Y ]= 1−Pr[X ] ·Pr[Y ].
Computing Pr[X ] The first probability is the number of ways of choosing dnQ/nRe
parties from the tQ corrupt parties divided by the number of ways of choosing dnQ/nRe






Thus the first dnQ/nRe corrupt parties in Q have been assigned. Then the probability
that the next honest party in R is also assigned only corrupt parties from the remaining






and this continues until all the nR−tR−1 honest parties in R have been assigned parties
in Q.
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Computing Pr[Y ] Each party in R has been assigned dnQ/nRe parties in Q so that
each party in Q has been assigned to exactly one party in R. In Step 12, each party in
R is independently assigned a random set of `−dnQ/nRe more parties in Q. For a given
party in R, this is the number of ways of choosing `−dnQ/nRe dishonest parties from
the remaining nQ−dnQ/nRe parties in Q such that they too are all dishonest – i.e. they








Putting these together, the probability that the algorithm produces a secure cover is
given by:
1−
 ( tQdnQ/nRe) · (tQ−dnQ/nRednQ/nRe ) · · · · · (tQ−(nR−tR−1)dnQ/nRednQ/nRe )( nQ
dnQ/nRe










Q! · (nQ− (nR− tR)dnQ/nRe)!







To see what happens in the extremal case where all parties but one are corrupt in each
of R and Q, set tQ = nQ−1 and tR = nR−1. Then:
1 − (n
Q−1)! · (nQ−dnQ/nRe)!
















This agrees with the intuition that when ` is equal to nQ, i.e. each party in R sends to
every party in Q, the cover is secure with probability 1. Since this probability is linear
in `, for outsourcing full-threshold to full-threshold, the only way of achieving statistical
security σ is to have an intractible number of parties, and hence in this situation it is
recommended for all parties in R to reshare to all parties in Q.
However, with lower thresholds the probability of a secure cover from the proba-
bilistic algorithm increases. When ` is at least tQ+1, then every party in R necessarily
sends to at least one honest party. The probability that this algorithm produces a secure
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cover grows with the number of parties. For example, if R is a (5,2)-threshold and Q
a (50,25)-threshold, then setting ` = 23 gives a secure cover with probability at least
1−2−80, instead of the 25 parties required to guarantee the cover is secure.
Thus it is not immediately clear that this probabilistic approach offers significant
advantage, as it only works when the number of parties is comparatively large. How-
ever, if a set of parties R has an access structure ΓR with nR/2 < tR < nR and runs
SPDZ then, for example, if R is (20,15)-threshold but runs a full-threshold protocol,
and Q is (50,25)-threshold, then ` = 13 gives a secure cover, and thus the amount of
communication is halved.
5.6 Communication Complexity
The costs associated with verifying the correctness of resharing are negligible compared
to the amount of preprocessed data that is transferred in circuits of large enough size.
The salient factor, then, is the cost of resharing.
The two sets of parties are connected with bilateral secure channels, giving the com-
plete bipartite graph between them. This topology requires nR ·nQ secure connections,















Figure 5.11: Complete Bipartite Graph.
For the Q2 outsourcing protocol, the communication cost is that of each party in R
resharing their shares under the LSSS for Q. The finite-field elements are sent over the
nR ·nQ secure channels, and the total communication cost (besides the verification step)
is mR·mQ. If the access structures are threshold access structures, then Shamir’s secret-
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sharing scheme can be used and then this is nR ·nQ, which is a linear communication
cost per party in R.
For the full-threshold case, without the optimization of probabilistically defining a
secure cover, the complete bipartite graph of secure channels is required, and again the
communication cost is nR ·nQ.
While the use case of outsourced preprocessing is primarily for situations in which
clients cannot perform preprocessing themselves, it would be informative to compare
the runtime of protocols executed in the “standard” manner with protocols in which
outsourcing is performed, to see if there are performance gains even when computing
parties are able to execute preprocessing. Unfortunately, this is difficult to do with-
out concrete instantiations due to the many variable factors in hardware and protocol
choice. This would be an interesting avenue of further research.
As a final note to conclude this chapter, observe that protocols for generating pre-
processing for parties under a Q2 access structure often assume a multiplicative LSSS
– as indeed is required for the protocol that will be presented in Chapter 6. (See Sec-
tion 2.4.4 for the definition of multiplicative LSSS.) However, ΠOnline, which is realized
in the FPrep-hybrid model, makes use only of the linear property of the LSSS, since
the costly multiplication step is resolved in the preprocessing phase. Consequently, the
LSSS used for parties in Q need not be multiplicative, which means a broader class of
LSSS can be used when resharing via the outsourcing protocol presented. This is use-
ful because it potentially allows a more efficient LSSSs to be used (i.e. one with fewer





Q2 MPC for Small Numbers of Parties
This chapter is based on work published at SCN’18 under the title Reducing Commu-
nication Channels in MPC [KRSW18] and was joint work with Marcel Keller, Dragos,
Rotaru and Nigel Smart.
The functionality FRand from that paper has been separated into two separate func-
tionalities FRRSS and FRZS. They have been proved secure in the universal composability
(UC) framework.
What was previously an optimization to the main protocol in the publication now
replaces the “un”-optimized variant, and the functionality now defines a more “full” pre-
processing phase from what was described in the published version, so that now input
and output masks are generated in addition to Beaver triples. The “opening” protocol of
the original work has been replaced with the generic functionality FOpen from Chapter 4,
which is taken from [SW19], resulting in a tidier proof of the actively-secure protocol.
This chapter This chapter focuses on two aspects of the communication cost asso-
ciated with multi-party computation (MPC): the total amount of data sent over the
network, and the number of channels the parties must maintain throughout circuit
evaluation.
More specifically, the focus is on an actively-secure, efficient protocol for Q2 access
structures with computational security, making use of the error-detection properties
of the linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) discussed in Chapter 3. The resulting pro-
tocol offers significant advantages in terms of communication cost when compared to
the historical, mainly information-theoretic (IT) protocols in this setting. The proto-
col uses replicated secret-sharing so the focus of this chapter is primarily on a proto-
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exponentially-many) shares for threshold schemes.
6.1 Overview
General, as opposed to threshold, access structures are practically interesting in situa-
tions where different groups of parties play different organizational roles. For example,
in a financial application, one may have a computation performed amongst a number
of banks and regulators; the required access structures for collaboration between the
banks and the regulators may not be a straightforward threshold.
In the classical results of Chaum et al. [CCD88a] and Ben-Or et al. [BGW88], parties
were assumed to be connected by a complete network of secure channels. These results
for honest-majority threshold access structures were extended to arbitrary access struc-
tures by Hirt and Maurer [HM97] and Beaver and Wool [BW98], in which case the two
necessary and sufficient conditions become Q2 and Q3 respectively, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.6.
Another line of work considered computationally-bounded adversaries, starting with
[GMW87]. There, parties are connected by a complete network of authenticated chan-
nels; it was shown that actively-secure protocols are possible in the (n, t)-threshold set-
ting when t < n/2 (i.e. with an honest majority), and active security with abort when only
one party is honest. Generally speaking, such computationally-secure protocols are less
efficient than the information-theoretic protocols as they require some form of public-
key cryptography (PKC); however, computational assumptions enable computation in
situations when it is provably impossible to do so using only IT primitives.
In recent years there has been considerable progress in practical MPC by mixing the
computational and IT approaches. For example, the VIFF [DGKN09], BDOZ [BDOZ11],
SPDZ [DPSZ12], Tiny-OT [NNOB12], and ABY [DSZ15] protocols are in the preprocess-
ing model and defer PKC to the preprocessing phase, and then use information-theoretic
primitives in the online phase.
It is therefore logical to wonder what advancements might be made in the Q2 setting
by sacrificing IT security. Recently, Araki et al. [AFL+16] gave an efficient passively-
secure MPC evaluation of the advanced encryption standard (AES) circuit (a common
benchmark) for a (3,1)-threshold access structure. This was then generalized to an
actively-secure protocol by Furukawa et al. [FLNW17]. Both protocols require a pre-
processing phase making use of symmetric-key cryptographic primitives only; thus the
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preprocessing is much more efficient than for the full-threshold protocols mentioned
above.
The passively-secure protocol of [AFL+16] is very cheap for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the preprocessing phase is only used to produce additive sharings of zero. Pseu-
dorandom zero-sharings (PRZSs) can be easily produced non-interactively after a one-
time setup phase using symmetric key primitives, as will be shown in Section 6.3. Sec-
ondly, the network is not assumed to be complete: each party only sends data to one
other party via a secure channel, and only receives data from the third party via a
secure channel. Thirdly, parties only need to transmit one finite-field element per mul-
tiplication. Compared to IT protocols in the same setting, the protocol requires that
each party holds two finite-field elements per share, as opposed to using an ideal secret-
sharing scheme, such as Shamir’s, in which each party need only hold one finite-field
element per secret.
The underlying protocol of Araki et al., bar the use of the PRZSs, is highly remi-
niscent of the Sharemind system [BLW08], which also assumes a (3,1)-threshold access
structure. Since both [AFL+16] and [BLW08] are based on replicated secret-sharing,
they are also closely related to the “MPC-Made-Simple” approach of Maurer [Mau06].
Thus, for the case of this specific access structure, the work of [AFL+16] can be seen
as using cryptographic assumptions to optimize the information-theoretic approach
of [Mau06].
The actively-secure successor to [AFL+16] by Furakawa et al. [FLNW17] uses the
passively-secure protocol (over an incomplete network of secure channels) to run a pre-
processing phase that produces Beaver triples. These are then consumed in the online
phase, by using the triples to verify the passively-secure multiplication of actual secrets.
This is different from the traditional methodology in which Beaver triples are used to
perform the multiplication as describe in Section 2.5.3, which allows the online phase
to be executed over authenticated channels rather than secure channels.
The question addressed in this chapter is whether the approach outlined in [AFL+16],
[BLW08] and [FLNW17] is particularly tied to the (3,1)-threshold access structure, or
whether it generalizes to other access structures. The protocol presented in this chapter
shows that they do indeed generalize to any Q2 access structure.
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6.2 Preliminaries
This chapter concerns the evaluation of an arithmetic circuit over a finite field Fq, where
q is a prime power. Most of the notation used in this chapter was defined in Chapter 2.
The network requirements are best understood in the context of the protocols them-
selves and so the descriptions are deferred until later.
6.2.1 Replicated Secret-Sharing
The protocols in this chapter make use of replicated secret-sharing, which was defined
in Section 2.4.3 but is explained in the context of MPC here. Recall that the set ∆+
of maximally unqualified sets of parties, and its structure, is important for replicated
secret-sharing; it is notationally simpler to consider the set of complements of maxi-
mally unqualified sets, which is denoted by ∇ := {G ∈ 2P :P\G ∈∆+}. Note that in general
it is not true that the set ∇ is equal to the set of minimally qualified sets, though there





where n is odd). In replicated secret-sharing, a secret x is shared as an additive sum
x =∑G∈∇ xRG , where party Pi is handed xRG if and only if i ∈G.
It is clear that if ∆ is Q2, then so is any subset. In particular, the set of maximally
unqualified sets ∆+ is also Q2. In fact, if ∆+ is Q2 then ∆ is Q2. Hence, for the set of
complements ∇ it holds that if G1,G2 ∈∇ then G1∩G2 6=∅. A set ∇ for which this property
holds was called a quorum system by Beaver and Wool [BW98].
Recall that a sharing of a secret x is denoted by the vector [[x]], and [[x]]Pi is the
vector of shares that party Pi holds. For replicated secret-sharing, additionally [[x]]R is
used to denote the share vector proper, whereas xRG is used to denote the summand of
the secret corresponding to the set G ∈ ∇. Recall from Section 2.4.4 that if an access
structure is Q2 then replicated secret-sharing is multiplicative, i.e. given two secret-
shared values [[a]] and [[b]], an additive sharing of the product a · b can be computed as






〈µi, [[a]]Pi ⊗ [[b]]Pi〉.
The fact that by local computations the parties each obtain one summand of the product
is the reason that it is possible to build an MPC protocol for any Q2 access structure
secure against passive adversaries and with IT security (which is exactly the protocol
of Hirt and Maurer [HM97]).
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Example 6.1, below, will be used throughout this chapter to demonstrate the savings
which can result from the protocol presented later, and also to examine the communica-
tion channels required.








Here the set ∇ is
∇=
{
{1,3,4}, {1,2,4}, {1,2,3}, {3,4,5,6}, {2,4,5,6}, {2,3,5,6},




If there is a party Pi that is in a qualified set only if some other party P j is in the
qualified set then the access structure is said to contain redundancy and Pi is said to
be redundant.
In the terminology of access structures, given an access structure Γ, a party Pi is
considered redundant if there exists another party P j ( j 6= i) such that for any U ∈ ∆,
Pi 6∈ U implies P j 6∈ U . In terms of replicated secret sharing, a party Pi is redundant if
there is another party P j that holds every share Pi holds (and possibly more).
For example, in the access structure defined by
∆+ := {{1,2}, {1,3,4}, {2,3,4}}
P3 (or, equivalently, P4) is redundant; once removed, the access structure becomes
∆+ := {{1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}}.
Note that if any party is omitted from all sets in ∆+ then it is present in all sets in
∇ and hence every party, but this party, is redundant, which makes the MPC protocol
trivial: the omitted party can simply perform the entire computation itself and output
the result to all parties.
The idea is that Pi learns information only when P j learns it, so if an adversary
corrupts P j it learns as much as when it corrupts P j and Pi. For MPC, this means that
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preprocessing can be outsourced to a non-redundant subset of parties and the data re-
distributed according to the original set of parties. For the protocol given in this chapter
this outsourcing is particularly cheap as replicated secret-sharing is used so the reshar-
ing cost is simply that of forwarding shares to the redundant party.
6.3 Computational Random Sharings
Improving on the protocols in [BW98] and [Mau06] seems to require sacrificing the IT
security for computational assumptions. In this section protocols for random sharings
are given, which are key components of the MPC protocol. The focus is on computational
security in the random oracle model, which leads to a very efficient protocol: any number
of (pseudo)random secrets can be generated from a one-time setup phase. Discussion of
the generation of random secrets with IT security is given in Section 7.3. As the one-time
setup cost potentially1 grows exponentially with the number of parties, the IT method
is more efficient for a large number of parties as the asymptotic cost is linear.
Specifically, this section gives protocols that UC-realize the functionalities FRRSS in
Figure 6.1 and FRZS in Figure 6.2, which provide parties with pseudorandom secret-
sharings (PRSSs) and pseudorandom zero-sharings (PRZSs), respectively. The idea is
for different sets of parties to agree on keys that are appended to every call to a random
oracle to obtain correlated randomness that can be used to generate random sharings2.
UC proofs for random sharings were given in [DGKN09], but the functionalities
were not defined. Since they are a key component of the MPC protocols, full proofs are
given here.
1The cost depends on the access structure.
2The random oracle here can be instantiated with a keyed pseudorandom function (PRF) rather than
a hash function.
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Functionality FRRSS
Initialize On input (Initialize,Γ, sid) from all honest parties and S, where sid is a new ses-
sion identifier, P is the set of parties, and Γ is an access structure, set ∇ to be the set of
complements of sets in ∆+ and await further messages.
Sharing of Secret On input (SecretSharing, id , sid) from all honest parties and S, the func-
tionality does the following:
1. If id is a new identifier, sample a set {rRG : G ∈∇} ← U (F).
2. For each G ∈∇, for each Pi ∈G, send rRG to Pi or to S if Pi ∈A.
Figure 6.1: Functionality for Secret-Sharings of Random Secrets for Replicated Secret-
Sharing, FRRSS.
Notice that the adversary cannot choose its own shares. This reflects the fact that
with replicated shares generated by PRF keys, A does not have a choice in what values
the shares take. Of course, this does not preclude it from ignoring these inputs later on,
but the validity of doing so is dealt with outside the execution of FRRSS (specifically, by
FOpen in the protocol later on).
Functionality FRZS
Initialize On input (Initialize,P , sid) from all parties, where sid is a new session identifier
and P is the set of parties, await further messages.
Sharing of Zero On input (ZeroSharing, id ,P ′, sid) from all parties in a set P ′ ⊆P , where id
is a new identifier,





2. For each i ∈ [n′], send [[t]]APi to Pi, or to S if i ∈ A.
Figure 6.2: Functionality for Secret-Sharings of Zero, FRZS.
6.3.1 PRSSs
The protocol ΠRRSS used to realize F
R
RSS is given in Figure 6.3.
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Protocol ΠRRSS
This protocol is realized in the FCoinFlip, FRO-hybrid model.
Initialize
1. The parties agree on a session identifier sid and a computational security parameter, κ.
2. The parties call an instance of FRO with input (Initialize,F, sid).
3. Each set of parties G ∈ ∇ agree on a session identifier sidG and send the message




4. Each set of parties G ∈∇ call FCoinFlip with input (RElt, sidG ) to obtain kG .
Sharing of Secret
1. The parties compute a new identifier, idr.
2. For each G ∈ ∇, the parties in G call FRO with input (idr‖kG , sid) and set the value they
receive as output as rRG .
3. Each party Pi concatenates the shares {rRG :G 3Pi} into a share vector [[r]]
R
Pi .
Figure 6.3: Protocol for Secret-Sharings of Random Secrets using Replicated Secret-
Sharing, ΠRRSS.
Theorem 6.1. The protocol ΠRRSS UC-securely realizes the functionality F
R
RSS against a
static, active, computationally-bounded adversary in the FCoinFlip, FRO-hybrid model.
Proof. The simulator is given in Figure 6.4.
Simulator SRRSS
Initialize
1. Agree on a session identifier, sid , with A.
2. Await the call to FRO with input (Initialize,F, sid) from A and send the command
(Initialize,Γ, sid) to FR
RSS
.
3. For each G ∈∇ where G∩A 6=∅, agree on a session identifier sidG with A and await the call
to FCoinFlip with input (Initialize, {0,1}2·κ , sidG ) and execute it honestly with A, storing
the outputs locally.
4. For each G ∈ ∇ where G ∩A 6= ∅, await the call to FCoinFlip with input (RElt, sidG ) and
execute it honestly, sending the output kG to A.
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Simulator SRRSS (continued)
Sharing of Secret
1. Compute a new identifier, idr.
2. Call FR
RSS
with input (SecretSharing, idr, sid) and then do the following:
• Await the set of shares {rRG :G ∈∇∧G∩A 6=∅} from FRRSS.
• For each G ∈∇ where G∩A 6=∅, await the call to FRO with input (s, sid) from A.
• If s = idr‖kG then send rRG to A.
• If s has been queried before, return the same output that was sent before.
• Otherwise sample t ← U (F) and send t to A.
3. (No simulation is required for this step.)
Figure 6.4: Simulator SRRSS for F
R
RSS.
The only problem occurs if A queries the random oracle before the set of seeds
{kG}G∈∇:G∩A 6=∅} are agreed on, and thus before S can program the random oracle by
replacing the call with an output from FRRSS.
The adversary is computationally bounded, so the number of possible queries to
the random oracle is bounded by some polynomial function in κ, i.e. poly(κ). The seeds
are of length 2 ·κ bits, so the chance that the adversary queries the random oracle on
an input before the seed agreement phase on a query that must be programmed with
output from FRRSS is poly(κ) · (2 ·22·κ)−1 < 2−κ by the Birthday Bound (see the proof of
Theorem 2.3). Thus no environment can distinguish except with negligible probability
in the computational security parameter.
6.3.2 PRZSs
In order to rerandomize additive sharings, which is required for proving the security
of the MPC protocol defined later, parties can add a uniformly-random sharing of zero.
Such sharings are provided by the functionality FRZS given in Figure 6.2. A protocol
ΠRZS realizing FRZS in the FRO-hybrid model is given in Figure 6.5.
This protocol was first described by Gilboa and Ishai [GI99], but instead of using
random oracles, there they altered the security notion to define a class of protocols that
involved agreeing on a random seed and then extending it locally. The reason for this
change in security definition is that there is some “short explanation” – namely, the
seeds – that “explains” the final random string that is given as output by any set of
parties, which means that simulation is not possible. Intuitively, one can see this as S
having to find a seed that produces the uniform output of FRZS, breaking the security of
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the PRF, in order to send A information so that the environment would not know that
the random outputs of honest parties were not generated by evaluating a PRF. This
was the same problem encountered by Boyle et al. [BCGI18], again avoided by carefully
choosing the definition of security for the primitive. Since the protocol assumes the use
of random oracles in other places (for example, in realizing efficient UC commitments),
its use here does not change the set of security assumptions.
Protocol ΠRZS
This protocol is realized in the FCoinFlip, FRO-hybrid model.
Initialize
1. Agree on a session identifier sid .
2. Call an instance of FRO with input (Initialize,F, sid).
3. Each unordered pair of parties (Pi,P j) (i.e. for all (i, j) ∈ [n]2 such that (i < j)) does the
following:
a) Call an instance of FCoinFlip with input (Initialize, {0,1}2·κ , sidi, j); let this instance be
denoted by F i, j
CoinFlip
.
b) Call F i, j
CoinFlip
with input (RElt, sidi, j) and set the returned output as ki, j.
c) Call F i, j
CoinFlip
with input (RElt, sidi, j) and set the returned output as k j,i.
Sharing of Zero To obtain a sharing of zero amongst parties indexed by X ⊆ [n], for each i ∈ X ,
1. The parties compute a new identifier idr.
2. Each party Pi calls FRO with input (idr‖ki, j, sid) and set the returned output as r i, j.
3. Each party Pi calls FRO with input (idr‖k j,i, sid) and set the returned output as r j,i.




r i, j − r j,i.
Figure 6.5: Protocol for Secret-Sharings of Zero, ΠRZS.
Theorem 6.2. The protocol ΠRZS UC-securely realizes the functionality FRZS against a
static, active, computationally-bounded adversary in the FRO-hybrid model.




























r i, j −
∑
j 6=i

















6.3. COMPUTATIONAL RANDOM SHARINGS
(where for simplicity it is assumed that X = [n]).
Simulator SRZS
Initialize
1. Agree on a session identifier, sid , with A.
2. Await the call to FRO with input (Initialize,F, sid) from A and initialize a local instance.
3. Each unordered pair of parties (Pi,P j) (i.e. for all (i, j) ∈ [n]2 such that (i < j)), where i ∈ A
or j ∈ A, do the following:
a) If i ∈ A or j ∈ A, await a call to an instance of FCoinFlip with input




b) Await the call to F i, j
CoinFlip
with input (RElt, sidi, j), execute it honestly, set the returned
output as ki, j and send this to A.
c) Await the call to F i, j
CoinFlip
with input (RElt, sidi, j), execute it honestly, set the returned
output as k j,i and send this to A.
Sharing of Zero
1. Compute a new identifier idr, call FRZS with input (SecretSharing, idr, sid) and await a
share vector [[t]]AA in response.
2. For each i ∈ X ∩ A, await the call to FRO with input (idr‖ki, j, sid) for each j ∈ X , execute it
honestly, set the returned output as r i, j and send this to A.
3. For each i ∈ X ∩A, await the call to FRO with input (idr‖k j,i, sid) for each j ∈ X and do the
following:
• Sample a set {ti, j} j∈X ← U (F) subject to ∑ j 6=i ti, j = [[t]]APi .
• Set r j,i := r i, j − ti, j.
• Send r j,i to A.
4. (No simulation is required for this step.)
Figure 6.6: Simulator SRZS for FRZS.
The only messages in the transcript are from the random oracle, (r i, j, r j,i). Each
r j,i can be viewed as −ti, j encrypted via the one-time pad r i, j. Thus the only informa-
tion learnt from such a pair is ti, j. Since the ti, j ’s are uniformly random subject to the
contraint that
∑
j 6=i ti, j = [[t]]APi , and the [[t]]
A
Pi ’s are uniformly random subject to the con-
straint that they sum to 0, the distribution of the simulated view is identical to the real
view of A.
A similar argument as for the proof of Theorem 6.1 can be used to show that the
environment cannot distinguish between worlds by querying the random oracle except
with negligible advantage.
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6.3.3 Communication Complexity
The total theoretical communication cost (in bits) for realizing the seed-agreement is
given in Table 6.1, where SC(EBC) and AC(EBC) denote a complete network of secure
and authenticated channels, respectively. The cost of instantiating the broadcast is
not included. The communication cost of commitments comes from the instantiation
of FCommit via ΠCommit in Figure 2.7. Furthermore, it is assumed that the functionality
FCoinFlip defined in Figure 2.8 is realized using the protocol ΠCoinFlip in Figure 2.9. Thus
in total, the cost (for each party in each pair, and for every party for every set in G ∈ ∇)
is that of a commitment, which is an element of {0,1}2·κ, and the decommitment, which
is a message that consists of the seed in {0,1}2·κ with the nonce in {0,1}κ.
Procedure Number of bits Channels
PRZS key commitments 2 ·κ ·n · (n−1) AC(EBC)
Opening commitments 3 ·κ ·n · (n−1) SC(EBC)
PRSS key commitments 2 ·κ ·∑G∈∇ |G| · (|G|−1) AC(EBC)
Opening commitments 3 ·κ ·∑G∈∇ |G| · (|G|−1) SC(EBC)
Table 6.1: Total communication cost to realize FRRSS and FRZS.
6.4 Converting Additive to Replicated
Replicated secret-sharing is always multiplicative if the access structure is Q2, as dis-
cussed in Section 6.2. The real cost in computing a passive multiplication of secrets
shared using replicated secret-sharing is that of converting the additive sharing of the
product back into a replicated sharing. Indeed, at its heart, the protocol of Araki et
al. [ABF+17] is an efficient method of turning an additive sharing into a replicated
sharing.
This is analogous to the main communication cost in the BGW protocol, where the
task is to convert what is essentially an additive sharing (modulo the Lagrange inter-
polation coefficients) back to a Shamir sharing of the secret. Given a procedure that
performs this conversion, it is straightforward to give a subprotocol in which parties
multiply two secrets. For now, it suffices to understand that it is desirable to have a
methodology for doing this; the specifics of the multiplication are dealt with in detail in
the following section.
From a high level, additive secret-sharing and replicated secret-sharing look very
similar: to share a secret, the dealer additively splits the secret into several shares and
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distributes them amongst the parties; indeed, additive secret-sharing is exactly repli-
cated secret-sharing for a full-threshold access structure. In this section, this similarity
is exploited to give a more communication efficient (but only computationally-secure)
method of converting additive sharings to replicated sharings; first, for comparison, the
“standard” (i.e. IT) method is described.
6.4.1 Information-Theoretic Conversion
The subprotocol given in Figure 6.7 is part of Maurer’s protocol [Mau06] and is sim-
ilar to the conversion in the protocol of Beaver and Wool [BW98] but uses replicated
secret-sharing rather than disjunctive normal form (DNF)-based secret-sharing. It is
expressed in its general form that turns an additive secret-sharing of a secret into a
secret under any other LSSS.
Subprotocol ΠAToAny
Parties hold [[v]]A and will convert to a sharing under another LSSS, denoted by [[ · ]].
Additive to Replicated
1. Each Pi creates a sharing [[[[v]]APi ]] of the value [[v]]
A
Pi .
2. Each Pi acts as the dealer in the LSSS and for each j 6= i sends [[[[v]]APi ]]P j to P j over a
secure channel.




P j ]]Pi .
4. Parties (locally) output [[v]].
Figure 6.7: Protocol to Convert Additive Shares to Shares Under Any LSSS, ΠAToAny.
Correctness










Security holds by the IT security of the LSSS.
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Communication Complexity









finite-field elements, and communicates with every other party over a point-to-point se-










= (n−1) · ∑
G∈∇
|G|
finite-field elements, across n·(n−1) secure channels (assuming a non-redundant access
structure). These secure channels are enumerated as uni-directional secure channels,
reflecting the fact that good security practice dictates that parties should have different
secret keys securing communication in different directions.
For the running example, Example 6.1, this translates to sending (6−1) ·41 = 205
finite-field elements over 6 ·5 = 30 secure channels. Note that the same finite-field ele-
ment will be sent to multiple parties (every set of parties G ∈∇ obtains a share common
to them all), but these elements are counted as distinct when analysing communication
costs.
6.4.2 Computational Conversion
The goal is to turn an additive sharing [[v]]A into a replicated sharing [[v]]R (with pas-
sive security) more efficiently than in the IT protocol above. The protocol is given in
Figure 6.9 but the method is first outlined here.
To do this conversion, once at the beginning of the protocol, each party is assigned
a set Gi ∈ ∇ where i ∈ Gi so that no two parties are assigned the same set. (Section 6.7
describes how to fix the protocol in the uncommon event that no such assignment can
be made.)
To turn an additive sharing [[v]]A into a replicated sharing, the parties first reran-
domize the additive sharing [[v]]A using a PRZS, by each party Pi computing [[v]]APi +
[[t]]APi , and then set this to be the share v
R
Gi .
To make up the remaining |∇|−n shares, the parties set any share not indexed by
some set in {Gi}i∈[n] to be the corresponding random share rRG from a PRSS [[r]]
R. Thus,
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In other words, the current sharing is offset from v by the sum of the random shares
taken from [[r]]R. To resolve this error, shares from r are subtracted from the vRGi shares
so that the sum of all shares is still v. To ensure each random share from [[r]]R is
only subtracted once, a partition {∇(i)}i∈[n] is computed so that Pi subtracts all shares
{rRG}G∈∇(i) of the PRSS from v
R
Gi . All that remains to obtain a replicated sharing is for
each Pi to send vRGi to every party who is supposed to hold it, since the parties already
hold the share vRG := rRG for all G ∈∇\{Gi}i∈[n]. Using the PRZS combined with the PRSS
means that the resulting sharing is uniform in the space of all share vectors [[v]]R that
share the secret v.
In the running example one could take G1 := {1,3,4}, G2 := {1,2,4}, G3 := {1,2,3}, G4 :=





∇(5) = {{1,2,5,6}, {1,3,5,6}, {1,4,5,6}},
∇(6) = {{2,3,4,6}, {2,3,5,6}, {2,4,5,6}, {3,4,5,6}}.
This results in shares being generated and sent as shown in Figure 6.8.
[[v]]A [[t]]A
[[v]]R
123 124 134 1256 1356 1456 2345 2346 2356 2456 3456
P1 [[v]]AP1 [[t]]
A
P1 ♦ ♦  ♦  
P2 [[v]]AP2 [[t]]
A
P2 ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦  
P3 [[v]]AP3 [[t]]
A
P3  ♦  ♦ ♦  
P4 [[v]]AP4 [[t]]
A
P4 ♦ ♦   ♦  
P5 [[v]]AP5 [[t]]
A
P5    ♦   
P6 [[v]]AP6 [[t]]
A
P6 ♦      
Key
♦ Receive share








Figure 6.8: Optimized Multiplication in Running Example.
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This method directly generalizes the method used by [AFL+16], which concentrated
on the case of the finite field F2 and a (3,1)-threshold, in the sense that this protocol
is the same as theirs in this 3-party setting. However, prior to this new methodology it
was not clear how to generate the remaining |∇|− n shares and maintain correctness,
and without incurring considerable additional communication overhead, since in the
3-party case |∇|−n = 0.
Choosing the Partition
After the sets {Gi}i∈[n] are chosen, the remaining shares are assigned to the parties
arbitrarily, where choices are made so that each party is assigned roughly the same
overall total number of shares in order to balance the load.
Any partition {∇(i)}i∈[n] of the set ∇ can be chosen with the constraint that for every
i ∈ [n] it holds that G ∈ ∇(i) implies Pi ∈ G. It is assumed that ∇(i) 6= ∅ for all i ∈ [n],
which may not always be possible, although there is an easy fix to the protocol in the
unlikely event that this happens, described in Section 6.7.
The partition is chosen by considering all the maps f : ∇ → P such that for every
i ∈ [n], f (G)=Pi implies Pi ∈G, and choosing a f such that im( f ) is as large as possible.
If f is not surjective then there is at least one set f −1({Pi}) (for some i) which is empty.
For small numbers of parties on a non-redundant Q2 access structure, such a map can
always be found; the necessary adaptation to the protocol when this is not the case, and
further relevant discussion, is given in Section 6.7.
The formal description of the subprotocol is given in Figure 6.9 and is followed by a
justification of its correctness and security (in the passive security setting).
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Subprotocol ΠAToROpt
It is assumed that, as part of the larger protocol, parties have already called an instance of FR
RSS
with input (Initialize,Γ, sid) and an instance of FRZS with input (Initialize,P , sid). Parties
hold an additive sharing [[v]]A.
Additive to Replicated
1. The parties compute a new identifier idt, call FRZS with input (ZeroSharing, idt,P , sid),
and receive an additive sharing of zero [[t]]A.
2. The parties compute a new identifier idr, call FRRSS with input (SecretSharing, idr, sid),
and receive [[r]]R.a
3. Each Pi defines a sharing [[v]]R by doing the following:
a) Set vRG := rRG for all G ∈∇\{G j} j∈[n] where G 3Pi.






G∈ f −1({Pi})\{Gi} r
R
G .
4. For every i ∈ [n], for every P j ∈Gi, Pi sends vRGi to P j over a secure channel.
5. Each party Pi concatenates {vRG :G ∈∇∧G 3Pi} into a share vector [[v]]
R
Pi .
6. Parties (locally) output [[v]]R.




, the parties need not to call the random oracle
on the keys {kGi }
n
i=1 – only on the other keys – since these shares are discarded in the next step.
Figure 6.9: Optimized Protocol to Convert Additive Shares to Shares Under Replicated
Secret-Sharing, ΠAToROpt.
Correctness
In Step 3a, Pi computes all shares not assigned to a party by {∇( j)} j∈[n]; in Step 3b the
share vR∇(i) is computed; and in Step 4, Pi receives a share for every G ∈ ∇ where G 3 i,
as is required by replicated secret-sharing.














































where the penultimate equality holds because f −1(P) = ∇ and f (Gi) = Pi for all i ∈ [n]
(so Gi is not contained in f −1({P j}) for any j 6= i).
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Security
The key observation for security is that the PRZS masks the local computations: any
unqualified set of parties U is missing at least one party, and hence one share of the
PRZS, which means that the shares {vRGi }i∈[n] are indistinguishable from uniformly ran-
dom. All other computations are local and so security follows assuming a secure protocol
for realizing FRRSS and FRZS is given.
6.5 Passively-Secure Q2 MPC Protocol
In this section the optimized (i.e. computationally-secure) variant of the additive-to-
replicated conversion is bootstrapped to a full MPC protocol. Linear operations are
straightforward; the passive multiplication procedure presented here starts as in Mau-
rer’s protocol – by forming an additive secret sharing of the product, which is always
possible with replicated secret-sharing realizing a Q2 access structure – but now the
optimized computational conversion procedure is used to convert the product to a repli-
cated sharing. The passively-secure arithmetic black box FPABB, which is the goal of
passively-secure MPC, is given in Figure 6.10.
Functionality FPABB
Initialize On input (Initialize,F, sid) from all parties, store F and initialize a new database DB
with indexing set DB.Ids and store the field as DB.Field :=F.
Input On input (Input, i, id , x, sid) from party Pi and (Input, i, id ,⊥, sid) from all other parties,
where i ∈ [n], id is a new identifier, and x ∈ DB.Field, set DB[id] := x and insert id into DB.Ids.
Add On input (Add, idx, idy, idz, sid) from all parties, if idx, idy ∈ DB.Ids and idz is a new iden-
tifier, set DB[idz] := DB[idx]+DB[idy] and insert idz into DB.Ids.
Multiply On command (Multiply, idx, idy, idz, sid) from all parties, if idx, idy ∈ DB.Ids are
present in memory and idz is a new identifier, store DB[idz] := DB[idx] · DB[idy] and insert
idz into DB.Ids.
Output To One On input (Output, i, id , sid) from all parties where id ∈ DB.Ids and i ∈ [n],
send DB[id] to Pi and continue.
Output To All On input (Output,0, id , sid) from all parties, if id ∈ DB.Ids, send DB[id] to all
parties and continue.
Figure 6.10: Passive Arithmetic Black Box Functionality, FPABB.
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6.5.1 Multiplication and Input using Conversion
Multiplication
The real difficulty in creating an MPC protocol given a LSSS is in performing secure
multiplication of secret-shared values, [[x]]R and [[y]]R. With this goal, we begin by fol-
lowing [BW98] and define a surjective function I : ∇2 →P (Intersection map) such that
I(G1,G2) =Pi implies that Pi ∈ G1 ∩G2; the existence of such a function follows from the
fact that the access structure is Q2, as discussed in Section 6.2. Note that there are
possibly multiple choices for I. Note also that party I(G1,G2) holds a copy of share xRG1
and yRG2 . The party indexed by I(G1,G2) will be put “in charge” of computing the cross
term xRG1 · y
R







whence the parties can execute ΠAToROpt.
Input
The “standard” way for a party Pi to provide input x is to generate a sharing [[x]]R and
distribute the shares. In the protocol given here, it is also possible to make use of the
conversion subprotocol ΠAToROpt for parties to provide inputs, at no extra setup cost: the
parties take an additive sharing of zero [[t]]A, and then Pi sets [[x]]APi := x+ [[t]]
A
Pi and all
other parties P j ( j 6= i) set [[x]]AP j := [[t]]
A
P j , and then they run the ΠAToROpt subprotocol. In
practice, this requires obtaining one PRZS and one PRSS which means the parties have
to perform several PRF evaluations, so as the number of parties grows (and the number
of required PRF evaluations grows exponentially) there may be a point at which it is
beneficial to provide input using the standard approach.
It is crucial for the UC-security of this protocol that the simulator should be able to
extract the inputs of the adversary in this optimized subprotocol. Fortunately, this is
indeed the case as every share is held by at least one honest party, including the shares
indexed by Gi for all i ∈ A, which are the shares actually “containing” the corrupt party’s
input in this optimized input subprotocol.
The protocolΠQ2,R
Online
is given in Figure 6.11. This protocol is the analogue of [AFL+16]
for arbitrary Q2 access structures and arbitrary finite fields.
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Protocol ΠQ2,R
Online
This protocol is realized in the FR
RSS
,FRZS-hybrid model and makes use of the subprotocol
ΠAToROpt.
Initialize
1. The parties agree on a session identifer sid .
2. The parties call FR
RSS
with input (Initialize,Γ, sid).
3. The parties call FRZS with input (Initialize,P , sid).
Input For Pi to provide input x, the parties compute a new identifier idx and do the following:
1. Party Pi sets [[x]]APi := x, and for each j 6= i, P j sets [[x]]
A
P j := 0.
2. The parties run the subprotocol ΠAToROpt on [[x]]
A to obtain a sharing [[x]]R.
Add To add secrets [[x]]R and [[y]]R, the parties and compute [[x]]R+ [[y]]R to obtain a sharing [[z]]R.
Multiply To multiply secrets [[x]]R and [[y]]R, the parties compute a new identifier idz and do the
following:







2. The parties run the subprotocol ΠAToROpt on [[z]]
A to obtain a sharing [[z]]R.
Output To One To output a secret with identifier idx to Pi, the parties do the following:
1. For all j ∈ [n], for all G ∈ ∇( j), for all i ∈ [n], if Pi 6∈ G then P j sends xRG to Pi over a secure
channel.
2. Party Pi computes x :=∑G∈∇ xRG .
Output To All To output a secret with identifier idx to all parties, the parties do the following:
1. For all i ∈ [n], for all G ∈ ∇(i), for all j ∈ [n], if P j 6∈ G then Pi sends xRG to P j over an
authenticated channel.
2. All parties compute x :=∑G∈∇ xRG .






Correctness of Input and Multiply follows from the outlines given in Section 6.5.1. Cor-
rectness of Add follows by the linearity of the LSSS and of Output by the correctness
of reconstruction.
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6.5.3 Security
Theorem 6.3. Let Γ be a non-redundant Q2 access structure and let {∇(i)}i∈[n] be a par-
tition of the set ∇ as defined above. Then the protocol ΠQ2,R
Online
UC-securely realizes the
functionality FPABB against a static, passive adversary, in the FRRSS,FRZS-hybrid model.
The alterations to the protocol for when there is no surjective partition are discussed
in Section 6.7.
Proof. The simulator is given in Figure 6.12 and the transcript in Figure 6.13.
Simulator SPABB
Since the subprotocol ΠAToROpt is used in Input and Multiply, a macro SAToR() is given for the
simulation (at the end).
Initialize
1. Agree on some sid with A.
2. Await the call to FR
RSS
with input (Initialize,Γ, sid) and initialize a local instance.
3. Await the call to FRZS with input (Initialize,P , sid) and initialize a local instance.
Input When party Pi is to provide input, the simulator computes a new identifier idx and does
the following:
1. Set [[x]]APi := 0 for all i ∈ [n]\ A on behalf of (emulated) honest parties.
2. Execute SAToR(idx) to obtain x.
If i ∈ A, then call FPABB with input (Input, i, id , x, sid) on behalf of Pi and
(Input, i, id ,⊥, sid) on behalf of all P j ∈A\{Pi}.
If i ∈ [n]\ A, then call (Input, i, id ,⊥, sid) on behalf of all P j ∈A.
Add To add [[x]]R and [[y]]R, compute a new identifier idz, set [[z]]R := [[x]]R+ [[y]]R, and call FPABB
with input (Add, idx, idy, idz, sid).
Multiply To multiply xR with yR, the simulator computes a new identifier idz and then does the
following:







2. Execute SAToR([[v]]A) and then call FPABB with input (Multiply, idx, idy, idz, sid).
Output To One To output identifier idx, the simulator does the following:
1. Send the command (Output, i, idx, sid) to FPABB and then do the following:
If i ∈ [n]\ A, then await shares {xRG :G ∈
⋃
i∈A ∇(i) ∧G 63Pi} from A.
If i ∈ A, then do the following:
• Retrieve from memory the corresponding shares [[x]]R.
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Simulator SPABB (continued)
• Await the output x from FPABB.
• Sample xRG′ ← U (F) subject to
∑
G∈∇ xRG = x where G′ ∈∇ is any set satisfying G′∩ A =∅.
• Send {xRG :G ∈
⋃
i∈[n]\A ∇(i) ∧G 63Pi} to A.
2. (No simulation is required for this step.)
Output To All To output a share with identifier idx, the simulator does the following:
1. Send the command (Output,0, idx, sid) to FPABB and then do the following:
• Await the output x from FPABB.
• Retrieve from memory the corresponding shares [[x]]R.
• Sample [[x]]RG′ ← U (F) subject to
∑
G∈∇ xRG = x where G′ ∈∇ is any set satisfying G′∩ A =
∅.
• For each i ∈ A, send {xRG :G ∈
⋃
j∈[n]\A ∇( j) ∧G 63Pi} to A.
• For each i ∈ [n]\ A, await shares {xRG :G ∈
⋃
j∈A ∇( j) ∧G 63Pi} from A.
2. (No simulation is required for this step.)
SAToR The macro SAToR(idv) for converting an additive sharing [[v]]A to a replicated sharing
[[v]]R is defined as follows:
1. Compute a new identifier idz, await the call to FRZS with input (ZeroSharing, idz,P , sid)
from A, then await the shares {[[t]]APi }i∈A from A, compute shares for (emulated) honest
parties internally, and store all shares.
2. Compute a new identifier ids, await the call to FRRSS with input (SecretSharing, ids, sid)
from A, and execute the local instance honestly, returning appropriate outputs to A and
storing the output shares, [[r]]R.
3. For all i ∈ [n]\ A,










4. For every i ∈ [n]\A, for every j ∈ A, if P j ∈Gi then send the share vRGi to A.
For every i ∈ A, for every j ∈ [n]\ A, if P j ∈Gi, then await the share vRGi from A.
5. On behalf of each (emulated) honest party Pi ∈P \A, concatenate {vRG : G ∈ ∇∧G 3Pi} into
a share vector [[v]]RPi .
6. (Locally) return v :=∑G∈∇ vRG .
Figure 6.12: Simulator SPABB for FPABB.
Note that the simulator’s local copies of shares are consistent throughout in the
sense that any linear operations are emulated locally by honest parties. This means
that, for example, if Z provides as input x and y and then requests the outputs x, y and
a · x+b · y then the shares are consistent as well as the secrets – i.e. for all G ∈∇,
a · xRG +b · yRG = (a · x+b · y)RG .
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A FRZS (Initialize,P , sid)
Input [See ΠAToROpt]
Add n/a n/a n/a
Multiply [See ΠAToROpt]
Output To One S A {xRG :G ∈
⋃
i∈[n]\A ∇(i) ∧G 63Pi} (if Pi ∈A)
A S {xRG :G ∈
⋃
i∈A ∇(i) ∧G 63Pi} (if Pi ∈P \A)
Output To All S A {xRG :G ∈
⋃
j∈[n]\A ∇( j) ∧G 63Pi}i∈A
A S {xRG :G ∈
⋃
j∈A ∇( j) ∧G 63Pi}i∈[n]\A








S A {vRGi : i ∈ [n]\ A∧Gi ∩ A 6=∅}
A S {vRGi : i ∈ A∧Gi \ A 6=∅}
Figure 6.13: Transcript for ΠQ2,R
Online
.
It is clear from the transcript that the key points for distinguishing between worlds
are in the output stage and in the execution of ΠAToROpt. Notice that a corrupt party’s
input can always be extracted since Gi always contains at least one honest party (since
every set in ∇ contains at least one honest party, by the definition of Q2), so S can
always extract inputs using knowledge of the PRZS mask and the PRSS shares. This
means that the output in the ideal world is correct according to the inputs of (real)
honest parties and the adversary. Now, in the output stage, since there is at least one
set G ∈ ∇ such that A∩G =∅ (again, because the access structure is Q2), S can fix the
output to be whatever it chooses – and in particular, to what it receives from FPABB.
It only remains to show that the execution ΠAToROpt does not reveal the fact that S
set the emulated honest parties’ inputs to 0 during the simulation. This is achieved by
a standard argument involving a sequence of hybrid worlds in the following way. Let
A ∈∆ be the set of parties corrupted by the adversary, let h := |P \A|, and for simplicity
assume that the indexing set for A, A, indexes the last n−h parties so that [h] indexes
the honest parties. Define the ith hybrid world as follows:
Hybrid i The FRRSS, FRZS-hybrid world in which the simulator is handed the inputs of
all honest parties P j ∈P \A where j ≤ i.
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The simulator for the ith world is defined by replacing the instruction [[x]]AP j := 0 in
Step 1 of Input in SPABB with the instruction [[x j]]AP j := x j, where x j is the input of
honest party P j, for each j ≤ i. Thus Hybrid 0 is exactly the ideal world, in which the
simulator knows none of the honest parties’ inputs, and Hybrid h is the FRRSS, FRZS-
hybrid world, where the simulator acts as honest parties would in a protocol execution.
Claim 6.1. The world Hybrid i is indistinguishable from Hybrid i+1 for all i such that
0≤ i < h.
Proof. Since inputs can always be extracted and outputs can always be doctored by S
to be the same secrets in the real (hybrid) world as in the ideal world, the only differ-
ence to the simulation between consecutive worlds is when an honest party provides
their input, (which is done independently for each i), which means that distinguishing
between consecutive worlds is the same task for all values of i < h. In detail, to distin-
guish between Hybrid i-1 and Hybrid i, Z must distinguish between the distributions
of shares it observes in the transcript for the input of Pi; that is, between{
rRG :G ∈∇\{G j} j∈[n] ∧G∩A 6=∅








rRG :G ∈∇\{G j} j∈[n] ∧G∩A 6=∅







where the first distribution is produced by a simulator that sets the input to be 0, as
in Hybrid i-1, and the second is produced by a simulator that knows the input of the
honest party Pi, as in Hybrid i.
Note that these two sets of shares are missing at least one share, indexed by some
set G such that G∩A=∅. Now either G ∈ {Gi}i∈[n], or G ∈∇\{Gi}i∈[n].
If G ∈ {Gi}i∈[n] then G = G j for some j ∈ [n]. Thus Z has no information on the share
[[t]]AP j of the PRZS which masks for v
R
G j . This means that both distributions above are
indistinguishable from uniform, since there is no way for Z to compute a sum and cancel
out this share.
If G ∈∇\{Gi}i∈[n], then Z has no information on some share rRG which masks one ele-
ment of {vRG j : j ∈ [n]\ A}. This means that again both distributions are indistinguishable
from uniform. 
Since there are only polynomially-many hybrid worlds, Hybrid 0 is indistinguish-
able from Hybrid h by transitivity, which is exactly saying that the ideal and FRRSS,
FRZS-hybrid worlds are indistinguishable.
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6.5.4 Communication Complexity
Unlike in the IT protocolΠAToAny, by usingΠAToROpt, it is no longer necessary for the par-
ties to be connected in a complete network during the passive multiplication: instead,
parties are connected as defined by the set
EAToR =
{
(i, j) ∈ [n]2 :P j ∈Gi \{Pi}
}
where (i, j) ∈ EAToR implies that Pi is connected to P j by a unidirectional channel. These
channels must be secure, and so they are denoted by SC(EAToR).
For a single party Pi to receive output, it must receive every share it does not hold
from a party that does hold the share, over a secure channel. The required set of con-
nections is defined by
E iOpen :=
{
( j, i) ∈ [n]× {i} :G ∈∇( j) ∧G 63Pi
}
.
For all parties to receive an output, it is the same as one party receiving output but over





The costs are summarized in Table 6.2, where the cost for initialization is the cost of
instantiating FRRSS and FRZS as given in Table 6.1 in Section 6.3.
Procedure Number of bits Channels
Initialize [See Table 6.1]
Input
∑




i∈[n](|Gi|−1) ·` ·T SC(EAToR)
Output To One




∣∣{G ∈∇ :G 63Pi}∣∣ ·` AC(EOpen)
Table 6.2: Total communication cost to realize FPABB with M inputs and T total multi-
plications.
For circuits with high multiplicative depth, the communication cost is dominated
by the cost of ΠAToROpt, in which for each conversion, party Pi sends |Gi|−1 finite-field
elements, so the total is
∑
i∈[n](|Gi|−1). For a threshold scheme, this total cost is n · (n−
t−1) = O(n2) field elements – a linear cost per party per multiplication. This sharply
contrasts the IT case in which the cost is O(n1.5 ·2n) – an exponential cost per party.
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(1,3), (1,4), (2,1), (2,4), (3,1), (3,2), (4,2), (4,3), (4,5),
(5,1), (5,2), (5,6), (6,2), (6,3), (6,4)
}
.
During the procedure, one field element is sent over each of these channels, so the par-
ties send 15 finite-field elements over 15 uni-directional secure channels for a passive
multiplication, which can also be seen by inspecting Figure 6.8. This equates to a band-
width saving, compared to the initial protocol of Maurer, of 93% in the number of trans-
mitted finite-field elements, and a saving of 50% in the number of secure channels.
6.6 Actively-Secure Q2 MPC Protocol
In this section, an actively-secure MPC protocol in the preprocessing model is given,
making use of the passively-secure protocol of the previous section and the cheap au-
thentication from Chapter 3. The overall protocol is then a relatively conventional ap-
proach to obtaining active security:
1. The preprocessing phase, realizing FPrep (Figure 4.7):
• Generate and multiply random secrets to obtain Beaver triples with passive se-
curity. This requires the passive protocol ΠQ2,R
Online
in Figure 6.11.
• Check triples by sacrificing. This requires communication over a set of reduced
set of authenticated channels and makes use of the protocol ΠOpen from Chap-
ter 3.
2. The online phase, realizing FABB (Figure 2.14):
• To evaluate a circuit, parties execute the protocol ΠOnline from Chapter 4. Addi-
tions require no communication and multiplications require only the same sub-
network of authenticated channels as for sacrificing instead of a complete net-
work.
Authentication for opened secrets was discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and is dealt
with by the functionality FOpen in Figure 4.1. An important aspect of the authenti-
cation procedure for a Q2 access structure is that secrets can be checked in batches;
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thus, comparably to [FLNW17] and analogously to the subprotocol ΠMACCheck (given in
Figure 4.14) used in full-threshold protocols such as SPDZ [DPSZ12], it is possible to
batch-check the correctness of Beaver triples, which means that, asymptotically, the cost
of generating a Beaver triple with active security is the same as the cost of performing
two passive multiplications and two openings of secrets. This is discussed in further
detail in Section 6.6.3.
Note that this standard bootstrapping to active security is unlike the method in
[FLNW17] where the online multiplication protocol involves executing the passively-
secure multiplication protocol and checking correctness using a Beaver triple. The tra-
ditional method allows the online protocol to be executed over authenticated, as opposed
to secure, channels. The preprocessing protocol ΠQ2,R
Prep
is given in Figure 6.14.
Protocol ΠQ2,R
Prep
This protocol is realized in the FCoinFlip, FOpen, FRRSS, FRZS-hybrid model.
Initialize The parties do the following:
1. Agree on a session identifer sid .
2. Set R := dσ/ log |F|e.
3. Call an instance of FOpen with input (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]]R, sid).
4. Call an instance of FR
RSS
with input (Initialize,Γ, sid).
5. Call an instance of FRZS with input (Initialize,P , sid).
6. Set Abort to false.
7. Agree on a sharing of 1, [[1]]R.a
Mask In order for Pi to obtain a mask, the parties do the following:
1. Compute a new identifier idr and then call FRRSS with input (SecretSharing, idr, sid) to
obtain a sharing [[r]]R.
2. Call FOpen with input (Open, i, idr, sid) to open r to Pi. If the FOpen returns the message
Abort then (locally) output ⊥ and halt; otherwise party Pi (locally) outputs (r, [[r]]RPi ) and
for all j ∈ [n]\{i} party P j (locally) outputs [[r]]RP j .
Triples To generate T triples, the parties do the following:
1. Generate For k = 1, . . . , (R+1) ·T, do the following:
a) Compute new identifiers idak and idbk and then call FRRSS with input









a) Call a new instance of FCoinFlip with input (Initialize,FR·T , sid).
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b) Call FCoinFlip with input (RElt, sid) to obtain {{ρk+`·T }Tk=1}
R
`=1.
c) For k = 1, . . . ,T, do the following:b
i. For `= 1, . . . ,R, do the following:
A. Set [[rk+`·T ]]R := [[ak]]R− [[ak+`·T ]]R and [[sk+`·T ]]R := [[bk]]R−ρk+`·T · [[bk+`·T ]]R.
B. Call FOpen with inputs (Open,0, idrk+`·T , sid) and (Open,0, idsk+`·T , sid).
C. If the flag Abort has not been set to true, the parties locally compute value
[[tk+`·T ]]R := rk+`·T · sk+`·T · [[1]]R+ sk+`·T · [[ak+`·T ]]R+ρk+`·T · rk+`·T · [[bk+`·T ]]R
+ρk+`·T · [[ck+`·T ]]R− [[ck]]R.
d) Call FOpen with input (Verify, sid), and if the parties have not aborted then call FOpen
with input (Open,0, idtk+`·T , sid) for every k ∈ [T] and for every ` ∈ [R]. If any returned
value is not zero, the parties set the flag Abort to true.




R)Tk=1 and discard all other secret-sharings, and otherwise they call FOpen
with input (Broadcast,Abort, sid), (locally) output ⊥, and halt.
aFor example, let i be the first non-zero component of t; then set the randomness vector x to
be the vector 0 except with the ith component equal to 1/ti.
bAll openings on different sets of triples are independent and can be batched.




Remark 6.1. Often in actively-secure MPC protocols, input and output masks are gen-
erated in the preprocessing phase and are then used in the online phase for parties to
provide inputs and obtain private outputs. (See, for example, [CDI05, DPSZ12].) The
input procedure was summarized in Section 2.5. For private outputs, the parties use a
secret-shared mask r known to Pi as follows: to reveal secret-shared x to Pi, the parties
compute and [[x]]− [[r]] and open this secret using authenticated channels; then Pi can
compute x = (x− r)+ r.
However, if the access structure is Q2, then a party to whom a secret is revealed can
detect whether or not the secret is correct, as described in Section 3.2. Rather than use
error-detection, the actively-secure protocols in this chapter follow the method involving
masks as it allows the online phase to be executed entirely over authenticated channels,
rather than requiring secure channels.
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follows from the correctness of the passively-secure multiplication
protocol: the other parts of the protocol only involve opening secrets to all parties or to
one party.
6.6.2 Security
It is necessary to show that if the adversary cheats then the honest parties detect it,
except with negligible probability in the statistical security parameter.
Lemma 6.1. For a fixed k ∈ [T], if tk+`·T = 0 for every ` ∈ [R], then it holds that ak·bk = ck
except with probability at most 2−σ.
Proof. Suppose tk+`·T = 0 for all ` ∈ [R] but ck = ak·bk+εk for some εk 6= 0. The adversary
must introduce errors {εk+`·T }R`=1 for triples {(ak+`·T ,bk+`·T , ck+`·T)}
R
`=1 when executing
the passive multiplication subprotocol so that ck+`·T = ak+`·T · bk+`·T + εk+`·T but that
the sacrifice equation still holds.
Since ρk+`·T is an output of FCoinFlip and not known when the triples are generated,
the only way that tk+`·T = 0 but ak ·bk = ck+εk where εk 6= 0 is for A to guess each ρk+`·T
so that
ρk+`·T ·εk+`·T −εk = 0
for all ` ∈ [R]. This is equivalent to guessing {ρk+`·T }R`=1, which can be done correctly
with probability at most |F|−R ≤ 2−σ.
Theorem 6.4. The protocol ΠPrep UC-securely realizes FPrep against a static, active ad-
versary in the FOpen, FCoinFlip, FRRSS, FRZS-hybrid model with statistical security σ.
Proof. The simulator is given in Figure 6.15 and the transcript in Figure 6.16.
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Simulator SPrep
Initialize The simulator does the following:
1. Agree on a session identifier sid with A.
2. Set R := dσ/ log |F|e.
3. Await the call to FOpen with input (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]]R, sid) from A and then call FPrep
with input (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]]R, sid) on behalf of each corrupt party.
4. Await the call to FR
RSS
with input (Initialize,Γ, sid) from A and initialize a local instance.
5. Await the call to FRZS with input (Initialize,P , sid) from A and initialize a local in-
stance.
6. Set Abort to false.
7. Agree on a sharing of [[1]]R with A.
Mask To create a mask for Pi, the simulator does the following:
1. Compute a new identifier idr, await the call to FRRSS with input (SecretSharing, idr, sid)
from A, call the internal copy of FR
RSS
with input (SecretSharing, idr, sid) to obtain [[r]]R,
and send the shares [[r]]RA to A.
2. Await the call to FOpen with input (Open, idr, i, sid) from A, and then do the following:
• Call FPrep with input (Mask, i, idr, sid) and if i ∈ A also send r.
• When FPrep executes Sample(idr), send the shares [[r]]RA to FPrep. Then,
If i ∈ A,
– Send [[r]]RP\A to A.
– If A calls FOpen with input (Broadcast,Abort, sid) then send the message Abort to
FPrep and halt; otherwise send the message OK.
If i ∈ [n]\ A,
– Await [[r]]RA from A.
– If N · [[r]]R 6= 0 then send the message Abort to FPrep and call the local instance of
FOpen with input (Broadcast,Abort, sid) and execute it honestly with A; otherwise,
send the message OK.
Triples To generate T triples, the simulator does the following:
1. Generate For k = 1, . . . , (R+1) ·T, compute identifiers idak , idbk and idck , call FPrep with
input (Triple, (idak , idbk , idck )
T
k=1, sid), and then do the following:
a) Call the internal copy of FR
RSS
with input (SecretSharing, idak , sid) and
(SecretSharing, idbk , sid) to obtain [[ak]]
R and [[bk]]
R, and when FPrep executes




A to both A and FPrep.
b) Execute Multiply of ΠQ2,R
Online
honestly with A, running the simulation of ΠAToROpt by ex-
ecuting SAToR(idv) from SPABB, to obtain a share vector [[c̃k]]R, and when FPrep executes




a) Await the call to FCoinFlip with input (Initialize,FR·T , sid) and initialize a (new) local
instance.
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Simulator SPrep (continued)
b) Await the call to FCoinFlip with input (RElt,FR·T , sid) from A, execute it honestly to
obtain {ρk+`·T }R·Tk=1, and send this set to A.
c) For k = 1, . . . ,T, do the following:
i. For `= 1, . . . ,R, do the following:
A. Set [[rk+`·T ]]R := [[ak]]R− [[ak+`·T ]]R and [[sk+`·T ]]R := [[bk]]R−ρk+`·T · [[bk+`·T ]]R.
B. Await the call to FOpen with inputs (Open, idrk+`·T , sid) and (Open, idsk+`·T , sid)
from A and execute honestly with A using the local instance of FOpen.
C. Compute the honest parties’ shares of
[[tk+`·T ]]R := rk+`·T · sk+`·T · [[1]]R+ sk+`·T · [[ak+T ]]R+ρk+`·T · rk+`·T · [[bk+`·T ]]R
+ρk+`·T · [[c̃k+`·T ]]R− [[c̃k]]R.
d) Await the call to FOpen with input (Verify, sid) from A and execute the procedure
honestly with A. If the (emulated) honest parties did not abort, then await the calls to
FOpen with input (Open, idtk+`·T , sid) for every k ∈ [T] and for every ` ∈ [R], and execute
the procedures honestly. If any (emulated) honest party would have set their flag Abort
to true then S sets its own Abort to true.
3. Check If A calls FOpen with input (Broadcast,Abort, sid), or if the flag Abort is set to
true, then call the internal copy of FOpen with input (Broadcast,Abort, sid), execute it
honestly with A, and then send the message Abort to FPrep; otherwise, send the message
OK to FPrep.
Figure 6.15: Simulator SPrep for FPrep.
It is clear from the transcript that the parties do not have inputs and the only out-
puts are triples and masks. This means that there are only two ways for an environ-
ment, Z, to attempt to distinguish between hybrid-world and ideal-world executions: 1)
Examining shares generated by corrupt parties to see if they are “carried through” by
the simulator into the ideal world; or 2) Making the adversary generate invalid share
vectors, masks, or triples, so that the hybrid world would abort but the simulator does
not detect this. It is important that the probability with which honest parties can detect
cheating behaviour be overwhelming in σ in order for the protocol to be (statistically)
correct.
For the first, recall that since replicated secret-sharing is used, S receives all shares
held by A during the execution of Multiply, which means that S can pass these on
to FPrep. This means that the shares passed on to (real) honest parties by FPrep are
consistent with the adversarially-generated shares during the execution of Multiply.
It is also necessary to show that nothing is revealed to Z by the fact that S does not
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Procedure From To Message


























[See ΠAToROpt, Figure 6.13]
Sacrifice A FCoinFlip (Initialize,FR·T , sid)
A FCoinFlip (RElt,FR·T , sid)
FCoinFlip A {ρk+`·T }R·Tk=1
A FOpen ((Open, idrk+`·T , sid)Tk=1)
R
`=1
FOpen A (([[rk+`·T ]]RP\A)Tk=1)
R
`=1
A FOpen ((Open,0, idsk+`·T , sid)Tk=1)
R
`=1
FOpen A (([[sk+`·T ]]RP\A)Tk=1)
R
`=1
A FCoinFlip (RElt,F(R−1)·T , sid)





A FOpen (Verify, sid)
A FOpen (Open,0, idu`′ , sid)
R
`=1
FOpen A ([[u`′ ]]RP\A)R`′=1
Check A FOpen (Verify, sid)
Figure 6.16: Transcript for ΠQ2,R
Prep
.
know the values of ak and bk and hence cannot compute “correct” sharings [[ck]]
R
Gi for
i ∈ [n]\ A. However, it was shown in Claim 6.1 that the environment never has enough
information to learn the value of the secret in the additive sharing being converted.
For the second, it is necessary to show that if the adversary introduces errors, then S
signals FPrep to abort in the ideal world with overwhelming probability in σ. There are
only two places to cheat: the corrupt parties can create an invalid share vector during
the execution of ΠAToROpt, or the share vectors can be valid but it does not hold that
ak · bk = ck for one or more k ∈ [T]. In the first case, the simulator can always detect
the error and tell FPrep to abort since it emulates FOpen honestly as a local instance. In
the second case, Lemma 6.1 shows that honest parties will abort, except with negligible
probability in σ if A cheated during the execution of Multiply.
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6.6.3 Communication Complexity
For this section it will be assumed that a partition {∇(i)}i∈[n] where ∇(i) 6=∅ for all i ∈ [n]
can be found. For redundant access structures, the redundant parties being removed
from the computation phase only interact with the remaining parties in the input and
output phases. Further discussion is given in Section 6.7.
The total communication cost is summarized in Table 6.3, and an explanation is
given below, which makes use of the definitions of EAToR, E iOpen, and EOpen given in
Section 6.5.4. The field size is denoted by ` := dlog |F|e.
Preprocessing phase The costs associated with Initialize are given in Table 6.1.
For Mask, the cost is given for Pi: to receive a mask, every party must send all of their
shares to Pi as outlined in Section 3.2, and so the set of channels required is
E iMask := ([n]\{i})× {i}.
For Triples, the passive multiplication protocol is used for generation requiring the
connections EAToR, and sacrificing triples requires EOpen from Section 6.5.4. For checking
triples, the complete graph of channels is needed, which is defined as
EBC :=
{
(i, j) ∈ [n]2 : i 6= j} .
Remark 6.2. While the channels EOpen suffice for opening secrets to all parties when
using replicated secret-sharing, for other LSSSs the channels required depends on the
map q as described in Section 3.3, which in general is a larger number of channels since
the authenticated opening procedure is more complex than simply all parties receiving
all shares they do not hold.
Online phase For Input, specifically for party Pi to provide input, it broadcasts a
field element, requiring AC(E iBC) where
E iBC := {i}× ([n]\{i}).
The procedure Multiply, using Beaver triples, involves opening secrets to all parties,
so the same network as for triple sacrifice is required, AC(EOpen). In Output To One,
providing output to party Pi requires the channels AC(EOpen) since the parties reveal
x− r and party Pi computes (x− r)+ r where r is a mask, and Output To All can also
be performed over AC(EOpen) since the verification step will authenticate that this was
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Phase Procedure Number of bits Channels




∣∣G∣∣)− ∣∣{G ∈∇ :G 63Pi}∣∣) ·` SC(E iMask)
Triples
Generation (1+dσ/`e) ·∑i∈[n](∣∣Gi∣∣−1) ·` ·T SC(EAToR)
Sacrifice (Open) 3 · dσ/`e ·∑G∈∇ ∣∣P \G∣∣ ·` ·T AC(EOpen)
Sacrifice (Check) 2 ·n · (n−1) ·κ AC(EBC)
Check n/a n/a
Online Input (n−1) ·` ·M AC(E iBC)
Add n/a n/a








∣∣P \G∣∣ ·` AC(EOpen)
Verify 2 ·n · (n−1) ·κ AC(EBC)
Table 6.3: Total communication cost to realize FABB with M inputs and T total multi-
plications.
done correctly (instead of requiring all parties to broadcast all of their shares). Finally,
Verify requires all parties to broadcast, so the network is EBC.
The costs for the running example are now given. The main communication costs in
the protocol are those associated with multiplication. This involves passive multiplica-
tion in the preprocessing phase to generate the triples, for which costs were analysed in
Section 6.5.4, and then opening secrets over authenticated channels in the online phase.
For the latter, the following connections are required:
EOpen =
{
(1,2), (1,5), (1,6), (2,3), (2,5), (2,6), (3,4), (3,5), (3,6), (4,1),
(4,6), (5,2), (5,3), (5,4), (6,1), (6,2), (6,3), (6,4), (6,5)
}
.








|G| = n · |∇|− ∑
G∈∇
|G|.
Note that this is more than the number of authenticated channels because, for example,
P6 sends both shares xR{1,3,4,6} and x
R
{2,3,5,6} to P1; this contrasts the computation for
passive multiplication which requires the same number of field elements as channels.
Thus each opening requires the transmission of 6 ·11− (3 ·3+8 ·4)= 25 finite-field el-
ements, and so a multiplication requires 50 finite-field elements over 19 authenticated
channels. Opening final output values still requires a complete network of authenti-
164
6.7. NO PARTITION
cated channels for the verification, but is performed far less frequently than the basic
multiplication operation.
6.7 No Partition
To conclude this chapter, modifications to the protocol are given when a partition {∇(i)}i∈[n]
satisfying ∇(i) 6=∅ for all i ∈ [n] cannot be found. This occurs for a non-redundant access
structure if the number of maximally unqualified sets is smaller than the number of
parties.
6.7.1 Existence of Non-Redundant Access Structures with No
Partition
First it is necessary to show that this is indeed possible. An example of a 6-party access
structure is given in Example 6.2.
Example 6.2. Consider the following access structure:
∆+ := {{1,2,4}, {1,3,5}, {2,3}, {4,5}, {6}}
for which
Γ− := {{1,6}, {2,5}, {3,4}, {1,2,3}, {1,4,5}, {2,6}, {3,6}, {4,6}, {5,6}}.
One can check that every set in 2[6] is a subset or superset of at least one maximally
unqualified or minimally qualified set, which determines whether or not the set is qual-
ified, hence these sets indeed form a complete monotone access structure. It is easily
verified that this access structure is Q2 and contains no redundant parties. However,
since there are only five sets in ∆+, there is no surjective map f from the five sets in ∇
to the six parties in P .
6.7.2 Modified Protocol
Recall from Section 6.4.2 that a map f : ∇→P is chosen such that im( f ) is as large as
possible. For any Pi ∈P \ im( f ), fix ∇(i) :=∅. The modification to the protocol is to apply
the protocol as given for all Pi ∈ im( f ), and use the standard IT sharing protocol for all
Pi with Pi ∈ P \ im( f ). The multiplication protocol then becomes the protocol ΠAToRNP
given in Figure 6.17.
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Subprotocol ΠAToRNP
It is assumed that, as part of the larger protocol, parties have already called an instance of FR
RSS
with input (Initialize,Γ, sid) and an instance of FRZS with input (Initialize,P , sid). Parties
hold an additive sharing [[v]]A.
1. The parties agree on a new identifier idt and call FRZS with input (ZeroSharing, idt,P , sid)
and receive an additive sharing of zero [[t]]A.
2. The parties agree on a new identifier idr and call FRRSS with input (SecretSharing, idr, sid)
to obtain [[r]]R.
3. Each Pi ∈ im( f ) defines a sharing vR by setting
a) Set vRG := rRG for all G ∈∇\{G j} j∈[n] where G 3Pi.






G∈ f −1({Pi})\{Gi} r
R
G .
4. For each i ∈ [n], for all P j ∈Gi, Pi sends vRGi to P j over a secure channel.
5. Each party Pi concatenates {vRG :G ∈∇∧G 3Pi} into a share vector [[v]]
R
Pi .





7. The parties set the final output to be [[v]]R := [[v]]R+∑{i:Pi∈P\im( f )} [[ui]]R.
Figure 6.17: Protocol to Convert Additive Shares to Shares Under Any LSSS With No
Partition, ΠAToRNP.
The correctness of the modified protocols follows from the correctnes of ΠAToROpt
and the fact that the secret-sharing scheme is linear. Security comes from the fact that
ΠAToROpt is secure and the only difference is that there are some additional shares that
are shared with IT security.
Communication Complexity
The only outstanding issue is to adapt the formulae for when f is not surjective. The
only difference is in how ΠAToROpt is executed and how secrets are opened.
Conversion The graph is
EAToRNP := {(i, j) : i ∈ im( f )∧G ∈∇(i) ∧P j ∈G \{Pi}}
∪ {(i, j) :Pi ∈P \ im( f )∧G ∈∇∧P j ∈G \{Pi}}
and the set of channels for converting is then SC(EAToRNP). Recall that secure channels



























Opening Authenticated channels are used for opening secrets. In order for secrets to
be opened with authentication in replicated secret-sharing, it suffices for each party to
receive every share it does not hold from some other party. In the case where f is not
surjective, the “partial” partition can be used in the same way the “full” partition was
used before: each party Pi is put in charge of sending the shares indexed by sets in ∇(i)
to all parties that do not hold it. Thus the set of channels is:
EOpenNP := {(i, j) :Pi ∈ im( f ) ∧ G ∈∇(i) ∧ P j ∈P \G}










Q2 MPC for Large Numbers of
Parties
This chapter is based on work published at CT-RSA 2019 under the title Error Detection
in Monotone Span Programs with Application to Communication-Efficient Multi-party
Computation [SW19] and was joint work with Nigel Smart. The main contribution of
that work referring to error detection for Q2 access structures was discussed separately
in Chapter 3. This chapter focuses on how to use the results in multi-party computation
(MPC).
A new section, Section 7.3, has been introduced. It describes the generation of secrets
with information-theoretic security for arbitrary Q2 access structures, giving a constant
factor saving in communication cost.
This chapter In this chaper, the results on error-detection for linear secret-sharing
schemes (LSSSs) realizing Q2 access structures are used to describe an MPC proto-
col for situations in which the access structure and the number of parties makes the
computationally-secure protocol of Chapter 6 too costly.
7.1 Overview
One of the questions left open by Furukawa et al. [FLNW17] was generalizing to an
arbitrary number of parties while avoiding replicated secret-sharing. While replicated
secret-sharing offers flexibility in being able to realize any access structure, unfor-
tunately it can require an exponentially-large number of shares to be held by each
party for each shared secret, depending on the access structure: moreover, the num-
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ber of pseudorandom function (PRF) keys to generate pseudorandom secret-sharings
(PRSSs) depends linearly on the number of maximally-unqualified sets. For example,
for a (256,128)-threshold access structure using the former method, the parties would
need to agree on roughly as many keys as there are atoms in the observable universe.
The exponential factor has significant repercussions for both communication and com-
putation complexity: on the communication side, parties must agree on exponentially-
many keys, and to open each secret, exponentially-many field elements must be sent
over the network; on the computation side, generating a single shared secret requires
each party to evaluate an exponential subset of these keys. For the protocols in this
chapter, the costs are essentially quadratic in the number of parties.
A key observation for obtaining better asymptotic efficiency is that in ΠOnline, given
in Figure 4.8, the LSSS need not be multiplicative. There are then three obvious ways
to reduce the costs of the overall protocol, which are discussed in this chapter:
• Perform the replicated protocol as described for small numbers of parties (incurring
exponential costs), and then convert this by local operations for use in the online
phase. In this case, the preprocessing phase is costly but the online phase is very
cheap.
• Outsource the preprocessing: then since the parties performing preprocessing can
reshare into whatever LSSS is desired, the online phase is cheap.
• Generate random secrets without starting at replicated secret-sharing, and then
use (an adapted version of) the information-theoretic (IT) protocol of Maurer from
Section 6.4.1 to generate triples in the preprocessing phase.
The first two methods are straightforward and follow from the results in previous
chapters. The focus in this chapter is primarily on the third method.
7.2 Preliminaries
The only preliminary information required for this chapter that has not yet been dis-
cussed involves how to convert sharings for different LSSSs by local operations.
170
7.3. GENERATING INFORMATION-THEORETIC UNIFORMLY-RANDOM SECRETS
7.2.1 Locally Converting Replicated Shares
Cramer et al. [CDI05] showed how to convert replicated sharings into sharings of any
other LSSS by local computations. This procedure is given in Figure 7.1. For correctness,
notice that for all i ∈ [n], ∑
G∈∇:Pi∈G
rRG · [[1G ]]Pi =
∑
G∈∇
rRG · [[1G ]]Pi
since [[1G ]]Pi = 0 if Pi 6∈ G by definition of [[1G ]]. Then correctness holds by linearity of
the LSSS.
Subprotocol ΠRToAny
This protocol was given by Cramer et al. [CDI05]. At this point in the protocol, the parties have a
replicated sharing [[x]]R, where Pi holds [[x]]RPi , and will convert it to a sharing of a different LSSS,
[[ · ]].
Initialize The parties agree on a set of sharings of 1, {[[1G ]]}G∈∇ where for each G ∈ ∇,
supp([[1G ]])⊆ { j ∈ [m] : ρ( j) ∈G}.
Convert Each party Pi computes ∑
G∈∇:Pi∈G
rRG · [[1G ]]Pi .
Figure 7.1: Protocol to Convert Replicated Secret-Sharing to Any LSSS, ΠRToAny.
7.3 Generating Information-Theoretic
Uniformly-Random Secrets
A functionality for generating uniformly-random secrets according to any LSSS is given
in Figure 7.2. Notice that this functionality produces t random sharings at a time, for
reasons that will be explained later. For a small number of parties, the key-setup re-
quired in realizing FAny
RSS
, viaΠRRSS from Chapter 6 is modest. However, the cost is asymp-
totically O(2n/
p
n) for threshold access structures, so for large numbers of parties the
generation of random shares is unlikely to yield good results.
The naïve method of obtaining a random sharing is for every party to sample a
random secret, distribute shares, and for the parties to take the sum; then, since at
least one party is honest, the resulting secret is uniform. Chapter 3 used redundancy
in an LSSS for a Q2 access structure to reduce the cost of opening secrets with active
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security. The goal of this section is to provide a methodology for generating uniformly-
random secrets more efficiently than by the naïve method by exploiting redundancy in
the Q2 access structure once more.
Functionality FAny
RSS
Initialize On input (Initialize,Γ, sid) from all honest parties and S, where sid is a new ses-
sion identifier, P is the set of parties, and Γ is an access structure, await further messages.
Sharing of Secret On input (SecretSharing, {idk}tk=1, sid) from all honest parties and S, the
functionality does the following:
1. Await a set of shares {[[xk]]A}
t





k ∈ Fm for all
k ∈ [t].
2. For each k ∈ [t], sample xk ← U ({x ∈Fd : MAxk = [[xk]]}) and set [[xk]] := M ·xk +εk.
3. For each i ∈ [n]\ A, send {[[xk]]Pi }k∈[d] to honest Pi.
Figure 7.2: Functionality for Secret-Sharings of Random Secrets for Any LSSS, FAny
RSS
.
Using a Qualified Set of Parties
Perhaps the most obvious way of obtaining uniformly-random shares is for every party
in any set of qualified parties to generate a random secret and distribute the shares,
and to take the sum of these secrets. Since the set is qualified, it contains at least one
honest party and so the resulting secret is uniformly-random. For an (n, t)-threshold
access structure, this gives 1 sharing from t+1. However, when the number of parties
is large, this leaves a lot of work to a small set of parties.
Generalization of Damgård-Nielsen
Damgård and Nielsen [DN07] showed how to do this in a much more symmetrical man-
ner in the threshold setting. More specifically, they showed how to obtain n− t random
secrets from n secrets, where t is a constant fraction of n satisfying n−t > t. This method
exploits the fact that any set of n−t parties contains an honest party, so if every random
sharing contains a contribution from at least one honest party then the secret is uni-
form. In this section this method is generalized, which is crucial for obtaining (general)
asymptotic improvement to protocols making use of Beaver’s circuit randomization.
Approach for Threshold Q2 Access Structures The technique of [DN07] is as
follows. Each party Pi samples some [[r i]] and distributes the shares. Then the parties
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where V is the Vandermonde matrix
10 · · · 1n−t−1
... . . .
...
n0 · · · nn−t−1
 .
The key observation is that if the adversary corrupts some set of parties A (of size t),
then the remaining set of n− t parties, P \A, can still force the resulting set of shares
([[s1]], . . . , [[sn−t]])> to be a set of uniformly-random secrets since every submatrix of V























where the first summand is always uniformly-random since VP\A> has full rank and(
[[r1]], . . . , [[rn]]
)
P\A
> is a vector of shares that are generated by honest parties.
Approach for General Q2 Access Structures In the general case, the argument
is that for any set of parties A corrupted by the adversary, the rows owned by the re-
maining (honest) parties P \A have rank d, where d is the rank of the monotone span
program (MSP) matrix. The reason this is sufficient is that it means that whatever set of
parties is corrupted, the shares that are output are always shares of uniformly-random
secrets. In fact, the necessary property required for using the matrix for randomness
extraction is exactly that it should be a share-reconstructable MSP for the Q2 access
structure. The notion of share-reconstructability was introduced in Section 3.6. Note
that this implies it is necessary for the access structure to be Q2, since for any unqual-
ified set U ∈ ∆, the target vector t necessarily lies in the span of the rows owned by
P \U .
These observations suggest that the parties can perform randomness extraction us-
ing any share-reconstructable MSP that realizes the same access structure. However, it
is possible to do better than this: given an access structure Γ, let
∆ :=
{
U ∈ 2P :P \U ∈Γ
}
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and consider the complete monotone access structure it defines. (Note that it is indeed
a complete monotone access structure since ∆ is trivially closed under the subset oper-
ation as Γ is closed under the superset operation.) One could call this access structure
the “Q2 closure” of Γ since if ∆ is Q2 then ∆ is the largest superset of ∆ that is still
Q2. Now consider the complement of ∆ in 2P : since the access structure Γ is complete,
a set is in Γ if and only if it is not in ∆; thus the set of complements can be expressed as
Γ= {Q ∈ 2P :P \Q 6∈Γ}. Hence the “Q2 closure” is exactly the dual access structure. (See
Section 2.4.1 for the definition of dual access structure.)
The result of Cramer et al. generalizes in the following way: one can use the matrix
from any share-reconstructable MSP realizing the dual access structure Γ∗ for random-
ness extraction (or indeed realizing any access structure Γ′ satisfying Γ∗ ⊆Γ′ ⊆Γ). In the
general case, this means that the parties must together provide m sharings, and will
obtain d. (Recall that the MSP matrix is in Fm×d.) The MSP matrix used to perform
randomness extraction need not be the same as the matrix used to share the secrets.
This generalization coincides with the original construction that used a (n,n− t) Van-
dermonde matrix for an (n, t)-threshold access structure, since this is exactly the MSP
matrix for Shamir’s secret-sharing (which is share reconstructable) of the dual access
structure, (n,n− t−1)-threshold.
Note that MSPs with these properties always exist because replicated secret-sharing
is always share-reconstructable (see Theorem 3.1), but will not always be efficient.
However, note that there is often a saving over the naïve method of obtaining 1 shar-
ing from n sharings: for example, in an (n, t)-threshold scheme, the parties generate
mR = n · ( n−1n−(n−t−1)−1) sharings and obtain dR = ( nn−(n−t−1)), which is an average of obtain-
ing 1 sharing from t+1 sharings. This matches the intuition that the method described
above is “as efficient” as using a qualified set of parties to obtain 1 sharing from t+1
sharings, but the load is balanced amongst all the parties.1 Unfortunately, the technique
still incurs a linear cost, but this method works regardless of the access structure, and
not just for threshold schemes. Nevertheless, this is a constant saving in communica-
tion cost. Note that in practice, using the matrix MR is relatively cheap since the matrix
is sparse so the cost of computing this matrix-vector multiplication is modest. Since for
large numbers of parties the exponential blow-up of replicated secret-sharing is exactly
what this chapter seeks to avoid, in general a more efficient share-reconstructable MSP
is likely to be preferable, if one exists.
1Clearly in this case the Vandermonde matrix should be used: the example is only intended to give
intuition for the asymptotics.
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These observations give rise to the protocol given in Figure 7.3. To differentiate
between the MSP in which the secrets are shared and the MSP used for randomness
extraction, the variables relating to the latter have the superscript R, which has been




Initialize Given an MSP, [[ · ]], realizing a Q2 access structure Γ, agree on any share-
reconstructable MSP realizing Γ∗, and let MR ∈FmR×dR be the corresponding MSP matrix.
Sharing of Secret
1. Each party Pi samples a set {rk}
|ρR(i)|
k=1 ← U (F).
2. Each party Pi generates sharings {[[rk]]}
|ρR(i)|
k=1 and distributes the shares.


















Lemma 7.1. The secret-sharings {[[sk]]}d
R
k=1 generated in Π
Any
RSS
are shares of independent
and uniformly-random secrets with respect to the access structure Γ.
Proof. The shares have the same access structure as the original secrets as they are
computed as a linear combination of secret-shared data (which is performed locally). It
remains to show that the resulting secrets are uniformly-random in the secret-sharing
space.

























Since A is a corrupt set of parties and MR realizes the dual access structure, the set P\A
of honest parties is qualified. Moreover, because the MSP is share-reconstructable, the
matrix MRP\A has rank d
R. Thus the vector ([[r1]], · · · , [[rmR]])>P\A · MRP\A is a vector of
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independent, uniformly-distributed secrets in FdR , which means ([[s1]], . . . , [[sdR]])
> is a
vector of independent, uniformly-random secrets.
The threshold protocol described by Cramer et al. [CDI05] was not proved secure in
the universal composability (UC) framework. Indeed, the main difficulty in doing so is
defining the right functionality and showing it is possible to simulate.
Theorem 7.1. The protocolΠAny
RSS
UC-securely realizes the functionality FAny
RSS
in the plain
model against a static, active adversary.





with input (Initialize,Γ, sid).
Sharing of Secret








and compute sharings [[rk]] := M ·xk.
2. Distribute and receive shares as follows:
• For each k ∈ [mR]\ρR−1(A), send [[rk]]A to A.
• For each k ∈ [mR]∩ρR−1(A), await a share vector [[rk]]P\A.
• Pad [[rk]]P\A with 0’s to become a full share vector [[rk]] and set ε
k := N · [[rk]].
• Sample xk ← U
({
x ∈Fd : MP\A ·x= [[rk]]P\A−εkP\A
})
and set [[rk]] := M ·xk +εk.
• Compute ([[s1]], . . . , [[sdR ]])
> := ([[r1]], . . . , [[rmR ]])> ·MR.
• Compute
(





ε1, . . . ,εm
R
)> ·MR.





3. (No simulation is required for this step.)





The tricky part about this simulation is to show correctness: that is, to ensure that
the final output shares of (real) honest parties form a valid share vector with the shares
held by corrupt parties if they act honestly. Since Lemma 7.1 implies the final share
vectors are uniform regardless of the set A of parties the adversary corrupts, and the
linear combination is public, it suffices to show that this holds for a single random
vector generated between S and A, i.e. where S sends shares [[r]]A for the sharing [[r]]
of a random secret r, and A responds with shares [[r′]]P\A, so that the final sharing held
by corrupt and honest parties should be [[r+ r′]]. (Note that S must send the vector first
as the adversary may be rushing.)
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The argument is similar to that given in the proof of Theorem 5.1. Suppose S gener-
ates [[r]] honestly and sends [[r]]A to A. Then A responds with a set [[r′]]A. Let [[x]]P\A :=
[[r]]P\A+ [[r′]]P\A. Then S samples [[x′]]A such that ([[x]]P\A, [[x′]]A) is a valid share vec-
tor. Then it sends [[x′]]A to F
Any
RSS
, which samples [[x′′]]P\A so that ([[x
′′]]P\A, [[x
′]]A) is a
valid share vector and sends the shares of [[x′′]]P\A to (real) honest parties, which output
these shares to the environment.
Let r′ be defined as the “actual” vector chosen by A so that [[r′]] = M ·r′ and let r be
the vector chosen by S to generate [[r]] as M ·r. Let x := r+r′. The process of sampling,
restricting, sending and resampling means the final share vector lies in the space
M · (M−1A · (M · (M−1P\A · [[x]]P\A))A)
=M · (M−1A · (MA · (x+ker(MP\A))))
=M · (x+ker(MP\A)+ker(MA))
=M ·x+M ·ker(MP\A)+M ·ker(MA)
where for a matrix A, here A−1 denotes taking a preimage. Now the first summand is
equal to the “actual” randomness vector the parties used to generate the secrets that
were sent, and is therefore indeed a particular solution to the equation above. The sec-
ond summand is any sharing supported by P \A, and since there is always a sharing of
1 with support P \A, the final share vector is a sharing of any secret in the field. The
third summand corresponds to a sharing supported by A, which by Lemma 3.1 is a shar-
ing of 0 since the access structure is Q2. Consequently, the final share vector obtained
by the environment from the real honest parties’ shares and the shares generated by A
is a valid share vector.
Finally, observe that if the adversary does not send shares to honest parties that
correspond to a valid share vector, then the simulator is able to compute the errors using
the error-detection matrix N (since the access structure is Q2). This is analogous to
computing the syndrome of a codeword in Coding Theory. The functionality introduces
the same errors in the ideal world, and so the environment is not able to distinguish
between the real and ideal worlds.
7.4 Information-Theoretic Preprocessing
Only linear operations are performed on shares in the protocol ΠOnline, since the non-
linearity of multiplication is handled by the Beaver triples. The consequence of this is
177
CHAPTER 7. Q2 MPC FOR LARGE NUMBERS OF PARTIES
that the LSSS used in the online phase need not be multiplicative. Typically, multi-
plicative LSSSs realizing a given access structure require at least the same number of
shares in total as non-multiplicative schemes.
The idea in this section is to execute the preprocessing phase using a multiplicative
LSSS to generate Beaver triples, but then to convert to a LSSS with a smaller number
of shares by local computations so that the online phase may proceed with this “more
efficient” LSSS.
Almost the entire preprocessing protocol is the same as in Chapter 6, so the full pro-
tocol is not given in this section. Instead, only the information-theoretic multiplication
subprotocol will be given. This passively-secure subprotocol can be slotted directly into
the preprocessing protocol of Chapter 6, and the IT functionality FAny
RSS
can be used to
obtain triple multiplicands (i.e. a’s and b’s) instead of the functionality FRRSS.
7.4.1 LSSS to Multiplicative LSSS
In order to use the IT multiplication protocol of Maurer [Mau06] in which the additive
sharing of the product is converted back into the original LSSS, as outlined in Sec-
tion 6.4.1, the LSSS must be multiplicative.
The first step of IT preprocessing is to recall the observation of Cramer et al. [CDM00]
that any LSSS realizing a Q2 access structure can be made multiplicative by at most
doubling the total number of shares. The observation is that if a secret is shared ac-
cording to an access structure Γ and its dual Γ∗, written as ([[ · ]], [[ · ]]∗) then by local
computations the parties can obtain an additive sharing of the secret. The details of the
construction are not given here as they are not important for the protocol. Thus the first
task is to find an optimal multiplicative LSSS for the access structure (in terms of total
number of shares); if one does not exist then the task is to find an optimal LSSS and
then to perform the computation to convert it to a multiplicative scheme.
The original LSSS is denoted by [[ · ]] and the LSSS derived from for computing prod-
ucts locally by [[ · ]]Π. Using this notation, it always holds that either [[ · ]]Π = [[ · ]] or
[[ · ]]Π = ([[ · ]], [[ · ]]∗). This notation should not be confused with [[ · ]][2], which is computed
with respect to an initial LSSS [[ ·]] and denotes any LSSS realizing the access structure




7.4.2 Multiplicative LSSS to Preprocessing
Once the parties have generated a large number of secrets according to the multiplica-
tive LSSS using FAny
RSS
, they can obtain an additive sharing of the product of two secrets
by local operations (by the definition of multiplicativity) and then execute the IT pro-
tocol ΠAToAny from Section 6.4 that turns an additive sharing into a sharing under any
other LSSS. In the case that [[ · ]]Π = ([[ · ]], [[ · ]]∗), i.e. where it is necessary to extend the
LSSS in order to make it multiplicative, a couple of points must be noted.
Firstly, since the online phase does not require multiplicativity, it suffices for the
parties to reshare their summands under the original LSSS, not in the product LSSS.
This reduces the amount of communication required when establishing the sharing of
the product of secrets.
Secondly, if a and b are secret-shared in the product LSSS, i.e. as [[a]]Π and [[b]]Π,
and only the original LSSS is going to be used in the online phase, then these sharings
need to be converted to the original (non-multiplicative) sharings so that all three parts
of the triple are shared according to the same scheme. Fortunately, this can be done very
efficiently. It was observed by Cramer et al. [CDI05] that some LSSSs can be converted
to other LSSSs that realize the same access structure by local computations. Moreover,
for a product LSSS generated from an LSSS by the method from [CDM00] (outlined
in the previous section), this is indeed the case for converting back into the original
scheme. In this case, the “local computation” involves each party Pi taking the shares
([[x]]Pi , [[x]]
∗
Pi ) of the secret x and simply discarding [[x]]
∗
Pi .
In summary, the protocol involves parties generating shares [[a]]Π and [[b]]Π, per-





Pi ]]. The subprotocol Π
IT
Mult for generating triples after obtaining [[a]]
Π and
[[b]]Π is given in Figure 7.5.
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Subprotocol ΠITMult
At this point, the parties are assumed to hold sharings [[a]]Π and [[b]]Π, where [[ · ]]Π is the product
LSSS derived from [[ · ]].
Multiply




Pi 〉 where µ(i) is the vector from Sec-
tion 2.4.4.
2. Each party Pi samples a share vector [[[[c]]APi ]] for the summand [[c]]
A
Pi , and distributes the
shares over secure channels.




P j ]]Pi .
4. The parties perform local computations to convert [[a]]Π to [[a]] and [[b]]Π and [[b]].
5. The parties output ([[a]], [[b]], [[c]]).
Figure 7.5: Subprotocol for Information-Theoretic Multiplication, ΠITMult.
The arithmetic circuit can now be evaluated in the usual way (i.e. using ΠOnline).
7.5 Communication Complexity
In this section, analysis of the communication complexity will be expressed in terms of
the costs for Shamir’s secret-sharing so that the results may be compared with other
protocols in the honest-majority setting, but it is important to note that many of the
techniques from this chapter – and indeed throughout this thesis – apply to general Q2
access structures, which many other protocols do not.
For a threshold access structure, the topologies from Section 6.5.4 and Section 6.6.3
can be expressed as follows:
E iBC = {i}× ([n]\{i})
EBC = {(i, j) ∈ [n]2 : i 6= j}
E iOutput = ([n]\{i})× {i}
EOpen = {(i, j) ∈ [n]2 : j = i+k mod n for k ∈ [t]}
EAToR = {(i, j) ∈ [n]2 : j = i+k mod n for k ∈ [n− t−1]}
7.5.1 Preprocessing
In this section, the cost of generating preprocesing for a threshold access structure in
two different ways is given:
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• Parties execute the protocol from Chapter 6 and then convert using ΠRToAny.
• Parties execute the IT protocol from Section 7.4.
Preprocessing with Computational Security
If the parties use replicated secret-sharing and convert, then the cost is shown in Ta-
ble 7.1, which is the same as Table 6.1 but for a threshold access structure. Notice that
ΠRToAny can be applied after the triple has been generated but before it is sacrificed,
which would save communication costs further.
Procedure Number of bits Channels
Initialize
PRZS key commitments 2 ·κ ·n · (n−1) AC(EBC)
Opening commitments 3 ·κ ·n · (n−1) SC(EBC)
PRSS key commitments 2 ·κ ·n · ( n−1n−t−1) · (n− t−1) AC(EBC)
Opening commitments 3 ·κ ·n · ( n−1n−t−1) · (n− t−1) SC(EBC)
Mask
Generation n/a n/a
Open (n−1) ·` SC(E iOutput)
Triples
Generation (a and b) n/a n/a
Generation (c) (1+dσ/`e) ·n · (n− t−1) ·` ·T SC(EAToR)
Sacrifice (Open) 3 · dσ/`e ·n · t ·` ·T AC(EOpen)
Sacrifice (Check) n/a n/a
Table 7.1: Total preprocessing communication cost to realize FPrep performing T multi-
plications using FRRSS and FRZS.
Preprocessing with Statistical Security
Whereas PRSSs can be generated non-interactively after the key-setup phase, Table 7.2
shows the amount of communication required to generate T triples.
The key point to notice is that for a small number of parties, the binomial term is
small enough that the key-setup phase is tractible; for a larger number of parties, the IT
protocol essentially replaces the binomial term with a quadratic term that also depends
on the number of multiplication gates, T, in the circuit. Note that in the generation of
the triple, obtaining c is only a constant factor more expensive (in terms of communica-
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Procedure Number of bits Channels
Initialize n/a n/a
Mask
Generation (1+dσ/`e) · d Tn−te ·n · (n−1) ·` SC(EBC)
Open (n−1) ·` SC(E iOutput)
Triples
Generation (a and b) (1+dσ/`e) · d Tn−te ·n · (n−1) ·` SC(EBC)
Generation (c) (1+dσ/`e) ·n · (n−1) ·` ·T SC(EBC)
Sacrifice (Open) 3 · dσ/`e ·n · t ·` ·T AC(EOpen)
Sacrifice (Check) n · (n−1) ·κ AC(EBC)




tion) than the method using replicated secret-sharing since the term n− t−1 = O(n) is
replaced by n−1.
7.5.2 Online Phase
The total cost of the actively-secure protocol is given in Table 7.3. There is a clear ad-
vantage to converting to Shamir’s secret-sharing for executing the online phase as the
binomial factors that would appear in Table 6.3 by considering a threshold access struc-
ture are replaced with factors linear in n.
Procedure Number of bits Channels
Input n · (n−1) ·` AC(E iBC)
Add n/a n/a
Multiply 2 ·n · t ·` ·T AC(EOpen)
Output To One (n−1) ·` SC(E iOutput)
Output To All n · t ·` ·T AC(EOpen)
Verify 2 ·n · (n−1) ·κ AC(EBC)




7.5.3 Comparison with Other Protocols
Comparison with Maurer
The protocol of Maurer [Mau06] is not realized in the preprocessing model, and it only
offers passive security. Nonetheless, it is interesting to compare.
In Maurer’s protocol, assuming a circuit with a large number of multiplications (i.e.
so that n·(n−1)·κ¿ T), the total number of bits sent over the network per multiplication
is n · (n−1) ·`.
In the protocol here, assuming a large field so that dσ/`e = 1, the cost is
n · (n− t−1) ·`+3 ·n · t ·`+2 ·n · t ·`= n · (n+4 · t−1) ·`
(where the authentication check is effectively 0). Since t < dn−12 e, this cost is at most 3·n·
(n−1) ·`. Thus the cost of actively-secure multiplication with computational security is
asymptotically just 3 times the cost of Maurer’s passive multiplication with IT security.
Comparison with Chida et al. [CGH+18]
The protocol of Chida et al. [CGH+18] takes quite a different approach to obtaining
actively-secure multiplication, bootstrapping the 2-round passive protocol for multipli-
cation due to Damgård and Nielsen [DN07], discussed briefly in Section 2.5.3, to active
security. The main point of their passive protocol was to create a scalable protocol: the
overall communication cost is linear in the number of parties rather than quadratic as
in protocols using Beaver’s circuit randomization.
The preprocessing phase requires generating sharings of random secrets under both
the original LSSS and its associated product LSSS, i.e. as ([[r]], [[r]][2]) where r is uni-
formly random. To multiply [[x]] and [[y]] in the online phase, the parties locally compute
the sharing [[x· y]][2], open the secret [[x· y]][2]−[[r]][2] and compute [[x· y]] := [[r]]+(x· y−r).
For active security, message authentication codes (MACs) are maintained on every se-
cret; in the online phase, every circuit operation is performed on both the secrets and
the corresponding MACs. The preprocessing for this protocol also facilitates the use of
randomness extraction described in Section 7.3. For non-threshold access structures,
the techniques for randomness extraction in Section 7.3 can be used to improve on their
efficiency.
While [CGH+18] scales better with the number of parties, there are several scenarios
in which the protocols in this chapter might be preferable. Firstly, [CGH+18] requires
the online phase to use a multiplicative LSSS, which for general Q2 access structures
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may necessitate either doubling the number of shares (compared to the online phase
of the protocol in this chapter) or using replicated secret-sharing. Secondly, the online
phase of the protocol in this chapter involves a constant factor less communication over
small fields since in [CGH+18], dσ/ log |F|e MACs are required for each secret and hence
1+dσ/ log |F|e passive multiplications are needed for one active multiplication; thus for
situations in which parties outsource their preprocessing, the protocol from this chapter
is better. It should be noted that the overall asymptotic costs are comparable with re-
spect to σ since triple generation depends linearly on dσ/| logF|e. Thirdly, in high-latency
networks, for example over wide-area networks (WANs), one would expect the online





This chapter is based on work in submission under the title MArBled Circuits: Mixing
Arithmetic and Boolean Circuits with Active Security [RW19] and was joint work with
Dragos, Rotaru.
This chapter Many efficient protocols exist for evaluating general Boolean [BDOZ11,
NNOB12,HSS17,WRK17b,HOSS18a] and arithmetic [DPSZ12,DKL+13,KOS16,KPR18]
circuits in the multi-party setting. Garbled circuits (GCs) are often used in situations
where the round complexity is important, for example over a wide-area network (WAN),
since they can be used to evaluate circuits in a constant number of rounds, but using
them to evaluate arithmetic circuits is generally expensive. On the other hand, while
linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS)-based multi-party computation (MPC) for arith-
metic circuits is efficient for “purely” arithmetic operations such as additions and mul-
tiplications, for more complex non-linear operations, the communication costs are sig-
nificantly higher. In this chapter, a protocol is given that allows GCs and LSSS to be
stitched together with active security, allowing one to choose how to evaluate different
parts of a large “mixed” circuit.
8.1 Overview
The motivation for this chapter is that many real-world use cases of computing on pri-
vate data involve a mixture of computations better-suited to Boolean circuits – such as
the comparison of two integers – and computations better for arithmetic computations
– such as evaluating statistical formulae.
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One way of combining these types of computation involves using LSSS-based MPC
over a finite field or ring to emulate arithmetic over the integers, and performing oper-
ations such as comparisons between secrets (i.e. <,>,=) using (what can be thought of
as) a costly emulation of a Boolean computation. One of the shortcomings of LSSS-based
MPC is that these natural but more involved procedures require special preprocessing
and several rounds of communication.
Another way of combining the computation is to use (Boolean) GCs instead of secret-
sharing for circuits involving many bit-wise operations. The disadvantage of using GCs
for mixed computations is that performing general arithmetic computations in Boolean
circuits can be expensive since addition and multiplication must be computed bit-wise.
Garbled circuits will be explained in detail later, but for now the following intuition
suffices: a GC is a randomized version of a circuit produced by a so-called garbler that
hard-wires its own inputs; the circuit is handed to a so-called evaluator, that evaluates
it on its inputs; finally, the garbler and evaluator engage in some procedure for decoding
the final circuit output. The security guarantee is roughly the same as for LSSS-based
MPC: that the garbler and evaluator should only learn the output and what can be in-
ferred from the output and their own inputs. Garbling of arithmetic circuits is challeng-
ing and the best-known techniques [BMR16,Ben18] require O(p) ciphertexts to be sent
for every multiplication, where p is the field characteristic. Conversely, techniques for
Boolean circuits have been known since the 1980s [Yao86, Oral presentation] and have
seen significant improvements since that time, as outlined in Section 2.6. The circuit
garbling described above is a two-party protocol. In multi-party garbling, every party
acts as both the garbler and evaluator, a protocol for which was first given by Beaver
et al. [BMR90]. In the recent past, Lindell et al. [LPSY15] showed how to garble with
active security (efficiently) using MPC, after which followed much work with a similar
approach [WRK17b, HSS17, KY18] so that multi-party garbling of Boolean circuits is
considered efficient enough to be practical.
So-called mixed protocols are those in which parties switch between secret-sharing
and garbled circuits mid-way through a computation, thus enjoying the efficiency of the
basic addition and multiplication operations in any field using the former and the low-
round complexity of GCs for non-linear subroutines using the latter. One can think of
mixed protocols as allowing parties to choose the most efficient field in which to eval-
uate different parts of a circuit. For mixed protocols to be efficient, clearly the cost of
switching between secret-sharing and garbling, performing the operation, and switch-
ing back must be more efficient than the method that does not require switching, per-
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haps achieved by relegating some computation to the offline phase.
There is a rich literature of mixed protocols in the two-party setting with passive
security – for example, [BPSW07, HKS+10, KSS14, BDK+18, IMZ19]. One of the more
recent works is that of Demmler et al. [DSZ15], known as Arithmetic-Boolean-Yao
(ABY), in which parties convert between arithmetic, Boolean, and “Yao” sharings. For
small subcircuits, converting arithmetic shares of a secret to Boolean shares of the bit-
decomposition of the same secret – without any garbling – suffices for efficiency gains
over evaluating the same circuit without switching. However, for large subcircuits, us-
ing garbling additionally allows reducing online costs.
Mohassel and Rindal [MR18] constructed a three-party protocol known as ABY3 for
mixing these three types of sharing in the active-security setting assuming at most one
corruption. However, actively-secure mixed protocols in a general multi-party setting
have hitherto not received much attention. One of the reasons for this is perhaps that
there is a difficult technical challenge to overcome in ensuring that authentication of
secrets is maintained through the conversion – that is, to ensure that the adversary
cannot introduce errors during the switching procedure.
The goal of this chapter is to realize a circuit and arithmetic black box (CABB),
given by the functionality FCABB (which extends FABB) in Figure 8.1, which is an ab-
straction of a mixed protocol in the active-security setting. The solution uses MPC in
a black-box way, and while the method used for garbling the circuit has some loose
requirements that must be satisfied, it is compatible with many state-of-the-art multi-
party Boolean circuit-garbling techniques; the only requirement is that parties should
be able to authenticate their own choices of inputs, and that XOR can be computed be-
tween authenticated bits. (This is discussed in detail later.) As the garbling uses MPC as
a black box, being executed in the FRPrep-hybrid model, no restriction need be made on
the access structure, making it compatible with the recent compilers for general access
structures [ABF+18,ACK+19].
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Functionality FCABB
This functionality extends FABB in Figure 2.14. The function BitDec : F→ {0,1}blog |F|c takes an
element of F and computes its bit-decomposition as a sequence of bits.
Evaluate Circuit On input (EvaluateCircuit,C, (idk)tk=1, id , sid) where t ·log |DB.Field| is the
arity of Boolean circuit C, if idi ∈ DB.Ids for all i ∈ [t], then await a message OK or Abort from
the adversary. If the message is OK, then set DB[id] := C(BitDec(DB[id1]), . . . ,BitDec(DB[idt]))
and continue; otherwise, send the message Abort to all parties, and then halt.
Figure 8.1: Circuit and Arithmetic Black Box Functionality, FCABB.
8.1.1 Switching Mechanism
The exposition in this chapter is focused mainly on the full-threshold setting, and hence
authentication is achieved using information-theoretic (IT) message authentication codes
(MACs) as described in Section 2.5.3, but since FRPrep is used as a black box, any access
structure can be used as long as FRPrep can be realized.
The key challenge for mixed protocols in the active-security setting is that secrets
must remain authenticated through the conversion from LSSS to GC and back again.
In the full-threshold setting, the naïve way of maintaining authentication from LSSS
to GC is for parties to bit-decompose the shares of their secrets and the MACs locally
and use these as input bits to the circuit, and checking the MAC inside the GC. This
necessitates a considerable amount of online communication since each party needs to
broadcast a pseudorandom function (PRF) key for each bit in the bit-decomposition of
each share of each secret and its MAC. This method also requires garbling several ad-
ditions and multiplications inside the circuit to check the MAC, and some methodology
for obtaining secret-shared output (in the arithmetic field) and corresponding MACs
(perhaps by requiring random masks to be provided as auxiliary input to the circuit).
The advantage of this solution, despite these challenges, is that it requires no additional
preprocessing, nor adaptations to the garbling procedure.
Contrasting this approach, the idea in this chapter is to make use of special pre-
processing to speed up the conversion in the online phase of the protocol. This prepro-
cessing takes the form of “doubly-shared” authenticated bits, dubbed daBits, following
the nomenclature set out in [NNOB12]. These doubly-shared secrets are values in {0,1}
shared and authenticated both in Fp and F2l , where 0 and 1 here denote the additive
and multiplicative identities, respectively, in each field. The idea is to use these daBits
to convert authenticated, secret-shared data in Fp, where p is a large prime, to authen-
188
8.1. OVERVIEW
ticated secret-shared data in F2l .
Remark 8.1. The parameter l is not directly related to ` := blog pc since the bits of an
element in Fp will be translated into a set of secret-shared bits in F2l , not a single F2l
field element. The parameters are chosen so that `=O(σ) and l =O(κ) in order that the
MPC protocol is secure with statistical security σ and the circuit garbling is secure with
computational security κ.
The switching procedure of a secret-shared element x in Fp to a set of input bits to
a garbled circuit involves constructing a random secret r in Fp using daBits, opening
x− r, bit-decomposing this public value (requiring no communication) and using these
as input bits for a GC. Then the parties can evaluate the garbled circuit locally, where
the circuit has a prepended subcircuit that adds r and computes the result modulo p.
This general idea for conversion has been used in many of the prior works in the two-
party semi-honest security setting. Garbling of the subcircuit is achieved using the bit
decomposition of r with the parts of the daBits in F2l . It will be shown in Section 8.4 that
retrieving outputs from the circuit in secret-shared form can be done by local operations,
whence they can proceed with further LSSS-based computations on secrets in Fp. This
method keeps the authentication check mostly outside of the circuit, instead requiring
that the MAC on x− r be correct. In fact, this approach is oblivious to the method used
for authenticating, which means that daBits can be generated using any MPC protocol
that offers authentication, such as the protocols in Chapters 6 and 7. This process of
mixing arithmetic and Boolean circuits by facilitating switching between secret-sharing
and garbled circuits is dubbed “circuit MArBling”, from Mixing Arithmetic and Boolean
circuits.
The rough structure is shown in Figure 8.2, where the Boolean circuit C is evaluated
on inputs x and y that are initially secret-shared in Fp, and the output is a set of secret-
shared bits in Fp representing the bit-decomposition of an element of Fp. The procedure
called “Mask conversion” (explained in the following sections) is a local operation in the
online phase. The notation (a− b) j is used to denote the jth bit in the binary expansion
of the integer a−b.
The only use of doubly-shared masks is at the two boundaries between a garbled cir-
cuit and secret-shared data (i.e. circuit input and output): all secrets used in evaluating
arithmetic circuits (i.e. using standard LSSS-based MPC) are authenticated shares in
Fp only. All other secrets “inside” the circuit (that is, for all wires that are not circuit
input or output wires) are authenticated shares of bits in F2l only. The online commu-
nication cost is that of each party broadcasting a single element of Fp and then broad-
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Figure 8.2: Conversion Overview.
casting log p PRF keys (of length κ) per input, for a circuit of any depth. Thus the online
cost is O(κ · log p) bits per party, per Fp input to the Boolean circuit.
Remark 8.2. While essentially all of the basic actively-secure MPC protocols enable the
evaluation of additions and multiplications, for more complicated non-linear functions
the only solutions that exist are those that require additional assumptions on the input
data. For example, comparison requires bit decomposition, which itself requires that
secrets be bounded by some constant. Since the bits of each input are directly inserted
into the circuit, this additional assumption can be avoided.
8.1.2 Structure
The realization of the functionality FCABB is achieved in the following way:
• In the preprecessing phase:
1. The MPC functionality FRPrep is extended to the functionality FRPrep+ given in
Figure 8.3 to allow the same bits to be generated in two independent FRPrep
sessions in two different fields, Fp and F2l .
2. The F2l instance of FRPrep inside FRPrep+ is used to perform a form of garbling
known as SPDZ-BMR-style garbling [LPSY15,KY18].
• In the online phase:
– The protocol ΠOnline is used with the instance of FRPrep over Fp to perform LSSS-
based MPC over a prime field, realizing the FABB part of FCABB.
– The protocol ΠBMREvaluate to used to evaluate circuits garbled as preprocessing,
realizing the circuit-evaluation part of FCABB.
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– A switching procedure is used to convert between secret-sharing and garbled
circuits and back again.
Functionality FRPrep+
This functionality extends the reactive functionality FRPrep with commands to generate the same
bits in two independent sessions.
Instances of FRPrep
Two independent copies of FRPrep are identified via session identifiers sidp and sid2l .
Additional command
daBits On receiving (daBits, (idk)tk=1, sidp, sid2l ), from all parties where {idk}
t
k=1 are fresh iden-
tifiers,
1. Sample a set {bk}tk=1 ← U ({0,1}).
2. Execute the macro Sample(idbk ) from each instance of FRPrep with S for each k ∈ [t].
3. Await a message Abort or OK from S. If the message is OK and Abort is false, then for all




k=1 to Pi; otherwise, send the message Abort to all honest
parties, and then halt.
Figure 8.3: Functionality for Two MPC Engines, with daBits in Both, FRPrep+.




Figure 8.4: Conversion Protocol Dependencies.
8.2 Preliminaries
This section provides an overview of the MPC techniques important for this chapter,
then gives a brief recapitulation of the protocol known as SPDZ-BMR developed by
Lindell et al. [LPSY15] for computing a multi-party garbled circuit with active security,
followed by an overview of the conversion technique.
Throughout this chapter, it will be assumed that the parties are connected in a com-
plete synchronous network of secure channels, i.e. SC(EBC), and have access to a broad-
cast channel, which can be instantiated in the random oracle model over this set of
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secure channels as described in Section 2.3.4 since the MPC and GC protocols here only
offer security with abort.
8.2.1 MPC
The protocol will make use of MPC as a black box; it involves reactive computation so
the functionality FRPrep from Section 4.6 is used (rather than FABB).
For the protocols that realize FCABB, it is not important how authentication is achieved
– i.e. whether by linear MACs so that [[ · ]] = ([[ · ]]A, [[γ(·)]]A) as in SPDZ, or by error-
detection properties as for Q2 access structures – the key point is that secrets can be
opened with authentication. Shares are denoted in the following three ways:
Sharing in Fp: [[a]]p
Sharing in F2l : [[c]]
2l
Sharing in both: [[b]]p,2
l = ([[b]]p, [[b]]2l ) where b ∈ {0,1} .
The sharing [[b]]p,2
l
, called a daBit, is considered correct if the bit is the same in both
fields – that is, either both the additive identity or both the multiplicative identity, in
their fields. Creating daBits efficiently is one of the main tasks of this chapter.
Conditions on the secret-sharing field
Let ` := blog pc. Throughout, MPC is executed in Fp where p is some large prime, but
the conversion protocol is only secure if it is possible to generate uniformly random field
elements by sampling bits uniformly at random {[[r j]]
p}`−1j=0 and summing them to get
[[r]]p := ∑`−1j=0 2 j · [[r j]]p. This requires that 1− 2`p = O(2−σ), which roughly speaking says
that p is only slightly larger than a power of 2. (By symmetry of this argument one can
require that p just be close (above or below) to a power of 2.) Recall that sampling a uni-
form element of {0,1}` produces the same distribution as sampling ` bits independently
by standard Measure Theory. It follows from Lemma 8.1 that under this assumption on
p, the statistical distance between the uniform distribution over Fp and the same over
{0,1}` is negligible.
Lemma 8.1. Let `= blog pc, let D be the probability mass function for the uniform dis-
tribution D over [0, p)∩Z and let E be the probability mass function for the uniform
distribution E over [0,2`)∩Z. Then the statistical distance between distributions is neg-
ligible in the security parameter if 1− 2`p =O(2−σ).
192
8.2. PRELIMINARIES
























· (p−2`) · 1
p
= 1− 2`p =O(2−σ).
Note on XOR
The protocol makes heavy use of the (generalized) XOR operation. This can be defined
in any field as the function
f :Fp ×Fp →Fp
(x, y) 7→ x+ y−2 · x · y,(8.1)
which coincides with the usual XOR function for fields of characteristic 2. In LSSS-
based MPC, addition requires no communication, so computing XOR in F2l is for free;
the cost in Fp (char(p) > 2) is one multiplication, which requires a Beaver triple and
some communication. This operation is the main cost associated with the preprocessing
phase, since generating daBits with active security requires generating lots of them and
then computing several XORs in both fields.
Agreement of Random Strings
The protocols require algorithms that provide the parties with specific random strings,
shown in Figure 8.5. Such random strings can be agreed in the FCoinFlip-hybrid model
using FCoinFlip to generate seeds and then using deterministic algorithms locally to com-
pute the necessary shared data, as demonstrated by ΠRand in Figure 8.6. Unfortunately,
a clean description of FRand that simply samples uniformly from the required sets is
not possible for a technical reason, as discussed in Section 6.3.2. It is, however, easy
to get around this by defining the functionality to sample a seed uniformly and to use
this to generate the random string deterministically itself. There is no communication
in the protocol beyond the call to FCoinFlip for a seed, so the simulation in the FCoinFlip-
hybrid world is trivial: the S replaces the seed provided as output by its local instance
of FCoinFlip with the seed sampled and output by FRand.
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Functionality FRand
Initialize On input (Initialize, sid) from all honest parties and S, await further messages.
Random subset On input (RSubset, X , t, sid) where X is a set and t satisfies t ≤ |X |,
1. Sample a seed seed ← U ({0,1}κ).
2. Set π := Shuffle(seed, |X |).
3. Let X = {xi}|X |i=1 and set S := {xπ(i) : 1≤ i ≤ t}.
4. Send S to all honest parties and S, and additionally send seed to S.
Random buckets On input (RBuckets, X , t, sid) where X is a set and t ∈N such that |X |/t ∈N,
do the following:
1. Sample a seed seed ← U ({0,1}κ).
2. Set π := Shuffle(seed, |X |).
3. Let X = {xi}|X |i=1 and for each i = 1 to |X |/t, set X i := {xπ( j) : (i−1) · t < j ≤ i · t}.
4. Send (X i)
|X |/t
i=1 to all honest parties and S, and additionally send seed to S.
Figure 8.5: Random Sampling Functionality, FRand.
Protocol ΠRand
This protocol is realized in the FCoinFlip-hybrid model. Let Shuffle() be the Knuth Shuffle in
Figure 2.1.
Initialize Parties agree on a session identifier sid and computational security parameter κ, and
call FCoinFlip with input (Initialize, {0,1}κ , sid).
Random Subset To compute a random subset of size t of a set X , parties do the following:
1. Call FCoinFlip with input (RElt, sid) to obtain a seed seed.
2. Set π := Shuffle(seed, |X |).
3. Let X = {xi}|X |i=1 and set S := {xπ(i) : 1≤ i ≤ t}.
Random Buckets To put a set of items indexed by a set X into buckets of size t ∈ N where
|X |/t ∈N, the parties do the following:
1. Call FCoinFlip with input (RElt, sid) to obtain a seed seed.
2. Set π := Shuffle(seed, |X |).
3. Let X = {xi}|X |i=1 and for each i = 1 to |X |/t, set X i := {xπ( j) : (i−1) · t < j ≤ i · t}.
Figure 8.6: Random Sampling Protocol, ΠRand.
Cut-and-choose
A process known as cut-and-choose is a way of one party proving a statement to another
party by generating a large number of randomized instances of a problem and revealing
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the secrets used to generate a large random subset so that with overwhelming probabil-
ity in the statistical security parameter, the remaining secret instances that were not
revealed are correct. Its general definition is not particularly important for this chapter
as the specific probabilities are calculated on an ad hoc basis in the following sections,
but it should be noted that it is a standard technique in cryptography.
8.2.2 Garbled Circuits
In this section, protocols for multi-party garbling are explained. The focus of this chap-
ter is on showing how to use special preprocessing to make mixed protocols efficient,
and consequently, the garbling methods described here are intended only to show the
use of daBits in situ – there is no claim of novelty in the garbling methods presented
here. Indeed, there are many optimizations to the outline given that are not discussed
since the precise garbling techniques are not important and they complicate exposition.
The garbling protocol presented is due to Keller and Yanai [KY18], which can be
thought of as a variant of SPDZ-BMR, as it is the easiest to explain from the point of
using MPC as a black box.
Garbling as an MPC Protocol
An outline of circuit garbling in the two-party setting was given in Section 8.1. The
concrete process, which only offers passive security, is now given. It is assumed that the
garbler and evaluator have already agreed on a Boolean circuit they wish to evaluate
on the union of their secret inputs.
To garble the circuit, first the garbler samples a global difference ∆, and then for
each wire u in the circuit samples a “zero key” ku,0 and sets the corresponding “one
key” as ku,1 := ku,0 ⊕∆. The keys can then be written as ku,b = ku,0 ⊕ b ·∆ for b ∈ {0,1}.
(The reason for this setup is explained below, and is part of the FreeXOR technique.)
A wire connection exiting one gate and entering another is considered one wire, as are
all circuit input and output wires. A masking (or permutation) bit λu is also sampled
for each wire, the reason for which will be explained shortly. Then the garbler converts
each Boolean fan-in-two gate g, where g : {0,1}2 → {0,1}, with input wires u and v and
output wire w to a set of 4 ciphertexts as shown in Table 8.1, where Enc is an encryption
algorithm that takes two symmetric keys and a message as input. The details of the
encryption scheme are explained later.
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kw,0 ⊕∆ · (g(1⊕λu,1⊕λv)⊕λw)
∥∥(g(1⊕λu,1⊕λv)⊕λw))
Table 8.1: Yao’s garbled gate with FreeXOR and Point-And-Permute.
From the table, observe that the gate is transformed into a set of four ciphertexts,
each encrypting one of two output keys concatenated with a bit called a signal bit,
computed as a function of masking bits and gate input bits.
Once every gate has been garbled, the garbler sends all ciphertexts to the evaluator,
and for every wire u corresponding to one of its own inputs it sends a key and a signal
bit Λu := u⊕λu to the evaluator:
(ku,u⊕λu
∥∥u⊕λu)
where u ∈ {0,1} is the garbler’s input on wire u. (Note that in practice the garbler can
just hardwire its inputs instead of sending ciphertexts and keys, but the exposition is
clearer if this is not assumed.)
In the protocol known as oblivious transfer (OT), a sender sends two messages and a
receiver chooses to receive one; the security guarantee of the protocol is that the sender
does not learn which message was selected and the receiver does not learn anything
about the message it did not select. This process is used to transfer keys for circuit
input wires that correspond to the evaluator’s inputs from the garbler to the evaluator:





where λv is known only to the garbler (but can be immediately deduced by the evaluator
using its own input). The evaluator selects the first if its input is v = 0, or the second if
its input is v = 1. Thus the evaluator obtains
(kv,v⊕λv ,v⊕λv)
which corresponds to the key kv,Λv with signal bit Λv = v⊕λv, and learns nothing about
the other key by the security of the OT protocol.
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Evaluation proceeds in the following way. Given a gate, signal bits Λu and Λv and
corresponding keys ku,Λu and kv,Λv , the evaluator decrypts the ciphertext corresponding
to the row (Λu,Λv), i.e. the ciphertext
Encku,Λu ,kv,Λv (kw,0 ⊕∆ · (g(Λu ⊕λu,Λv ⊕λv)⊕λw)
∥∥(g(Λu ⊕λu,Λv ⊕λv)⊕λw))
which returns the key kw,0 ⊕∆ · (g(u,v)⊕λw) since Λu ⊕λu = u and Λv ⊕λv = v, along
with the bit (g(u,v)⊕λw). Now since w = g(u,v), it holds that g(u,v)⊕λw = w⊕λw =
Λw and so the key learnt is kw,Λw and the bit is Λw. The evaluator now uses this key
(and the output key of another gate) to decrypt the next gate. The evaluator proceeds
iteratively through the circuit and obtains a key (or multiple keys) as final output. The
evaluator and garbler then interact to obtain the output to which the circuit output keys
correspond.
Point-and-Permute The technique of using masking bits as described above is called
point-and-permute and was introduced by Beaver et al. [BMR90]. The purpose of the
masking bits is so that the evaluator does not learn partial evaluations of the circuit,
which may otherwise leak information about the garbler’s input. Since the masks are
unknown and uniform, the signal bits leak nothing about the partial evaluation. Note
that it is only necessary to hide internal circuit wire values from the evaluator, so mask-
ing bits on circuit input wires can be set to 0.
The original technique for determining the output key while keeping the internal
circuit wire secret was to use some sort of authenticated encryption and for the evalu-
ator to permute the ciphertexts arbitrarily, so that the garbler had to decrypt all four
ciphertexts and output whichever was a valid plaintext; using point-and-permute, the
garbler only needs to decrypt one ciphertext per gate.
FreeXOR The reason for choosing keys to differ by the global difference ∆ is that it
leads to an efficient way to garble XOR gates: instead of choosing an independent output
wire key kw,0 and mask λw for XOR gates, the key can be set to kw,0 := ku,0 ⊕ kv,0 and
λw :=λu⊕λv. Then because the (XOR) difference between every zero/one key pair in the
circuit is the same (the global difference, ∆), there is no need to send ciphertexts for
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XOR gates: the evaluator computes Λw :=Λu ⊕Λv and
ku,Λu ⊕kv,Λv = ku,0 ⊕∆ · (v⊕λv)⊕kv,0 ⊕∆ · (v⊕λv)
= ku,0 ⊕kv,0 ⊕∆ · (u⊕v⊕λu ⊕λv)
= kw,0 ⊕∆ · (w⊕λw)
= kw,Λw .
This technique was introduced by Schneider and Kolesnikov [KS08] and is known as
FreeXOR. It requires additional assumptions on the encryption scheme, discussed below
when the encryption scheme is defined.
Multi-Party Garbling Overview
In multi-party garbling, every party acts as both garbler and evaluator. Each party
generates a circuit for which it knows all the wire keys, but where each ciphertext
is encrypted under all parties’ corresponding wire keys. This means that every party
must evaluate all n circuits in parallel to decrypt each subsequent gate and so learn all
n succeeding keys.
Lindell and Pinkas [LP07] showed how to use cut-and-choose to obtain active secu-
rity. The orthogonal approach of SPDZ-BMR garbling is to force the parties to act hon-
estly when garbling by using actively-secure MPC to compute the ciphertexts. Lindell et
al. [LPSY15] gave a generic multi-party method, known as SPDZ-BMR, for garbling in a
constant number of rounds with active security where the preprocessed material is ob-
tained from SPDZ [DPSZ12]. Their method is (roughly) to execute the classic [BMR90]
multi-party garbling protocol using SPDZ to generate all the necessary secrets (such as
random bits and keys) and to compute the ciphertexts. While the SPDZ-BMR protocol
garbles Boolean circuits, the wire masks are arithmetic shares in Fp of binary values,
and the wire keys are random elements of Fp secret-shared amongst the parties. Impor-
tantly, it was shown that it is not necessary for parties to provide zero-knowledge proofs
that the evaluations of the PRF used for encryption, which are computed locally by each
party, are done honestly, as the evaluators will abort with overwhelming probability if
parties cheat in this way.
The FreeXOR garbling technique crucially relies on the fact that the keys are ele-
ments of a field of characteristic 2. Towards the goal of a multi-party garbling protocol
with FreeXOR, one might hope to perform SPDZ-BMR over F2l . One of the reasons
this was not considered for SPDZ-BMR was (presumably) that the SPDZ offline phase
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was much faster for large prime fields than extension fields. Indeed, the most efficient
variant of SPDZ used BGV [BGV12] as the somewhat-homomorphic encryption (SHE)
scheme, which means that while the preprocessing phase can be parallelized through
ciphertext packing, for large extension fields – and in particular for finite extensions
of F2 – the amount of packing is severely limited. However, shortly after this Keller et
al. [KOS16] showed how to use OT to perform the offline phase even more efficiently.
This solution was shown to be more efficent than using SHE for extension fields. De-
spite recent work [KPR18] showing that SHE solutions outperform OT solutions for
large prime fields, [KOS16] remains faster over extension fields. Subsequently, Keller
and Yanai [KY18] showed how to apply FreeXOR in the multi-party setting using SPDZ-
BMR-style garbling where the SPDZ shares are in F2l instead of Fp.
Meanwhile, Hazay et al. [HSS17] also showed how to obtain FreeXOR in the multi-
party setting, again over F2l , but take a different approach from SPDZ-BMR: they do not
make use of a a full-blown MPC functionality and instead produce an unauthenticated
garbled circuit – it is merely additively shared, whereas in SPDZ-BMR and [KY18], the
garbled circuit is authenticated with MACs. Active security comes from the fact that an
incorrectly-garbled circuit will only cause the parties to abort when evaluating it. This
approach requires only a single (authenticated) F2 multiplication per AND gate.
The implementation of the protocols in this chapter1 uses the multi-party Boolean
circuit garbling protocol due to Keller and Yanai [KY18], which is less efficient than
[HSS17] and [WRK17b], but the implementation [Kel19] was easier to integrate with
the SPDZ compiler to be able to switch between different online phases of an MPC
program [ABF+18]. Despite this there is good reason to believe that the generation of
the specialized preprocessing required in the solution here dovetails with most if not all
of these alternative these garbling schemes as the only requirements are the following:
• Parties should be able to authenticate their own secret inputs (in fact, secret bits
suffices), for whatever authentication method is used in the protocol.
• Parties should be able to compute the XOR of authenticated bits.
Unfortunately, the authentication is usually abstracted away in garbling functionalities
so one cannot make straightforward claims about using garbling in a black-box way.
1The implementation was done by the coauthor of this work.
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Encryption
So far, discussion of encryption has been abstract; in this section the definition as used
in the SPDZ-BMR protocol is given. Messages are encrypted by computing the XOR of
the message with a pseudorandom one-time-pad generated by a PRF under keys held
by multiple parties as described below. In detail, the encryption of a message m ∈ {0,1}κ
under keys ku := k1u
∥∥ · · ·∥∥knu and kv := k1v∥∥ · · ·∥∥knv and nonce r, where Pi holds they keys
kiu,k
i









Fka,kb (·) := Fka(·)⊕Fkb (·).
For clarity, the formula will be explicitly in the circuit garbling rather than abstract
to the encryption notation. Use of the PRF for encryption as above, and the integration
of the FreeXOR technique to circuit garbling, require specific assumptions on the PRF,
as is discussed in [CKKZ12] and [HSS17]. Analysis of the security of this encryption
scheme is omitted as the details of the garbling are not the focus of this chapter.
Multi-Party Garbled Gate Using this encryption scheme, a garbled gate is defined




















where idg denotes the gate index and ∆ j is the global difference of P j. Each PRF eval-
uation Fkiu,α,kiv,β(idg, j) is evaluated by party Pi and then provided as input to the MPC
engine by calling FRPrep with input
(Input, i, idF i
α,β
,Fkiu,α,kiv,β(idg, j), sid).
The masking bits are generated as random bits using FRPrep so no party knows them.
















and n2 inputs for the PRF evaluations.
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Once these ciphertexts have been computed, they are revealed to all parties, and so
each party Pi holds { g̃ jα,β : (α,β) ∈ {0,1}2 , j ∈ [n]}. The full protocol is given in Figures 8.9,
8.10 and 8.11 but it is modified to allow for the use of the special preprocessing and for
parties to obtain secret-shared output, so it is best read in the context of later sections.
Note that since the keys for the PRF are in the field F2l in the garbling protocol, the
instance of FRPrep must be over a field with l =Ω(κ) for computational security.
Output
In the usual BMR protocol, immediately after garbling, the parties open the masks for
output wires. This enables all parties to view the output bits. Instead, in the conversion
protocol later, the parties will obtain the final output in secret-shared form, which they
can do simply by not opening the output masks, and by computing (locally) the XOR of





8.3 Generation of daBits
In this section, the functionality FRPrep+ is constructed.
Any technique for generating daBits using MPC as a black box requires some form of
checking procedure to ensure consistency between the two fields. One common method
of checking consistency between two sets of the (alleged) same secrets involves checking
that random linear combinations of secrets produce the same result in both cases. Unfor-
tunately, since the two instantiations of MPC are in different fields, one cannot compute
the same linear combination in both fields. It is, however, possible to check XORs of bits,
which in Fp is non-linear and so requires multiplication. (See Equation 8.1 in Section
8.2.) Minimizing communication costs here therefore means minimizing the number of
multiplications. Techniques using OT such as [WRK17b] to generate authenticated bits
require a lot of XORs for checking correctness, so are undesirable for generating daBits.
The protocol for generating daBits is summarized as follows. In order to generate the
same bit in both fields, each party samples a bit and calls the Fp and F2k instances of
FRPrep with this same input and then the parties compute the n-party XOR. To ensure
all parties provided the same inputs in both fields, randomized checking procedures
called cut-and-choose and bucketing are executed. While this is often an expensive pro-
cedure, the larger the number of daBits generated the lower the average cost per daBit.
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The idea behind these checks is the following. First, the parties open a random sub-
set of secrets so that with some probability all unopened bits are correct. This ensures
that the adversary cannot cheat on too many of the daBits. Then the secrets are placed
into “buckets”, and then in each bucket one secret is designated as the one to output,
all other secrets in the bucket are used to check the designated secret, and then they
discard all but the designated secret. For a single bucket, the check will only pass (by
construction) if either all secrets are correct or all are incorrect. Thus the adversary is
forced to corrupt whole multiples of the bucket size and hope they are grouped together
in the same bucket. Fortunately, (it will be shown that) there is no leakage on the bits
since the parameters required for the parts of the protocol described above already pre-
clude it.
The cut-and-choose and bucketing checks in the protocol presented here are similar
to those described by Frederiksen et al. [FKOS15, App. F.3], in which “triple-like” se-
crets can be checked efficiently. Note that it is not necessary to remove leakage on the
bits as described in [FKOS15, p.5] since no operation is performed beyond inputting the
bits into the two different fields: for triples, one creates the triple, authenticates and
then sacrifices, which means there is the possibility for leakage on the triple.
The protocol FRPrep
∥∥ΠdaBits is given in Figure 8.7.
Protocol FRPrep
∥∥ΠdaBits
This protocol is in the FRPrep-hybrid model. To save on notation, to say that the parties com-
pute [[z]] := [[x]] · [[y]] means that they compute a new identifier idz, call F pRPrep with input
(Multiply, idx, idy, idz, sidp), and store the output secret-sharing of a secret identified as idz
(and analogously for the F2l instance).
Initialize
1. Call an instance of FRPrep with input (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]]p, sidp); denote it by F pRPrep.
2. Call an instance of FRPrep with input (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]]2
l









, as determined by the session identifier.
daBit subroutine
daBits To generate ` bits, the parties do the following:
1. Generate daBits
a) Choose C > 1 and B > 1 so that CB · (B·`B )> 2σ.
b) For each i ∈ [n],
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Protocol FRPrep
∥∥ΠdaBits (continued)
ii. The parties call F p
RPrep




k=1 and P j ∈P \
{Pi} has input (Input, i, idbik ,⊥, sidp)
m
k=1.









and P j ∈P \{Pi} has input (Input, i, idbik ,⊥, sid2l )
m
k=1.
iv. The parties store the returned shares {[[bik]]
p, [[bik]]
2l }mk=1.
2. Cut and Choose
a) Call FRand with input (RSubset, [C ·B ·`], (C−1) ·B ·`, sid) to obtain a set S ⊆ [C ·B ·`] of
size (C−1) ·B ·`.
b) Call F p
RPrep
with inputs (Open,0, idbik
, sidp)k∈S for all i ∈P .
c) Call F2k
RPrep
with inputs (Open,0, idbik
, sid2l )k∈S for all i ∈P .
d) If any party sees daBits which are not in {0,1} or not the same in both fields, they call
(either instance of) FRPrep with input (Broadcast,Abort, sid), (locally) output ⊥, and
halt.
3. Combine For all k ∈ [`]\ S, do the following:
a) Set [[bk]]





b) For i from 2 to n,
i. Set [[bk]]
p := [[bk]]p + [[bik]]







a) Call FRand with input (RBuckets, [B ·`],B) to obtain a set of sets {Xk}`k=1 to put the B ·`
daBits into ` buckets of size B.
b) For each bucket Xk ∈ {Xk}`k=1,
i. Relabel the bits in this bucket as b1, . . . ,bB.
ii. Set [[ck]]p := [[b1]]p and [[ck]]2l := [[b1]]2l .
iii. For k′ from 2 to B, compute a new identifier idck and do the following:
A. Set [[ck]]p := [[b1]]p + [[bk′ ]]p −2 · [[b1]]p · [[bk′ ]]p.
B. Set [[ck]]2
l
:= [[b1]]2l ⊕ [[bk′ ]]2l .
iv. Call F p
RPrep





with inputs (Open,0, idck , sid2l )
B
k=2.
vi. If any party sees daBits which are not in {0,1} or not the same in both fields, they
call (either instance of) FRPrep with input (Broadcast,Abort, sid), (locally) output ⊥,
and halt.
vii. Set [[bk]]
p,2l := [[b1]]p,2l .
c) Call F p
RPrep
with input (Verify, sidp).
d) Call F2k
RPrep
with input (Verify, sid2l ).
e) If the checks pass without aborting, output {[[bk]]
p,2l }`k=1 and discard all other bits.
Figure 8.7: Protocol for Two MPC Engines, with daBits in Both, FRPrep
∥∥ΠdaBits.
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Proposition 8.1 is required in order to show that FRPrep
∥∥ΠdaBits universal compos-
ability (UC)-securely realizes the functionality FRPrep+ in Figure 8.3 in the FRPrep-
hybrid model.
Proposition 8.1. For a given ` > 0, choose B > 1 and C > 1 so that C−B · (B`B )−1 < 2−σ.
Then the probability that one or more of the ` daBits output after Check Correctness
by FRPrep
∥∥ΠdaBits is different in each field is at most 2−σ.
Proof. Using F p
RPrep
and F2kRPrep as black boxes ensures the adversary can only possibly
cheat in the input stage. It will be argued that:
1. If both sets of inputs from corrupt parties to F p
RPrep
and F2kRPrep are bits (rather than
other field elements), then the bits are consistent in the two different fields with
overwhelming probability.
2. The inputs in F2k are bits with overwhelming probability.
3. The inputs in Fp are bits with overwhelming probability.
If these hold then it follows that the daBits are bits in the two fields, and are consistent.
1. Let c be the number of inconsistent daBits generated by a given corrupt party. If
c > B` then every set of size (C−1)B` contains an incorrect daBit so the honest parties
will always detect this in Cut and Choose and abort. Since (C−1)B` out of CB` daBits
are opened, on average the probability that a daBit is not opened is 1− (C−1)/C = C−1,
and so if c < B` then
(8.2) Pr[None of the c corrupted daBits is opened]= C−c.
At this point, if the protocol has not yet aborted, then there are B` daBits remaining of
which exactly c are corrupt.
Suppose a daBit [[b]]p,2
l
takes the value b̃ in Fp and b̂ in F2k . If the bucketing check
passes then for every other daBit [[b′]]p,2
l
in the bucket it holds that b̃⊕ b̃′ = b̂⊕ b̂′, so
b̃′ = (b̂⊕ b̂′)⊕ b̃, and so b̃ = b̂⊕1 if and only if b̃′ = b̂′⊕1. (Recall that at this stage it is
assumed that the inputs are certainly bits.) In other words, within a single bucket, the
check passes if and only if either all daBits are inconsistent, or if none of them are. Thus
the probability that Check Correctness passes without aborting is the probability
that all corrupted daBits are placed into the same buckets. Moreover, this implies that
if the number of corrupted daBits, c, is not a multiple of the bucket size, this stage never
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passes, so c = Bt for some t > 0. Let E be the event that all corrupted daBits are placed




) · (B(t−1)B ) · · ·(BB) · (B`−BtB ) · (B`−Bt−BB ) · · ·(BB)(B`
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Since the randomness for Cut and Choose and Check Correctness is independent,
the event that both checks pass after the adversary corrupts c daBits is the product of
the probabilities. To upper-bound the adversary’s chance of winning, the probability is










The maximum occurs when t is small, and t ≥ 1 otherwise no cheating occurred; thus
since the proposition stipulates that C−B ·(B`B )−1 < 2−σ, the daBits are consistent in both
fields, if they are indeed bits in both fields.
2. Next, it will be argued that the check in Cut and Choose ensures that the in-
puts given to F2kRPrep are indeed bits. It follows from Equation 8.2 that the step Cut and
Choose aborts with probability C−c if any element of either field is not a bit, as well
as if the elements in the two fields do not match. Moreover, in Check Correctness, in
order for the check to pass in F2k for a given bucket, the secrets’ higher-order bits must
be the same for all shares so that the XOR is always zero when the pairwise XORs are
opened. Thus the probability that this happens is the same as the probability above in
Equation 8.3 since again this can only happen when the adversary is not detected in
Cut and Choose, that it cheats in some multiple of B daBits, and that these cheating
bits are placed in the same buckets in Check Correctness.
3. It will now be shown that all of the Fp components are bits. To do this, it will be
shown that if the Fp component of a daBit is not a bit, then the bucket check passes
only if all other daBits in the bucket are also not bits in Fp.
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If the protocol has not aborted, then in every bucket B, for every 2 ≤ j ≤ B, it holds
that
(8.4) b1 +b j −2 ·b1 ·b j = c j









and at least one b ji is generated by an honest party, this value is uniform and unknown
to the adversary when it chooses its inputs at the beginning.
Suppose b1 ∈Fp \{0,1}. If b1 = 2−1 ∈Fp then by Equation 8.4 we have b1 = c j; but c j
is a bit, so the “XOR” is not the same in both fields and the protocol will abort. Thus it
may be assumed that b1 6= 2−1 and so the equation above can be rewritten as
(8.5) b j = b
1 − c j
2 ·b1 −1 .
Now if b j is a bit then it satisfies b j(b j −1)= 0, and so
0=
(





b1 − c j
2 ·b1 −1 −1
)
=− (b
1 − c j)(b1 − (1− c j))
(2 ·b1 −1)2
so b1 = c j or b1 = 1− c j; thus b1 ∈ {0,1}, which is a contradiction. Thus if b1 is not a
bit then b j is not a bit for every other b j in this bucket. Moreover, for each j = 2, . . . ,B,
there are two distinct values b j ∈ Fp \ {0,1} solving Equation 8.5 corresponding to the
two possible values of c j ∈ {0,1}, which means that if the bucket check passes then the
adversary must also have guessed the bits {c j}Bj=1, which it can do with probability 2
−B
since they are constructed using at least one honest party’s input. Thus the chance of
cheating without detection in this way is at most 2−Bt ·C−Bt · (B`Bt)−1.
Thus it has been shown that the probability that b1 ∈ Fp \ {0,1} is given as output
for the Fp component is at most the probability that the adversary corrupts a multiple
of B daBits, that these daBits are placed in the same buckets, and that the adversary
correctly guesses c bits from honest parties (in the construction of the bits {b j} j∈B) so
that the appropriate equations hold in the corrupted buckets. Indeed, needing to guess
the bits ahead of time only reduces the adversary’s chance of winning from the same
probability in the F2k case.
It is therefore possible to conclude that the daBits are bits in both fields and are the
same in both fields with probability except with probability at most 2−σ.
Theorem 8.1. The protocol FRPrep
∥∥ΠdaBits UC-securely realizes FRPrep+ against an ac-
tive, static adversary corrupting up to n−1 out of n parties in the FRPrep, FCoinFlip-hybrid
model.
206
8.3. GENERATION OF DABITS
Proof. The simulator is given in Figure 8.8.
Simulator SPrep+
Initialize
1. Await the call to FRPrep with input (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]]p,0), initialize a local instance, and
then call FRPrep+ with input (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]]p,0).
2. Await the call to FRPrep with input (Initialize,Γ, [[ · ]]2
l
,1), initialize a local instance, and




All calls for producing preprocessing, other than what is described for the generation of daBits,




, should be forwarded to FRPrep+. All response messages
from FRPrep+ are relayed directly back to A.
daBit subroutine
daBits Call FRPrep+ with input (daBits, id1, . . . , id`,0,1).
1. Generate daBits Execute Generate daBits from FRPrep
∥∥ΠdaBits with A, sampling in-
puts for all honest parties.
2. Cut and Choose Execute Cut and Choose from FRPrep
∥∥ΠdaBits with A.
3. Combine Execute Combine from FRPrep
∥∥ΠdaBits with A.
4. Check Correctness Execute Check Correctness from FRPrep
∥∥ΠdaBits with A. If the pro-
tocol aborted, send Abort to FRPrep+, and otherwise send OK.
Figure 8.8: Simulator SPrep+ for FRPrep+.
The simulator merely relays information between A and FRPrep+ for the entire exe-
cution of the protocol outside of the procedure daBits, so the simulation here is perfect.
The simulator also honestly executes the oracle FCoinFlip, so this is also simulated per-
fectly.
Notice that the parties do not have inputs in the subroutine daBits in FRPrep+, so
there is no need for the simulator to extract any inputs from corrupt parties. It remains
to show the contribution to the transcripts produced in its execution are indistinguish-
able, namely that the protocol aborts in the hybrid world with the same distribution
as when the honest parties are emulated by the simulator, and that the outputs of all
corrupt parties combined with the outputs of honest parties are “consistent” – that is,
they correspond to a possible execution of FRPrep+ or of the protocol.
The correctness of the simulation holds by the fact that the simulator simply exe-
cutes the protocol as honest parties would, making random choices for honest parties
by sampling in the same way as in the protocol.
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If the adversary performs a selective-failure attack, then the environment may learn
information. A selective failure attack is where the environment can learn some infor-
mation if the protocol does not detect cheating behaviour. For example, if the environ-
ment guesses an entire bucket of bits (and thus guesses some daBit) and chooses the
adversary’s input so that the bucket check would pass based on these guesses, then if
the protocol does not abort, then the environment learns that its guesses were correct.
Moreover, in this case the simulator does not tell FRPrep+ to abort and so the environ-
ment receives the outputs of honest parties. Then if the final output bit for this daBit
is not the XOR of the honest parties’ final output shares for this daBit with the XOR of
the corrupt parties’ shares, then the execution must have happened in the ideal world
since in this world the output depends on the random tape of FRPrep+ and is indepen-
dent of the adversary’s and honest parties’ random tapes, contrasting the output in the
FRPrep,FCoinFlip-hybrid world in which the final output is an XOR of bits on these tapes
(which were guessed by the environment). Since this happens with probability 12 , in
expected 2 executions, the environment can distinguish. However, by Proposition 8.1,
the environment can only mount a selective failure attack by making such guesses with
success with probability at most 2−σ by the choice of parameters.
Thus the only way to distinguish between worlds is if the transcript leaks informa-
tion on the honest parties’ inputs. However, the only time data regarding the honest
parties’ inputs are revealed is in Check Correctness, in which XORs are computed
in both fields and the result is opened. This reveals no information on the final daBit
outputs as the linear dependence between the secret and the public values is broken
by discarding all secrets in each bucket except the designated (i.e. first) bit. Thus the
overall distributions of the two executions are statistically indistinguishable.
8.4 Switching and Modified Garbling
In this section, the switching procedures are explained in detail. The modified SPDZ-
BMR protocol ΠCABB is given in Figures 8.9, 8.10 and 8.11.
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Protocol ΠCABB
This protocol is realized in the FRPrep+-hybrid model. To save on notation, to say that the parties
compute [[z]] := [[x]] · [[y]] means that they compute a new identifier idz, call F pRPrep with input
(Multiply, idx, idy, idz, sidp), and store the output secret-sharing of a secret identified as idz
(and analogously for the F2l instance). Recall that ` := blog pc.
Initialize The parties call FRPrep+ with inputs (Initialize,Fp, sidp) and
(Initialize,F2k , sid2l ).
Arithmetic Circuit
Input For Pi to provide input x ∈ Fp, the parties compute a new identifier idx, Pi calls
FRPrep+ with input (Input, i, idx, x, sidp) and all other parties call FRPrep+ with input
(Input, i, idx,⊥, sidp).
Add To add secrets x and y, parties compute a new identifier idz and call FRPrep+ with input
(Add, idx, idy, idz, sidp) and then each Pi provides input [[x]]pPi and [[y]]
p
Pi .
Multiply To multiply secrets x and y, parties call FRPrep+ with input
(Multiply, idx, idy, idz, sidp) where idz is a new identifier.
Output To receive output x with identifier idx, parties do the following:
1. Call FRPrep+ with input (Verify, sidp).
2. Call FRPrep+ with input (Open,0, idx, sidp).
3. Call FRPrep+ with input (Verify, sidp).
Boolean Circuit (All of the following procedures are performed, in order.)
Initialize garbling To garble a Boolean circuit C with identifiers W for wires, GAND for AND
gates and GXOR for XOR gates, the parties do the following:
1. The parties compute new identifiers {idλw }w∈Wo and call FRPrep+ with input
(daBits, {idλw }w∈Wo , sidp, sid2l ) where Wo denotes the set indexing circuit output wires.
2. For each i ∈ [n], the parties compute a new identifier id∆i and call FRPrep+ with input
(RElt, id∆i , sid2l ) and then call FRPrep+ with input (Open, i, id∆i , sid2l ) to reveal ∆i to Pi.
Input layer Let the number of Fp inputs to the circuit be t. The parties do the following:
1. For k = 1 to t,
a) Compute new identifiers {idrk, j }
`−1
j=0 and call FRPrep+ with input
(daBits, {idrk, j }
`
j=0, sidp, sid2l ) to obtain {[[rk, j]]
p,2l }`j=0.
b) Compute a new identifier idrk and set [[rk]]
p :=∑`−1j=0 2 j · [[rk, j]]p.
c) Create the circuit ADDMOD(ak,bk, p) and prepend the circuit to C to be garbled, augment-
ing GAND and GXOR as appropriate. See Section 8.4.1 for details.
d) For every input wire w corresponding to an input ak, j of ADDMOD(ak,bk, p), compute a
new identifier idλwk, j and set [[λwk, j ]]
2l := [[0]]2l .
e) For every input wire w corresponding to an input bk, j of ADDMOD(ak,bk, p), compute a
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Protocol ΠCABB (continued)
new identifier idλwk, j and set [[λwk, j ]]
2l := [[rk, j]]2
l
.
2. For each input wire w ∈W, for each i ∈ [n],
a) Compute a new identifier idkiw,0 and call FRPrep+ with input (RElt, idkiw,0 , sid2l ).
b) Call FRPrep+ with input (Open, i, idkiw,0 , sid2l ) to reveal k
i
w,0 to Pi.
c) Pi sets kiw,1 := kiw,0 ⊕∆i and the parties set [[kiw,1]]2
l
:= [[kiw,0]]2
l ⊕ [[∆i]]2l .
Garble Refer to ΠBMRGarble in Figure 8.10.
Output layer For every wire w that is an (external, circuit) output wire, the parties do the fol-
lowing
1. Retrieve a daBit [[λw′ ]]
p,2l from memory, generated in Initialize, with identifier idλw′ .
2. Compute a new identifier idλw0 and set [[λw0 ]]
2l := [[λw]]2
l ⊕ [[λw′ ]]2
l
.
3. Call FRPrep+ with input (Open,0, idλw0 , sid2l ); all parties store this locally in memory as the
value Λw0 .
Open To open the circuit, the parties do the following:
1. For every g ∈GAND, for every j ∈ [n], for every (α,β) ∈ {0,1}2,
a) Call FRPrep+ with input (Open,0, id g̃ j
α,β
, sid2l ). If FRPrep+ sends the message Abort, then
call FRPrep+ with input (Broadcast,Abort, sidp), locally output ⊥, and halt; otherwise
continue.
2. Call FRPrep+ with input (Verify, sid2l ). If FRPrep+ sends the message Abort, then (locally)








j=1)g∈G and the input
mask identifiers idr1 , . . . , idr t and associated shares [[r1]]
p, . . . , [[r t]]p.
Evaluate Refer to ΠBMREvaluate in Figure 8.11.
Figure 8.9: Protocol for Garbling and Evaluating a Circuit, ΠCABB.
Subprotocol ΠBMRGarble
Garble Traversing the circuit in topological order, for every gate g ∈G with (internal) input wires
u and v and (internal) output wire w,
• If g is an XOR gate, i.e. g ∈GXOR,












• If g is an AND gate, i.e. g ∈GAND,




2. For each i ∈ [n],
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Subprotocol ΠBMRGarble (continued)
a) Compute a new identifier idkiw,0 and call FRPrep+ with input (RElt, idkiw,0 , sid2l ) to
obtain [[kiw,0]]
2l .
b) Call FRPrep+ with input (Open, i, idkiw,0 , sid2l ) to reveal k
i
w,0 to Pi.
c) Party Pi sets the one key as kiw,1 := kiw,0 ⊕∆i.
d) For all four distinct elements (α,β) ∈ {0,1}2, and for every j ∈ [n], the par-
ties compute a new indentifier idF g,i, j
α,β
, and then Pi calls FRPrep+ with in-
put
(





and the other parties with input(

























Figure 8.10: Subprotocol for Garbling a Circuit, ΠBMREvaluate.
Subprotocol ΠBMREvaluate








i=1)g∈G , idr1 , . . . , idr t and
[[r1]]p, . . . , [[r t]]p of ΠBMRGarble, evaluate in the following way, traversing the circuit in topologi-
cal order:
1. For each input {[[xk]]
p}k∈[t], the parties do the following:
a) Retrieve from memory the secret mask [[rk]]
p (locally) output in ΠBMRGarble.
b) Compute a new identifier idak and set [[ak]]
p := [[xk]]p − [[rk]]p.
c) Call FRPrep+ with input (Open,0, idak , sidp).
d) Denote the corresponding input wires by {wk, j}
blog pc−1
j=0 . Bit-decompose the public value
ak and let the bits be {ak, j}
blog pc−1
j=0 .
e) For each j = 0, . . . ,blog pc−1, set Λwk, j := ak, j ⊕0.
f) For each i ∈ [n], Pi sends {kiwk, j ,Λwk, j }
blog pc−1
j=0 to all other parties.
g) The parties call FRPrep+ with input (Verify, sidp).
2. For every g ∈G,
a) If g is an XOR gate,
i. Party Pi computes Λw :=Λu ⊕Λv.




b) If g is an AND gate,
i. Each party computes the n keys indexed by j ∈ [n] as












and compares its keys kiw,0 and k
i
w,1 to the i
th key obtained to determine the global
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Subprotocol ΠBMREvaluate (continued)
signal bit Λw.
3. For every external output wire w,
a) Retrieve from memory the corresponding public signal bit Λw0 produced in Output
layer.
b) Locally compute Λw′ :=Λw0 ⊕Λw.
c) Locally compute the secret output as
[[bw]]p :=Λw′ + [[λw′ ]]p −2 ·Λw′ · [[λw′ ]]p.
4. Send the message (Verify, sid2l ) to FRPrep+.
Figure 8.11: Subprotocol for Evaluating a Garbled Circuit, ΠBMREvaluate.
8.4.1 Conversion from LSSS to GC






j=0 , and FRPrep is called with input (Verify, sidp) either at this
point or later on, and then these public values are taken to be signal bits to the circuit.
To correct the offset r, the circuit simply takes in the F2k parts of the daBits of r as
input, and the circuit (x− r)+ r mod p is computed inside the garbled circuit.
In more detail, consider the following Boolean circuit




where the computation takes place over the integers and the inputs a and b are supplied
as a string of bits.
Let the input wires of ADDMOD(a,b, p) be (u j)
blog pc−1
j=0 for the bits of a, (v j)
blog pc−1
j=0 for the
bits of b, and the output wires be (w j)
blog pc−1





Then the circuit that the parties garble in ΠCABB is the circuit obtained by associating
wire w j with wire u′j for every j = 0 to blog pc−1. Now if a = x− r and b = r then clearly
(C ◦ADDMOD)(a,b, p)= C(x) where ◦ denotes the wiring association as above.
Optimization With some tweaking of the garbling protocol, it is possible to reduce
communication and computation costs further. Since x− r is a public value, there is no
need to have masks for the corresponding input wires, so they can be set to 0. Fur-
thermore, since r is independent of the online inputs, the bits used to construct r can
be hard-wired into the circuit, reducing preprocessing and online costs: if the masking
212
8.4. SWITCHING AND MODIFIED GARBLING
bits are set to be equal to the daBits used to construct r, i.e. {r j}
blog pc−1
j=0 , then when
computing the ciphertexts, for the input u corresponding to the bit r j, it holds that


















for β ∈ {0,1}. Thus there are only 2n ciphertexts instead of 4n, and consequently also
only 2n keys must be opened online instead of 4n. Note that in order to avoid cluttering
the description, in the protocol in Figure 8.9, all four ciphertexts are computed and
opened.
8.4.2 Conversion From GC to LSSS
The output of a multi-party garbled circuit is one or more keys and corresponding public
signal bits. In SPDZ-BMR, the output wire masks are revealed after garbling so that
all parties can learn the final outputs. A simple way of retaining shared output of the
circuit, as required in mixed protocols, is for the parties not to reveal the masks for
output wires after garbling and instead to compute the XOR of the secret-shared mask
with the public signal bit, in MPC. In other words, for output wire w they obtain a






However, the output must be in Fp. If the circuit output wires are daBits, then the
parties can (locally) compute a sharing of each output bit as
[[b]]p :=Λw + [[λw]]p −2 ·Λw · [[λw]]p.
If such modifications to the garbling protocol are not possible, then the following
approach gives a cheap conversion procedure. One can define an additional layer to the
circuit after the output layer which converts output wires with masks only in F2l to
output wires with masks as daBits, without changing the real values on the wire. To do
this, parties do the following: for every output wire w,
1. In the garbling stage,
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c) Call FRPrep+ with input (Open,0, idλw0 , sid) an call this Λw0 = 0⊕λw0 .
2. In the evaluation stage, upon obtaining Λw,
a) Compute Λw′ :=Λw ⊕Λw0 .
b) Compute the final (Fp-secret-shared) output as [[b]]p := Λw′ + [[λw′]]p − 2 ·Λw′ ·
[[λw′]]
p.
Observe that Λw0 ≡λw0 so this procedure is just adding a layer of XOR gates where the
masking bits are daBits and the other input wire is always 0 (so the gate evaluation
doesn’t change the real wire value), as shown in Figure 8.12. This was the labelled
“Mask Conversion” layer in Figure 8.2. Note that since the signal bits for XOR gates are
determined from input signal bits and not the output key, there is no need to generate







Figure 8.12: Circuit Output Wires.
For correctness, observe that:
Λw′ ⊕λw′ = (Λw ⊕Λw0)⊕ (λw ⊕λw0)
= ((b⊕λw)⊕ (0⊕λw0))⊕ (λw ⊕λw0)
= b.
8.4.3 Security
Correctness of the actual garbling was outlined in Section 8.2. The proof of Theorem 8.2
follows from the security of SPDZ-BMR [LSS16] and [KY18], and the fact that the addi-
tional input and output procedures perfectly hide the actual circuit inputs and outputs.
Theorem 8.2. The protocol ΠCABB UC-securely realizes the functionality FCABB against
a static, active adversary in the FRPrep+-hybrid model.
Proof (Sketch). Security essentially follows immediately from the security of the gar-
bling protocol, the fact that FPrep can be used to realize FABB UC-securely via the pro-
tocol ΠOnline (which means that FRPrep can also be used to realize it also using ΠOnline
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since it is merely an extension of FPrep), and the fact that the only communication in
the switching procedure involves revealing inputs masked by random values in Fp. A
sketch of the proof is now given highlighting these key points.
The only secrets to which the simulator is not privy are the secret inputs of honest
parties. Everything else in the protocol involves calls to FRPrep+ which is locally emu-
lated by the simulator. Moreover, preprocessing is not output by FCABB, which means
that any preprocessing generated to perform the garbling or circuit evaluation can be
emulated perfectly by the simulator.
Suppose there are h honest parties in total, and that they are indexed by [h] ⊆ [n],
and let Hybrid i be defined as follows:
Hybrid i The FRPrep+-hybrid world in which the simulator is handed the inputs of all
honest parties P j ∈P \A where j ≤ i.
The simulator is given in Figure 8.13.
Simulator SCABB
Initialize Initialize a local copy of FRPrep+ and await the inputs (Initialize,Fp, sidp) and
(Initialize,F2k , sid2l ) from A.
Arithmetic Circuit
Calls to FRPrep+ with sid = sidp have the same format as corresponding calls in FCABB, so the
simulator just relays these calls. For any calls to preprocessing, the simulator executes a local copy
of FRPrep+ and emulates honest parties honestly.
Boolean Circuit (All of the following procedures are performed, in order.)
Initialize garbling Run Initialize from ΠCABB with A.
Input layer Run Input layer from ΠCABB with A.
Garble Run ΠBMRGarble with A.
Output layer Run Output layer from ΠCABB with A.
Open Run Open from ΠCABB with A.
Evaluate Call FCABB with input (EvaluateCircuit,C, idx1 , . . . , idxt , id , sidp) and then do the
following:
1. For each k = 1 to t do the following:
a) Retrieve the masks [[rk]]
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Simulator SCABB (continued)
b) Compute a new identifier idak and set [[ak]]
p := [[xk]]p − [[rk]]p.
c) Await the call to FRPrep+ with input (Open,0, idak , sidp) from A and execute it honestly
to obtain some ak ∈Fp.
d) (This step requires no simulation.)
e) (This step requires no simulation.)
f) Await the calls to FRPrep+ with input (Open,0, idkwk, j ,ak, j , sid2l )
`−1
j=0 from A, where wk, j is
the wire for the jth input bit ak, j of ak, and execute the procedure honestly.
g) Await the call to FRPrep+ with input (Verify, sidp) and execute it honestly, aborting if
(emulated) honest parties would.
2. Execute the circuit evaluation honestly on behalf of (emulated) honest parties, aborting if
they would abort. to FCABB. If an honest party would have aborted then the simulator
sends Abort to FCABB.
3. Execute the output layer procedures honestly on behalf of (emulated) honest parties.
4. Await the call to FRPrep+ with input (Verify, sid2l ). If at any point an (emulated) honest
party aborted, send the message Abort to FCABB, and otherwise send the message OK.
Figure 8.13: Simulator SCABB for FCABB.
The world Hybrid h is exactly the ideal world in which the simulator receives the
inputs of no honest parties. The world Hybrid 0 is exactly the FRPrep+-hybrid world and
is simulated perfectly since the simulator just executes the protocol on behalf of honest
parties. No extraction of inputs is required since the ideal calls of A to FRPrep+ contain
all necessary information to pass on messages to FCABB so that the functionality will
provide the same outputs to real honest parties.
Claim 8.1. Hybrid i is indistinguishable from Hybrid i+1 for i = 0, . . . ,h−1.
Proof. For the emulation of FRPrep+ with sid = sidp and for the garbling the simulation
is perfect since honest parties’ inputs are not required.
The ability of the simulator to equivocate outputs in the simulation SABB of the pro-
tocol ΠOnline that realizes FABB in the FPrep-hybrid world implies the simulator here
can do the same when FCABB provides output and the adversary calls FRPrep+ to obtain
outputs of secrets. The upshot of this is that the values on which the garbled circuit is
evaluated in the protocol do not matter, since circuit evaluation does not leak informa-
tion about the inputs (as proved in [LPSY15]), and FCABB only outputs elements of Fp,
so whatever is given as output from FCABB can be used to replace the simulated output:
it only matters that the protocol aborts with the same distribution as in a real execution,
which it does because the simulator emulates the behaviour of honest parties.
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However, there is one point in the protocol in which the transcript is dependent on
the real inputs of honest parties (which are unknown to the simulator), which is when
secrets in Fp are opened after being masked with daBits. However, since the secret
masks [[r]]p are constructed from uniformly-sampled bits, by Lemma 8.1 the distribution
of the uniformly sample r′ ← U (Fp) is statistically close to the distribution of a− r
mod p where a is the input of an honest party and r ← U ({0,1}blog pc). 
Since there are a polynomial number of hybrid worlds that are statistically indis-
tinguishable, Hybrid 0 and Hybrid h are also statistically indistinguishable – that is,
the FRPrep+-hybrid world is indistinguishable from the ideal world.
8.5 Realizing the Protocol
When implementing the daBit generation, there are various caveats and possible opti-
mizations to the protocol described, a few of which are outlined in this section.
Choice of prime It is necessary that p be close to a power of 2 so that x− r is (sta-
tistically) indistinguishable from a uniform element of the field, as discussed in Sec-
tion 8.2. If SPDZ is used to perform the MPC, a technique known as packing is used
to amortize the costs; this technique requires that p be congruent to 1 mod N where
N = 215 = 32768. This means that the prime is always different from a power of two
by at least 15 bits since the l-bit prime must be of the form 2l−1 + k ·215 +1 for some k
where 1≤ k ≤ 2l−16−1, so the secret masks r constructed from a sequence of bits “miss”
at least this much of the field.
Cut and choose optimization Parties only need to input bits (instead of full field
field elements) into FRPrep during FRPrep
∥∥ΠdaBits, which means that for the instance of
FRPrep over F2l , only authenticated “bit” masks need to be generated for the input phase:
for FRPrep over F2l , full field element masks are generally constructed by generating a
set of l authenticated bits. This trick cannot be applied to the instance of FRPrep over
Fp.
Share conversion To reduce the amount of garbling when converting an additive
share to a GC one, if the Fp inputs to the garbled circuit are assumed to be bounded
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by p/2σ, then a uniform r in Fp is 2σ times larger than x so x − r is statistically-
indistinguishable from a uniform element of Fp; consequently, one need only garble
(x− r)+ r and not (x− r)+ r mod p, which makes the circuit marginally smaller
8.6 Application: Computation of a Multi-Class SVM
The application and implementation as described here was completed by the coauthor of
this work. It is included for the sake of completeness.
A (multi-class) Linear Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a method for classifying
images using machine learning. It involves deciding on a set of classes and computing a
matrix A and a vector b from a large dataset generated by some well-defined method in
such a way that when a new input “feature vector”, x, is provided as input, the index of
the largest component of the vector A ·x+b determines the class. The key computation
is therefore the function
ARGMAX (A ·x+b) ,
that is, computing the index of the first component of the vector A ·x+b attaining the
maximum value in the vector (i.e. ‖A ·x+b‖∞), for a given vector x.
Computing an SVM can be done in MPC. The application for this is that an orga-
nization or company that trains the model (i.e. computes A and b) on a large private
dataset may want to allow clients to query the model on their own private input (i.e. x).
In this case, the MPC computation is that of computing
ARGMAX
(
[[A]] · [[x]]+ [[b]]) ,
where [[A]] and [[b]] are input by the company with the private dataset, and [[x]] by the
client that wishes to classify their image.
The efficiency of the switching protocols (called “circuit marbling”) described in this
chapter, using daBits, was tested for an SVM. This particular circuit was chosen because
it is clear that it uses a combination of arithmetic computation, namely [[A]] · [[x]]+ [[b]],
and bit-wise operations, namely ARGMAX, which are better suited to LSSS-based and
GC-based MPC, respectively. In the experiments, the online phase of an SVM with 100
classes and 128 features was benchmarked by simulating a WAN with a round-trip
ping time of 100ms and 50Mb/s bandwidth with two parties. Concretely, this means
that x ∈F128p , A ∈F102×128p and b ∈F102p . This is the same SVM structure used by Makri
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et al. [MRSV19] to classify the Caltech-101 dataset [LAR03] which contains 102 dif-
ferent categories of images such as aeroplanes, dolphins, helicopters, and others. The
particular SVM has bounded inputs so that x can be viewed as a vector x ∈ (Z/225Z)128,
a field size p where log p = 128 and statistical security σ= 64.
The results are given in Tables 8.2 and 8.3, where “Marbled SPDZ” refers to the
protocols as described in this chapter. The costs are given in terms of data items (i.e.
triples, bits, and AND gates) as the concrete costs depend on the implementation of
MPC and GC that is used. Timings were computed using [Kel19].
The online phase using Marbled-SPDZ is one order of magnitude faster than both
SPDZ-BMR and SPDZ. The price paid for this efficiency in the online phase is that
approximately 2.6 times the number of triples are required when compared to SPDZ;
however, Marbled-SPDZ requires significantly fewer garbled AND gates, essentially be-




Fp triples Fp bits AND gates
SPDZ n/a 19015 9797 n/a
SPDZ-BMR n/a n/a n/a 14088217
SPDZ 0 13056 n/a
Marbled-SPDZ daBit convert 63546 0 27030
SPDZ-BMR n/a n/a 8383
Table 8.2: Two-party linear SVM: single-threaded (non-amortized) preprocessing phase
costs with σ= 64.
It is clear that by relegating computation to the preprocessing phase by generating
daBits, there is considerable speed-up in the online phase. Thus in situations in which
preprocessing is outsourced, daBits are a useful form of data. However, the total amount
of preprocessing required is significantly more than for plain SPDZ.
In conclusion, the method presented here for generating daBits is very costly and
there may be situations in which parties can generate them with authentication without
treating the garbling and secret-sharing in a “completely” black-box way. Despite this,




Comm. rounds Time (ms) Total (ms)
SPDZ n/a 54 2661 2661
SPDZ-BMR n/a 0 2786 2786
SPDZ 1 133
272Marbled-SPDZ daBit convert 2 137
SPDZ-BMR 0 2




After a little over 30 years, multi-party computation (MPC) is finally starting to become
practical, and is deployed in real-world applications. Nonetheless, there is still a lot to
be done. This chapter lists a few of the areas of research that would follow well from the
topics covered in this thesis.
Asynchronous MPC The protocols in this work have assumed synchronous com-
muncation, in which every party receives all messages in a given round before sending
any messages for the next round. In asynchronous protocols, the adversary is permitted
to delay messages, which models real-world communication over wide-area networks
(WANs) such as the Internet much more closely.
It would be interesting to investigate how the error-detection properties of a Q2
access structure could be used to develop asynchronous protocols. For example, if the
parties were under a Q3 access structure, then when opening secrets in each round of
communication they could wait until they received enough shares to reconstruct and
then continue, but meanwhile wait to receive enough shares to perform error-detection,
and then abort if they detect that a party is sending erroneous shares.
Examining Share-Reconstructability It turned out that share-reconstructability
of a monotone span program was a useful property not only for error-detection, but also
for randomness extraction. It would be interesting to see if this property is related to
any other properties of secret-sharing schemes in the literature.
In a similar vein, it would be interesting to know for which complete monotone non-
redundant Q2 access structures there exists a partition indexed by [n], as required by
the protocol in Chapter 6. Considerable effort went into finding Example 6.2.
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Generalizing Outsourcing The outsourcing protocol only explored outsourcing to a
set of parties using the same “type” of authentication. It would be interesting to de-
velop a methodology for mixing the different types. Indeed, recently, Smart and Tan-
guy [ST19] showed how to use resharing techniques to outsource preprocessing from a
Q2 access structure to a full-threshold access structure, giving “Triples-as-a-Service”.
It would be informative to implement and compare these techniques with the “naïve”
methods for generating preprocessing (i.e. without outsourcing).
Better daBit Generation The method involving cut and choose for generating daBits
in Chapter 8 is not very efficient, requiring several Beaver triples to check correctness
of a single daBit. One of the reasons for this is that, prior to this thesis, it was not pos-
sible to talk about the explicit shares of secrets when using MPC (namely, when using
FPrep to realize FABB or to execute the SPDZ-BMR protocol) since secrets were always
assumed to be stored in an “authenticated dictionary” to which parties only had black-
box access, as was discussed in Section 4.1. Now that there is a methodology for FPrep
involving shares explicitly, there is no need to use secrets in a completely black-box way,
and consequently there may be more efficient ways to generate daBits. Improving the
cost to generate daBits to the extent that the overall cost of preprocessing and online
time was less than the same time for executing either SPDZ or a multi-party garbling
protocol would be a major breakthrough.
To complement the support vector machine example, it would also be interesting
to find a good application for evaluating a garbled circuit first and then linear secret-
sharing scheme (LSSS)-based MPC.
Mixing Homomorphic Encryption and MPC The protocol in Chapter 8 allowed
conversion between the two of the main pillars of computing on private data – LSSS and
garbled circuits (GCs). However, there remains one further expansive area of research
in this field in the form of homomorphic encryption. Mixed protocols involving these
three techniques may lead to some interesting results, as indeed has been shown by
Henecka et al. in the case of two parties with passive security [HKS+10].
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